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Celebrity in Cyberspace: A Personality
Rights Paradigm for Personal Domain
Name Disputes
Jacqueline D. Lipton*

Abstract
When the Oscar-winningactress Julia Robertsfoughtfor control of the
<juliaroberts.com>domain name, what was her aim? Didshe want to reap
economic benefitsfrom the name? Probablynot, as she has not used the name
since it was transferredto her. Ordid she want to prevent othersfrom using it
on eitheran unjust enrichment or aprivacy basis? Was she, infact,protecting
a trademark interest in her name? Personal domain name disputes,
particularlythose in the <name.com> space, implicate unique aspects of an
individual's persona in cyberspace. Nevertheless, most of the legal rules
developedfor these disputes are basedon trademarklaw. Although a number
of individuals have successfully used these rules in practice, the focus on
trademarklaw has led to inconsistentand often arbitraryresults. This Article
suggests that ifpersonalnames merit legalprotection in cyberspace, it should
be under an appropriate set of legal rules, rather than through further
expansionof trademarks. This Article develops a newframeworkforpersonal
domain name disputes based on the theoriesunderlying the right ofpublicity
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tort. Unlike trademark law, this tort is aimed at the protection of individual
names and likenesses. It has not been utilized much in cyberspace largely
becauseof time, cost, andjurisdictionaldisadvantagesoflitigationas opposed
to the quicker and cheaper, but trademark-based,Uniform Domain Name
DisputeResolution Policy (UDRP). This Article suggests the creationofa new
PersonalDomainName Dispute ResolutionPolicy (PDRP)that combines the
proceduraladvantages of the UDRP with the theory underlying the right of
publicity tort.
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I. Introduction
When Julia Roberts, the popular Oscar-winning actress, brought
proceedings for control of the domain name <juliaroberts.com>,'just what was
her beef? Was she concerned that the registrant of the domain name would be
unjustly enriched by its use? Or was she rather concerned about unauthorized
content that might appear on the associated website? Or both? She was
successful in her complaint against Russell Boyd,2 the registrant, in an
arbitration under the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy
(UDRP).3 But what, theoretically, was the justification for her success? The
justification is actually found in trademark law.4 The UDRP was implemented
to protect trademark holders against the activities ofbad faith cybersquatters 5those who register domain names speculatively to profit from selling the names
to "rightful" trademark owners.6

1. Roberts v. Boyd, WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center Case No. D2000-0210,
2000 WL 33674395 (May 29, 2000) (Page & Bridgeman, Arbs.), available at http://www.
wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-02 I 0.html.
2. See id. § 6 (finding that complainant had common law trademark rights in her name).
3. The UDRP is a private dispute resolution procedure for domain name disputes that is
administered by the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN). See
generally ICANN, UNIFORM DOMAIN NAME DISPUTE RESOLUTION POLICY (1999), availableat
http://www.icann.org/en/udrp/udrp-policy-24oct99.htm [hereinafter UDRP].
4. See Roberts, 2000 WL 33674395, § 6 ("[T]he name 'Julia Roberts' has sufficient
secondary association with Complainant that common law trademark rights do exist under
United States trademark law."). The UDRP is premised on protection of trademark interests, so
individuals bringing actions with respect to personal names under the UDRP must establish
trademark rights in those names in order to bring a successful complaint. See P. Landon
Moreland and Colby Springer, Celebrity Domain Names: ICANN Arbitration Pitfalls and
PragmaticAdvice, 17 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH L.J. 385, 389 (2001) ("The first
potential pitfall in obtaining a favorable judgment under the UDRP is a celebrity's failure to
establish recognized trademark rights in his or her personal or professional name.").
5. 2 ANNE GILsON LALONDE, GILSON ON TRADEMARKS § 7A.06 (2008) ("Cybersquatters
register trademarks in Internet domain names with no intention of developing a viable web site
but instead to hold the name for resale to either the trademark owner or a third party.").
6. For a discussion of this practice, see Jacqueline Lipton, Beyond Cybersquatting:
Taking Domain Name Disputes PastTrademarkPolicy,40 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1361, 136977 (2005).
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The UDRP is a global online dispute resolution procedure, 7 incorporated
into domain name registration agreements by reference! Domain name
registrants are contractually bound to submit to an online arbitration if a third9
party complains about their registration or use of the domain name.
Complaints are premised on the complainant's assertion of trademark rights
corresponding with the relevant domain name.' 0 The advantages of the UDRP
over litigation are that it is inexpensive and fast compared to litigation," and its
reach is effectively global because relevant parties are bound to it by contract,

7. Notably, disputes involve domain names in the <.com>, <.net>, and <.org> domain
spaces as well as some others. For a discussion of these disputes, see the introductory notes to
the UDRP, available at http://www.icann.org/en/udrp/udrp-policy-24oct99.htn. The full text of

the UDRP is also available at this website.
8. UDRP,supra note 3, 1. The UDRP is structured as follows:
This Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the "Policy") has been
adopted by the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers ("ICANN"),
is incorporated by reference into your Registration Agreement, and sets forth the
terms and conditions in connection with a dispute between you and any party other
than us (the registrar) over the registration and use of an Internet domain name
registered by you.
Id.

9. Id.
10. See id. 4(a) (outlining the structure of a domain name complaint). The UDRP states
that:
You are required to submit to a mandatory administrative proceeding in the event
that a third party (a "complainant") asserts to the applicable Provider, in compliance
with the Rules of Procedure, that: (i) your domain name is identical or confusingly
similar to a trademark or service mark in which the complainant has rights; and

(ii) you have no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and
(iii) your domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.
Id. (emphasis added).
11. See Lipton, supra note 6, at 1372 (noting that the UDRP is a private, international,
and relatively inexpensive option allowing complainants to resolve disputes over domain
names). Lipton further notes:
The UDRP does not oust the jurisdiction of national courts.... [The] dispute is
managed by arbitrators licensed by one of the organizations charged with hearing
disputes under the UDRP. It involves the receipt of a complaint and a response by
the registrant. The arbitrator or panel then provides a decision and resolution based
on this material. There are generally no in-person hearings. The only orders that
can be made under the UDRP are orders for cancellation of a disputed name or for
transfer of a domain name to the complainant.
Id; see also Jessica Litman, The DNS Wars: Trademarks and the Internet Domain Name
System, 4 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 149, 155 (2000) (noting the often prohibitive cost of

trademark infringement and dilution litigation in early domain name disputes); Moreland &
Springer, supranote 4, at 386 ("Prior to the establishment of ICANN Arbitration, recovery of
celebrity domain names was an expensive and potentially lengthy process.").
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wherever they may physically reside. Thus, it has been the avenue of choice for
most domain name complainants.
The problem is that not all disputed domain names correspond with
trademarks. Personal names, for example, may or may not be trademarked,
depending on the circumstances. UDRP arbitrators often have little guidance
as to whether a particular name really operates as a trademark, despite regularly
being required to make such determinations. This has led to inconsistent and
arbitrary results in practice. Why, for example, should Julia Roberts 12 and Tom
Cruise 13 be regarded as having trademarks in their personal names when the
same is not true for Bruce Springsteen14 or the late Anna Nicole Smith? 15 Why
12. See Roberts v. Boyd, WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center Case No. D2000-02 10,
2000 WL 33674395, § 6 (May 29, 2000) (Page & Bridgeman, Arbs.), available at
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2OO0/ d2000-02 10.html (finding that Julia
Roberts had a common law trademark in her name).
13. See Cruise v. Alta. Hot Rods, WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center Case No.
D2006-0560, 2006 WL 4002761, § 6A (July 5,2006) (Abbott, Abel & Sorkin, Arbs.), available
at http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/ decisions/html/2006/d2006-0560.html (finding that
Tom Cruise had trademark and service mark rights in his name).
14. See Springsteen v. Burgar, WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center Case No. D20001532, 2001 WL 1705212, § 6 (Jan. 25, 2001) (Harris & Froomkin, Arbs.), available at
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-1532.html (discussing the
difference between celebrities whose names have acquired a distinctive secondary meaning and
those that have not). The arbitrators noted:
It appears to be an established principle from cases such as Jeanette Winterson,
Julia Roberts, and Sade that in the case of very well known celebrities, their names
can acquire a distinctive secondary meaning giving rise to rights equating to
unregistered trade marks, notwithstanding the non-registerability ofthe name itself.
It should be noted that no evidence has been given of the name "Bruce Springsteen"
having acquired a secondary meaning; in other words a recognition that the name
should be associated with activities beyond the primary activities of Mr.
Springsteen as a composer, performer and recorder of popular music. In the view
of this Panel, it is by no means clear from the UDRP that it was intended to protect
proper names of this nature.
Id.
15. See Smith v. DNS Research Inc., National Arbitration Forum Claim No.
FA0312000220007, 2004 WL 2358216 (Feb. 21, 2004) (Davis, Arb.), availableathttp://www.
adrforum.com/domains/decisions/220007.htm (finding that the evidence submitted by Anna
Nicole Smith was not sufficient to establish common law trademark rights in her name). The
Panel stated:
[I]t is unlikely that the evidence submitted here by Complainant of her career, in
and of itself, is sufficient to establish common law trademark rights in the name,
which is a requirement for Complainant to prevail on this aspect of the case. While
the UDRP does not require a registeredtrademark for protection of a trademark
from a confusingly identical domain name, the mere fact of having a successful
career as an actress, singer or TV program star does not provide exclusive rights to
the use of a name under the trademark laws. The cases require a clear showing of
high commercial value and significant recognition of the name as solely that of the
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should Senator Hillary Clinton's name be recognized as a trademark 16 when the
17
same is not true for other politicians such as Kathleen Kennedy Townsend?
The reliance on the UDRP to resolve personal domain name disputes raises two
related issues. The first is that the UDRP inadvertently encourages the
expansion of trademark law into questionable areas-for example, situations
where an individual's name is not operating as a source indicator for products
or services (i.e., as a trademark or service mark). The second issue is that
reliance on trademark-focused regulations for personal domain name disputes
appears in practice to have stalled the development of legal rules more
appropriately tailored for these disputes.
This Article suggests that these problems could be addressed by creating a
new Personal Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (PDRP). This new
procedure could retain the time, cost, and jurisdictional benefits of the UDRP,
but be based on a theoretical model more focused on protecting individual
personas than trademark law. The obvious set of legal rules that protects
individual names and likenesses against unauthorized commercial use is the
right of publicity--or "personality rights"-tort.18 Marrying the substance of
the right of publicity tort with the procedural benefits of the UDRP is suggested
performer. The Humphrey Bogart case cited by the Complainant is a prime
example of the type of case that would be expected to prevail, since virtually no one
familiar with the movie industry would fail to recognize his name as that of a
famous movie star. The Panel does not believe Complainant's name has yet
reached that level of fame.
Id.
16. See Clinton v. Dinoia, National Arbitration Forum Claim No. FA0502000414641,
2005 WL 853535 (Mar. 18, 2005) (Atkinson, Arb.), available at http://www.adrforum.
com/domains/decisions/414641 .htm (finding that Senator Clinton had an unregistered trademark
rright in her personal name in connection with both her political activities and her career as an
author of a number of books sold in commerce).
17. See Townsend v. Birt, WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center Case No. D20020030, 2002 WL 827005, § 7 (Apr. 11, 2002) (Donahey, Davis & Sellers, Arbs.), availableat
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/htmU12002/d2002-0030.html (finding that an
individual politician in a state gubernatorial race did not hold trademark rights in her personal
name).
18. 1 GILSON LALONDE, supra note 5, § 2.16[1] (2008) ("The right of publicity... is the
right of an individual to control the commercial use of his or her name, likeness, signature, or
other personal characteristics."). The United States is the only country that has created a
specific right of publicity tort. Other jurisdictions may protect similar rights in other ways. See,
e.g., Trade Practices Act, 1974, § 52 (Austl.) (prohibiting misleading and deceptive conduct in
commerce). In the United Kingdom, privacy laws have been utilized to create a right similar to
the right of publicity in practice. See, e.g., Douglas & Others v. Hello! Ltd., (2001) Q.B. 967
(U.K.) (discussing compensation for unauthorized publication ofphotographs of the wedding of
Michael Douglas and Catherine Zeta-Jones on a privacy basis despite the absence of a right of
publicity in the United Kingdom).
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in this Article as a possible way forward. It would remove the focus from
trademark law, thereby avoiding undesirable extensions of trademark law into
areas where personal names are not truly functioning as trademarks. It would
also facilitate the development of a new jurisprudence focused on identifying
and enforcing emerging social norms in relation to the protection of personal
names online, whilst balancing these norms against the need to avoid chilling
speech in cyberspace. Initially, a new PDRP should ideally be limited in
operation to <name.com> versions of an individual's name, as opposed to, say
<name.net>, <name.org>, or <namesucks.com>. This is because the
<name.com> version of an individual's name is likely the most closely
associated with the individual's "authorized" online persona.' 9 In other words,
it is the domain name that most closely approximates an individual's persona in
20
the domain space.
One might argue that developing a PDRP along these lines is unnecessary
because: (a) it would overpropertize personal names online and hence chill free
speech; (b) domain name regulation is irrelevant because sophisticated search
19. Certainly most of the high-profile personal domain name disputes involve
<name.com> domain names. See generally Borg v. Garcia, WIPO Arbitration and Mediation
Center Case No. D2007-0591, 2007 WL 2155427 (June 21, 2007) (O'Farrell, Arb.), available
at http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/htm/2007/d2007-059 1.html (resolving the
dispute over the domain name bjornborg.com); Cruise v. Alta. Hot Rods, WIPO Arbitration and
Mediation Center Case No. D2006-0560, 2006 WL 4002761 (July 5, 2006) (Abbott, Abel &
Sorkin, Arbs.), availableat http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2006/ d20060560.html (resolving the dispute over the domain name tomcruise.com); Clinton v. Dinoia,
National Arbitration Forum Claim No. FA0502000414641, 2005 WL 853535 (Mar. 18,2005)
(Atkinson, Arb.), available at http://www.adrforum.com/domains/decisions/414641.htm
(resolving the dispute over the domain name hillaryclinton.com); Smith v. DNS Research Inc.,
National Arbitration Forum Claim No. FA0312000220007, 2004 WL 2358216 (Feb. 21, 2004)
(Davis, Arb.), availableat http://www.adrforum.com/domains/decisions/220007.htm (resolving
the dispute over the domain name annanicolesmith.com); Spacey v. Alta. Hot Rods, National
Arbitration Forum Claim No. FA0205000114437, 2002 WL 1832705 (Aug. 1, 2002)
(Meyerson, Buchele & Harris, Arbs.), available at http://www.adrforum.comdomains/decisions/i 14437.htm (resolving the dispute over the domain name kevinspacey.com);
Springsteen v. Burgar, WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center Case No. D2000-1532, 2001
WL 1705212 (Jan. 25, 2001) (Harris & Froomkin, Arbs.), available at
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-1532.html (resolving the
dispute over the domain name brucespringsteen.com); Roberts v. Boyd, WIPO Arbitration and
Mediation Center Case No. D2000-0210, 2000 WL 33674395 (May 29, 2000) (Page &
Bridgeman, Arbs.), available at http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/
2000/d2000-02 10.html (resolving the dispute over the domain name juliaroberts.com).
20. Some might argue that this was the intent of the <.name> domain space. However,
that particular domain space has not grown in practice in this way, and most personal domain
name disputes revolve around <.com> versions of an individual complainant's name. See
arbitrations cited supra note 19 and accompanying text (describing a few such <.com>
disputes).
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engines have taken the place of intuitive domain names as an Internet searching
tool; 21 and (c) personality rights jurisprudence is not an appropriate substantive
fit for personal domain name disputes. The first and second concerns may be
rebutted, and the third may be qualified. With respect to the overpropertization
concern, the suggested PDRP in fact does little more in practice than is
currently done by the UDRP with respect to propertizing personal names.
However, it does so in a more consistent and appropriate manner-by
developing a jurisprudence that is specific to interests in individual personas as
opposed to trademarks. It therefore removes from the trademark arena those
disputes that are not really about trademarks, while facilitating the development
of a more nuanced personality-rights based jurisprudence.22 Further, the
limitation of the PDRP, at least initially, to <name.com> domains should limit
its impact on free speech.
While it is unquestionable that sophisticated search engine technology has
a significant role to play in locating information online, the fact that personal
domain name disputes are still routinely arbitrated suggests that their control
remains an important issue in cyberspace. 23 There are a variety of reasons for
this. Even sophisticated search engines use algorithms that prioritize domain
names in search results. 24 Additionally, domain names have an important
referentialfunction. In other words, if I want to recommend a given website to
a friend or colleague, I will likely refer to it by its domain name, and not by the
21. See Eric Goldman, DeregulatingRelevancy in Internet TrademarkLaw, 54 EMORY
L.J. 507, 548 (2005) (suggesting that increasing sophistication of search engines will portend
the death of Internet domain names as search tools).
22. Trademark law has come under attack in recent years for becoming too expansive in
scope, particularly in relation to the use of trademarks online. Removing the need to assert
trademarks in personal names to prevent some inappropriate uses of those names in the domain
space would avoid unnecessary reliance on expanding the boundaries of trademark law in the
personal domain name context. For a discussion of questionable expansions of trademark law in
the Internet context, see generally Graeme Dinwoodie & Mark Janis, Confusion over Use:
Contextualism in Trademark Law, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1597 (2007) [hereinafter Dinwoodie &
Janis, Confusion over Use]; Graeme Dinwoodie & Mark Janis, Lessonsfrom the Trademark Use
Debate, 92 IOWA L. REv. 1703 (2007) [hereinafter Dinwoodie & Janis, Lessons]; Stacey Dogan
& Mark Lemley, GroundingTrademarkLaw Through TrademarkUse, 92 IOWA L. REv. 1669
(2007); Goldman, supra note 21, at 553; Gregory Lastowka, Google's Law, 73 BROOKLYN L.
REv. 1327 (2008); Mark Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense,
108 YALE L.J. 1687, 1701-03 (1999).
23. See arbitrations cited supra note 19 and accompanying text (listing just a few personal
domain name disputes).
24. See topranker.in, Domain Name Importance for Search Engine Optimization,
http://www.topranker.in/important-seo tipsfordomainname.htm (last visited Oct. 5, 2008)
("Search engines give top priority for the keyword occurring in domain name in Search Engine
Result Pages (SERP).") (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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search steps I took to find it. An intuitive domain name is therefore still
extremely important even in the age of sophisticated search engine technology.
With respect to concerns about basing a PDRP on American personality
rights jurisprudence because of its somewhat controversial history and practical
application, some comment should be made here. While the right of publicity
tort has been criticized for lack of a clear theoretical basis or focus, 25 it is the
only obvious model of a legal remedy based intimately on protecting various
aspects of an individual's persona that may be important in the domain space.
Other countries' laws might protect some aspects of individual privacy,2 6 or
unfair competition related to unauthorized use of an individual's persona.2 7
However, the American right of publicity tort is the only area of law that
attempts to draw together the various disparate threads of protecting an
individual persona.2 8
Some have argued that the right of publicity should be more like
trademark law,2 9 thus arguably removing the impetus to treat personal names
differently from trademarks in the domain space. However, even if personality
rights jurisprudence ultimately comes to be more like trademark law, it still will
not be trademark law. It will develop in a way that focuses on the protection of
personas rather than marks. This will likely result in at least some deviations
from trademark law. Thus, a PDRP based on even a trademark-like personality
rights jurisprudence would be preferable to the current incoherent application
of trademark jurisprudence to personal domain name disputes. In any event, if
all this Article does is alert readers to the possibility of different practical and
theoretical models for balancing competing interests in personal names in the
domain space, it will have made a useful contribution to the debate on Internet
governance.
25.

See, e.g., Alice Haemmerli, Whose Who? The Casefora KantianRight of Publicity,

49 DUKE L.J. 383, 389 (1999) ("The timing is propitious for an overhaul of the right of
publicity. Existing doctrine remains in a state of disarray that leaves room for wrongs without
remedies, despite its characterization as a field of 'settled' law, with a 'self-evident'
philosophical basis.").
26. See, e.g., Council Directive 95/46, Protection of Individuals with regard to the
Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31
(EC).
27. See, e.g., Trade Practices Act, 1974, § 52 (Austl).
28. Of course, some would say that is precisely what is wrong with it-it tries to cover too
much under the same umbrella. See, e.g., Stacey Dogan & Mark Lemley, What the Right of
Publicity Can Learnfrom TrademarkLaw, 58 STAN. L. REv. 1161, 1162 (2006) (arguing that
the right of publicity has no clear theoretical foundation, making it difficult for courts to place
limits on the right).
29. See id. at 1220 ("The best justifications for a right of publicity are trademark-based
justifications .... ).
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To this end, Part II categorizes different classes of personal domain name
disputes. It focuses respectively on disputes involving celebrities, politicians
and public figures, and private individuals. It also identifies the limitations of
trademark-based rules in these disputes. Part III identifies ways in which
personality rights jurisprudence is a better, or at least more "honest" substantive
fit for these disputes, albeit with inherent practical and theoretical limitations.
Part IV presents a framework for a new PDRP that draws on the substance of
the personality rights tort, while maintaining the procedural and cost benefits of
the UDRP. Part V presents conclusions about ways in which a new PDRP
would facilitate the evolution of a personality rights based jurisprudence in
cyberspace, while removing disputes that are not really about trademarks from
the reach of trademark law.
1. PersonalDomain Name Disputes and TrademarkLaw
A. CategorizingPersonalDomain Name Disputes
Different classes of individuals have differing concerns about the use of
their names in cyberspace. From past judicial and arbitral decisions, it seems
that the major classes of disputes involving personal domain names can be
divided into three categories respectively involving: (a) celebrities' names,
(b) politicians' and public figures' names, and (c) private individuals' names.
These categories, perhaps unsurprisingly, match the categories of persona
protected historically by the right of publicity tort. The tort focuses on rights in
personas and has developed rules, admittedly somewhat disharmonized, 30 that
at least begin to cater to the different needs of these different classes of people,
and to balance those needs against competing societal interests in free speech.
The right of publicity is not perfect, 3' but could be used, with some tweaking,
30. See GRAEME DINWOODIE & MARK JANIS, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION:
LAW AND POLICY 813 (2004) ("Most states have recognized either statutory or common law
rights of publicity. In the remaining jurisdictions, right of publicity claims have not been
asserted in recent reported decisions.... ."); 1 GiLSON LALONDE, supranote 5,§ 2.16[1] ("The
publicity right is still developing and the courts are far from unanimous in defining its scope.");
Haemmerli, supra note 25, at 389 ("Existing practice [under the right of publicity] is...
confused, with fifty state regimes protecting differing aspects of identity, for varied terms, and
with disparate remedies.").
31. It is equally arguable that some other body of law from another jurisdiction, such as
privacy rights jurisprudence from Europe, or "misleading and deceptive conduct"jurisprudence
in Australia, could be used as the substantive basis for a PDRP. The American law is chosen
here because it appears to deal the most directly with the kinds of disputes that are arising in the
<name.com> space. This may be because much of the celebrity industry is based in the United
States, notably California, and many of these disputes involve celebrity names.
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as the basis for an efficient online arbitration mechanism for personal domain
name disputes.
1. Celebrities'Names
The most prominent category of disputes involving personal names in the
domain space revolves around celebrities' names-the names of people who
are famous for their commercial activities in fields such as music,32 television, 3
movies, 34 and sports.35 These people probably have the most commercially
valuable personal names in the sense that they trade to a large extent on their
names and likenesses for their livelihood.36 However, this kind of trading on a
personal name does not automatically mean that the name functions as a
trademark. Trademarks are defined in the Lanham Act to include "any word,
32. See, e.g., Springsteen v. Burgar, WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center Case No.
D2000-1532, 2001 WL 1705212, § 6 (Jan. 25,2001) (Harris & Froomkin, Arbs.), availableat
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-1532.html (resolving the
dispute over the domain name brucespringsteen.com); Ciccone v. Parisi, WIPO Arbitration and
Mediation Center Case No. D2000-0847, 2000 WL 33727232 (Oct. 12, 2000) (Partridge,
Dabney & Sorkin, Arbs.), available at http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/
html/2000/d2000-0847.html (resolving the dispute over the domain name Madonna.com);
Experience Hendrix L.L.C. v. Hammerton, WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center Case No.
D2000-0364, 2000 WL 33939203, § 7 (Aug. 2, 2000) (Jenkins, Arb.), available at
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0364.html (resolving the
dispute over the domain name jimihendrix.com), af'd,Aug. 15, 2000.
33. See, e.g., Smith v. DNS Research Inc., National Arbitration Forum Claim No.
FA0312000220007, 2004 WL 2358216 (Feb. 21, 2004) (Davis, Arb.), available at
http://www.adrforum.com/domains/decisions/220007.htm (resolving the dispute over the
domain name annanicolesmith.com).
34. See, e.g., Cruise v. Alta. Hot Rods, WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center Case No.
D2006-0560, 2006 WL 4002761 (July 5, 2006) (Abbott, Abel & Sorkin, Arbs.), availableat
http://www. wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2006/d2006-0560,html (resolving the
dispute over the domain name tomcruise.com); Spacey v. Alta. Hot Rods, National Arbitration
Forum Claim No. FA0205000114437, 2002 WL 1832705 (Aug. 1,2002) (Meyerson, Buchele
& Harris, Arbs.), available at http://www.adrforum.com/domains/ decisions/1 14437.htm
(resolving the dispute over the domain name kevinspacey.com); Roberts v. Boyd, WIPO
Arbitration and Mediation Center Case No. D2000-0210, 2000 WL 33674395 (May 29, 2000)
(Page & Bridgeman, Arbs.), available at http://www.wipo.int/amc/ en/domains/decisions/
html/2000/d2000-021 0.html (resolving the dispute over the domain name juliaroberts.com).
35. See, e.g., Borg v. Garcia, WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center Case No. D20070591, 2007 WL 2155427, §7 (June 21, 2007) (O'Farrell, Arb.), available at
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2007/d2007-0591.html (resolving the
dispute over the domain name bjornborg.com).
36. However, there is some dispute about the extent to which they trade on those names in
a "trademark sense." For a general critique of this point in the domain name context, see
Anthony Verna, www. whatsina.name, 14 SETON HALLJ. SPORTS & ENT. L. 153 (2004).
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name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof... used by a person...
to identify and distinguish his or her goods... from those manufactured or sold
by others and to indicate the source of the goods.... ""
A celebrity will not theoretically have a trademark or service mark in her
name simply by virtue of being famous.38 There must be products or services
associated with her name, and her name must be used to distinguish her
products or services from those sold by others. 39 Nevertheless, celebrities have
generally relied on the trademark-focused UDRP to bring complaints about
unauthorized uses of their names in the domain space.'a This is largely because
the UDRP is the simplest and most cost-effective procedural avenue for them, 4'
37. 15U.S.C.§ 1127(2006). "Service marks" are similarly defined in the same section as
follows:
The term "service mark" means any word, name, symbol, or device, or any
combination thereof--(1) used by a person, or (2) which a person has a bona fide
intention to use in commerce and applies to register on the principal register
established by this chapter, to identify and distinguish the services of one person,
including a unique service, from the services of others and to indicate the source of
the services, even if that source is unknown. Titles, character names, and other
distinctive features of radio or television programs may be registered as service
marks notwithstanding that they, or the programs, may advertise the goods of the
sponsor.
Id.
38. See, e.g., Chung, Mong Koo v. Individual, WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center
Case No. D2005-1068, 2005 WL 3841676, § 6 (Dec. 21, 2005) (Brown, Arb.), available at
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2005/d2005-1068.html (resolving the
dispute over the domain name chungmongku.com). The UDRP noted:
[A] complainant may show that his or her personal name has taken on such a cachet
that it has become a trademark, but that to succeed in doing so the complainant will
have to show that the name has actually been used in trade or commerce. It will
instantly be seen that this is a considerable hurdle to vault and that the reason why
some cases have failed to establish trademark rights in a personal name is that the
evidence has shown only that the name is famous and not that it has been used in
trade or commerce.
Id.

39. See id. § 6 ("The name in question should be actually used in trade or commerce to
establish unregistered trademark rights. Merely having a famous name (such as a
businessman, or religious leader) is not necessarily sufficient to show unregistered trademark
rights.").
40.

See Sarah Sheffield, Comment, "Celebritysquatting": The Ubiquity of Celebrity

Cultureand the Unique Problem It Presentsfor Domain Name Ownership, 15 VILL. SPORTS
&ENT. L.J. 409, 421 (2008) ("As the law currently stands [related to domain name disputes],
celebrities overwhelmingly prefer mediation to litigation, although mediation produces
mixed results for celebrities seeking a domain name.").
41. Costs of judicial proceedings can be prohibitive for private individuals. See Litman,
supra note 11, at 155 (noting the often prohibitive cost of trademark infringement and dilution
litigation in early domain name disputes); Moreland & Springer, supra note 4, at 386 ("Prior to
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even though it was never intended that the UDRP would inadvertently create a
situation where personal names are recognized as trademarks in an expansive
and unprincipled way. While many UDRP arbitrators have accepted trademark
claims in personal names, 42 others have not.43 It is difficult to ascertain a
principled distinction between the different approaches.
While it is possible that a "Julia Roberts movie" might be regarded as a
product involving a "Julia Roberts" trademark, this seems unlikely. Audiences
may go to see a movie because Julia Roberts stars in it, or they may associate a
certain quality of performance with Ms. Roberts, but they are unlikely to regard
Ms. Roberts as the source of the movie in a trademark sense. The movie studio
that produced the film is more likely to be regarded as the source of the movie.
It is possible that Ms. Roberts's name is a trademark or service mark when she
offers her performance services to movie producers and movie studios.
However, this does not seem to be the basis on which UDRP arbitrators

the establishment of ICANN Arbitration, recovery of celebrity domain names was an
expensive and potentially lengthy process.").
42. See Cruise v. Alta. Hot Rods, WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center Case No.
D2006-0560, 2006 WL 4002761, § 7 (July 5, 2006) (Abbott, Abel & Sorkin, Arbs.), available
at http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2006/d2006-0560.html (finding that
Tom Cruise had trademark and service mark rights in his name); Spacey v. Alta. Hot Rods,
National Arbitration Forum Claim No. FA0205000114437,2002 WL 1832705 (Aug. 1,2002)
(Meyerson, Buchele & Harris, Arbs.), available at http://www.adrforum.com/domainsl
decisions/l 14437.htm (finding that Kevin Spacey had sufficient proprietary rights in his name);
Roberts v. Boyd, WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center Case No. D2000-0210, 2000 WL
33674395, § 6 (May 29, 2000) (Page & Bridgeman, Arbs.), available at
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0210.html (finding that Julia
Roberts had a common law trademark in her name).
43. See, e.g., Smith v. DNS Research Inc., National Arbitration Forum Claim No.
FA0312000220007, 2004 WL 2358216 (Feb. 21, 2004) (Davis, Arb.), available at
http://www.adrforum.com/domains/decisions/220007.htm (finding that Anna Nicole Smith did
not have an unregistered trademark in her name); Hebrew Univ. of Jerusalem v. Alta. Hot Rods,
WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center Case No. D2002-0616,2002 WL 31495974, § 7 (Oct.
7, 2002) (Limbury, Ophir & Donahey, Arbs.), available at http://www.
wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2002/d2002-0616.htm (finding that the Hebrew
University of Jerusalem did not have an unregistered trademark in the name "Albert Einstein");
Springsteen v. Burgar, WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center Case No. D2000-1532, 2001
WL 1705212, § 6 (Jan. 25, 2001) (Harris & Froomkin, Arbs.), available at
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-1532.html (finding that Bruce
Springsteen did not have an unregistered trademark in his name); Sumner v. Urvan, WIPO
Arbitration and Mediation Center Case No. D2000-0596, 2000 WL 33939204, 6.5 (July 24,
2000) (Christie, Arb.), available at http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/
html/2000/d2000-0596.html ("In the opinion of this Administrative Panel, it is doubtful whether
the Uniform Policy is applicable to this dispute. Although it is accepted that the Complainant is
world famous under the name STING, it does not follow that he has rights in STING as a
trademark or service mark.").
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decided that she had trademark rights in her name. 44 There was very little
discussion of the point in the Roberts arbitration, other than the arbitrators
acknowledging that a mark does not have to be registered to attract the
protection of the UDRP. 4' There is a suggestion in the Roberts arbitration, and
in other UDRP decisions involving personal names, that the name of an author
of a creative work, such as the author of a book, may be regarded as a
trademark.4 6 However, even if this test for trademark status is correct, an actor
in a film is not the film's author.47 Under this analysis, it would be more likely
that the writer or director of the film was its author-and therefore it would be
48
more sensible to regard their names as trademarks in the context of the film.
Celebrities may have valid reasons for asserting some control over their
personal names in the domain space, particularly in the <name.com> space
which is probably viewed by most Internet users as the likely site for a
celebrity's authorized online presence. Celebrities may want to control this
domain for their own commercial motives-which seems reasonable,
particularly if this is in line with current Internet usage norms. For example,
44. See Roberts v. Boyd, WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center Case No. D2000-02 10,
2000 WL 33674395, § 6 (May 29, 2000) (Page & Bridgeman, Arbs.), available at
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html2000/ d2000-0210.html ("[T]he name
'Julia Roberts' has sufficient secondary association with Complainant that common law
trademark rights do exist under United States trademark law.").
45. See id. (noting that other decisions have cited English law as justification for the
proposition that "common law trademark rights exist in an author's name"). The Panel further
noted that "[t]he Policy does not require that the Complainant should have rights in a registered
trademark or service mark. It is sufficient that the Complainant should satisfy the
Administrative Panel that she has rights in common law trademark or sufficient rights to ground
an action for passing off." Id.
46. See id. ("A recent decision citing English law found that common law trademark
rights exist in an author's name."); see also Clinton v. Dinoia, National Arbitration Forum
Claim No. FA0502000414641, 2005 WL 853535, § 7 (Mar. 18, 2005) (Atkinson, Arb.),
available at http://www.adrforum.com/domains/decisions/414641.htm (finding that Senator
Clinton did have an unregistered trademark right in her name in connection with both her
political activities and her career as an author of a number of books sold in commerce).
47. Vema, supra note 36, at 162-63. Vema argues:
If an author has trademark rights in his or her name, then it must come from the
rather singular nature of a novel. Yes, there are editors in the writing process,
however, editors do relatively little work compared to the author. A movie, on the
other hand, has many other people involved in the process .... Looking at the
credits of any major motion picture, there are writers, assistant directors, and people
who need to operate the microphone and the camera. There may be more than one
scriptwriter. The actors and actresses are just a small part of the motion picture.
Id.

48. Some people would disagree even with this analysis because of the collective, creative
nature of a motion picture. See supra note 47 and accompanying text (noting the singular nature
of a novel and the collaborative nature of a motion picture).
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Tyra Banks's management company, Bankable Inc., appears to have registered
the domain name <tyrabanks.com> precisely for this purpose.4 9 It is an official
website authorized and operated by Ms. Banks, including details about her and
her career.50 Another example is <parishilton.com>, which appears to be an
authorized website for Paris Hilton, including details of her proposed public
appearances and her recently released album. 51
Celebrities may also want to control relevant domain names to prevent
unjust enrichment. In other words, celebrities who may not necessarily want to
make commercial profits themselves from using a domain name may
nevertheless wish to prevent others from profiting from their name online. If
we are at least initially limiting the scope of a PDRP to <name.com> domain
names, this seems reasonable. It seems sensible to allow a presumption that
celebrities' rights in the <name.com> version of their name extend to
preventing others from using the name to make an unauthorized commercial
profit from Internet users who are actually seeking the authorized website ofthe
relevant celebrity. 52 This would likely be the result in applying the right of
publicity to a <name.com> case where the registrant
was making an
53
unauthorized commercial use of the domain name.
49. See Whols-Search.com, http://www.whois-search.com/whois/tyrabanks.com (last
visited Oct. 5, 2008) (showing that the company Bankable Inc. has registered the domain name
<tyrabanks.com> through March 20, 2013) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
50. See generallyTyraBanks.com, www.tyrabanks.com (last visited Oct. 5,2008) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
51. See generally ParisHilton.com, www.parishilton.com (last visited Oct. 5, 2008) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Other examples of apparently official websites
run by a famous notable personality are www.donaldtrump.com and www.trump.com for
Donald Trump.
52. At least this would be the inference drawn from a parallel to applications of trademark
principles in the domain space where a presumption seems to have arisen that <trademarkcom>
versions of domain names rightfully belong to the trademark holder. See Jacqueline Lipton,
Commerce Versus Commentary: GripeSites, Parodyandthe FirstAmendment in Cyberspace,
84 WASH. U. L. REv. 1327, 1359-60 (2006) ("Here, the arbitrator seems to be suggesting a
presumption that the use of a .com gTLD [generic top level domain] corresponding to a
trademark will be in bad faith .... ).
53. In fact, a right of publicity action may well support such an action in relation to some
other iterations of the name in the domain space, such as <name.net> and <name.org>.
However, these actions are seldom taken in current practice because of the costs and
jurisdictional issues involved in litigation, as contrasted with a UDRP arbitration. See infra Part
III.B.1 (discussing why most disputes involving personal domain names have been brought
under the faster and less expensive UDRP). This Article suggests initially restricting the
operation of a PDRP based on the right of publicity to <name.com> names largely as a trial run
to see how arbitrators reflect emerging social norms in decisions respecting the <name.com>
space. If there was a later perceived need to expand or otherwise alter the scope of the PDRP,
this could be achieved later in light of developments in <name.com> cases.
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Alternatively, a celebrity might want to control a <name.com> domain
name to avoid any authorized web content about her. In other words, some
celebrities may wish to control <name.com> versions of their names to
telegraph to the public that they have not authorized any web content. Thus,
Internet users will find nothing relating to the celebrity under the <name.com>
name, and they will be aware that any web content they find under other
iterations of the celebrity's name is likely to be unauthorized content. In some
ways, this analogizes to a kind of privacy protection allowing the celebrity to
communicate to the public her desire not to exploit her own image online, and
perhaps implicitly request privacy considerations from others. An example of
this is found in the Julia Roberts UDRP arbitration. After successfully
obtaining a transfer of the <juliaroberts.com> domain name, Ms. Roberts has
not utilized the name for an official website. This result does not necessarily
chill speech about celebrities online. Many other domain names are available
for fans and critics who want to communicate about their idols. Search engines
will also help Internet users find unauthorized content about individuals posted
under less intuitive domain names.
The interests identified above in both commercial control of<name.com>
names and in privacy protections of a celebrity persona match the emphases of
the right of publicity tort much more than does trademark law. The right of
publicity tort has been explained variously on the basis of economic property
rights in an individual's name or likeness, 54 a need to prevent free riding or
54. Various justifications have been put forward for a property basis for personality rights,
and have equally been criticized over the years. See Dogan & Lemley, supra note 28, 1181-83
(critiquing Lockean labor theory justifications for personality rights as property); Mark
McKenna, The Right of Publicity andAutonomous Self-Definition, 67 U. PiTr. L. REv. 225,
247, 251-67 (2005) (noting that courts avoid important questions by labeling identity as
property and criticizing Lockean labor theory justifications for property rights in personal
identity). McKenna also notes the following:
It might be true that identity is sufficiently similar to other objects the law regards
as property and therefore deserves at least some of the sticks in the traditional
bundle of property rights. But far too few courts and commentators have offered a
theory as to why any of the traditional property justifications lead to that
conclusion.
Id.; see also Haemmerli, supra note 25, at 388 ("Both proponents and critics of the right of
publicity generally perceive it as a property claim grounded in Lockean labor theory."); id.at
407-08 (noting dual property and privacyjustifications for right of publicity actions); id at 412
("To the extent that commentators specifically address publicity rights, they tend to do so within
this property context, and to use Lockean labor theories ofproperty to explain the assertion of a
property right in identity or persona."); Roberta Kwall, Fame, 73 IND. U. 1, 15 (1997) (arguing
"that a property-based conception for publicity rights is the natural outgrowth of our cultural
norms as well as our theoretical conceptions of property"); Eileen Rielly, Note, The Right of
Publicityfor PoliticalFigures: Martin Luther King, Jr., Center for Social Change, Inc. v.
American Heritage Products, 46 U. PITr.L. REv. 1161, 1165-69 (1985) (describing
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unjust enrichment, 5" and the need to protect a person's privacy from
unauthorized commercial interference. 6 Personality rights jurisprudence has
also dealt extensively with issues of balancing the public's interest in free
speech about a celebrity with the celebrity's interest in controlling her public
persona.57 Although these are difficult issues that have not been definitively
resolved even within the right of publicity, this body of law has at least started
to address these concerns and develop responses to them. Trademark law, on
development of a property rights rationale for the right of publicity); Diane Zimmerman &
Melissa Jacoby, Foreclosingon Fame: Exploring the UnchartedBoundariesof the Right Of
Publicity, 77 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1322, 1367 (2002) (concluding that the commodification of
personas will not adversely affect the debtor-creditor relationship). See generally David
Westfall & David Landau, PublicityRights as PropertyRights, 23 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J.
71 (2005) (examining the property basis for rights of publicity).
55. See Dogan & Lemley, supra note 28, at 1181-83 (critiquing unjust enrichment as a
theory of publicity rights); Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular
Culture and PublicityRights, 81 CAL. L. REv. 127, 196-205 (1993) (same); McKenna, supra
note 54, at 247-48 (same). See generally Sarah Konsky, PublicityDilution: A Proposalfor
Protecting Publicity Rights, 21 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 347 (2005)
(recognizing unjust enrichment along with Lockean theory and several other theoretical
justifications as explanations for the right of publicity).
56. See Dogan & Lemley, supra note 28, at 1208-10 (critiquing privacy-based
justifications for the right of publicity); Haemmerli, supra note 25, at 407-08 (describing
theoretical muddle between property and privacy theory underlying rights of publicity claims);
Madow, supra note 55, at 167-68 (discussing the privacy rights basis of some early publicity
rights cases); McKenna, supra note 54, at 285 ("Since all individuals share the interest in
autonomous self-definition, every individual should be able to control uses of her identity that
interfere with her ability to define her own public character."); id. at 286 ("'Compelling a person
to express a message herself presents a particular sort of threat to her freedom of belief: It
threatens her ability to control what she tells the world about who she is and what she holds
important... . "' (quoting Gregory Klass, The Very Idea of a FirstAmendment Right Against
CompelledSubsidization, 38 U.C. DAvIs L. REv. 1087, 1116 (2005))); Rielly, supranote 54, at
1164-65 (describing the privacy foundations of the right of publicity).
57. See Peter Felcher & Edward Rubin, Privacy, Publicity, and the Portrayalof Real
People by the Media, 88 YALE L.J. 1577, 1590 (1979) ("The First Amendment inevitably
defines the operation and extent of the right of publicity; once the defendant can establish that
the expression in question is protected, he will almost invariably prevail."); Haemmerli, supra
note 25, at 441-58 (analyzing First Amendment issues that arise with respect to the right of
publicity); Kwall, supra note 54, at 46-47 ("We do not deprive the owners of famous
trademarks or the copyright owners of popular works... their rights just because the public has
played some role in placing a value on these works.... [C]ritics must justify why the cachet of
a person's fame should be treated differently."); Madow, supra note 55, at 140 (describing the
role of the consumer as an active and creative participant in the creation of cultural
commodities); Rielly, supra note 54, at 1172-74 (balancing First Amendment concerns with the
publicity rights of public figures and politicians). See generally Roberta Kwall, The Right of
Publicity vs. the FirstAmendment: A Property and Liability Rule Analysis, 70 IND. L.J. 47
(1994) (suggesting a property versus liability rule basis for balancing First Amendment concerns
against right of publicity claims); Diane Zimmerman, Who Put the Right in the Right of
Publicity?, 9 DEPAuL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. & POL'Y 35 (1998).
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the other hand, even the trademark laws focused on preventing cybersquatting,
are not geared towards such balancing of interests. They are aimed
predominantly at protecting valuable trademarks against unauthorized
commercial uses. 58 Where trademark cases have dealt with free speech, the
inquiry has focused on balancing the integrity of commercial source indicators
against First Amendment concerns,5 9 rather than on balancing the integrity of
individual personas against the First Amendment. Personality rights
jurisprudence has developed responses to questions about balancing First
Amendment concerns against rights in individual personas. 60 Thus, the
personality rights tort is better suited to personal domain name disputes than
trademark law in most cases.
2. Politicians'and PublicFigures'Names
Politicians and other public figures may also have concerns about the use
of their personal names in domain names. These concerns may differ in some
ways from those of celebrities, and may be valid to the extent that they do not
unduly interfere with freedom of expression in the political process. 6' Again,
58. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (2006) (establishing infringement of a registered
trademark by the creation of consumer confusion as to source of goods or services); id.
§ 1125(a) (demarcating infringement of an unregistered mark); id. § 1125(c) (delineating
trademark dilution through tarnishment or blurring); id. § 1125(d) (addressing cybersquatting in
relation to domain names corresponding with trademarks). But see id. § 1129(1) (providing for
the protection of personal names against cyberpiracy without requiring the plaintiff to establish
a trademark in her personal name to succeed on a claim under the provision). Note that these
examples are outside the UDRP.
59. See Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 900-01 (9th Cir. 2002)
(balancing expressive interests of popular singers in using the "Barbie" trademark in their
"Barbie Girl" song). It is worth noting that some cases have dealt with the balance of free
speech against trademark claims and right of publicity claims in the alternative. See generally
Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989) (dealing with the use of Ginger Rogers's
personal name in a movie title for a movie about two cabaret performers who imitated Ginger
Rogers and Fred Astaire).
60. See supra note 57 and accompanying text (citing to a number of such responses).
61. See N.Y. Magazine v. Metro. Transit Auth., 987 F. Supp. 254,265 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)
(balancing Mayor Rudolph Giuliani's rights of privacy and publicity against First Amendment
interests), affd in part,vacatedin part, 136 F.3d 123 (2d Cir. 1998); Rielly, supra note 54, at
1172-74 (describing need to balance First Amendment interests in political debate against the
publicity rights of politicians and public figures); see also Wilson v. Brown, 73 N.Y.S.2d 587,
590 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1947) (refusing to grant an injunction that would restrict the defendants from
using plaintiff's name on a dance card). In Wilson, the court stated:
One who takes an office, whether it is in government or in outside organizations,
must be deemed to have agreed to any reasonable public use of, or reference to, his
name .... Persons who accept high positions ought not to be so tender about the
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trademark law is not a good fit for balancing competing interests in such names.
Even if some famous celebrities, such as authors,62 have trademarks in their
names, politicians are less likely to hold such trademarks.63 Most politicians do
not use their names as source indicators as trademark law requires. 64 Rather,
they use their names to raise public awareness about particular issues 65 and, in
the case of politicians, often in the context of a political campaign. These
names often have a temporal quality that is particularly significant to the
democratic process. If, for example, electors are voting on a particular issue, a
given domain name might be extremely valuable in the lead-up to an election
and much less valuable thereafter6-both in the hands of the person whose
name it is and in the hands of others.
mention of their names; they must bear "the white light that beats upon a throne."
If they want peace and privacy they should stay out of public life; if they object to
having their names legitimately mentioned they need only to resign and they will
quickly subside into happy obscurity.
Id.
62. Of course, where a politician is also an author, she may assert trademark rights in her
name under this analysis. See, e.g., Clinton v. Dinoia, National Arbitration Forum Claim No.
FA0502000414641, 2005 WL 853535 (Mar. 18, 2005) (Atkinson, Arb.), available at
http://www.adrforum.com/domains/decisions/414641.htm (finding that Senator Clinton had an
unregistered trademark right in her personal name in connection with both her political activities
and her career as an author of a number of books sold in commerce).

63.

Jacqueline Lipton, Who Owns "Hillary.com"? Political Speech and the First

Amendment in Cyberspace,49 B.C. L. REV. 55, 58 (2008) ("Many politicians' names may not
even attain a common law trademark status if used in a purely political, as opposed to
commercial, context."); SECOND WIPO INTERNET DOMAIN NAME PROCESS, WORLD
INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., THE RECOGNITION OF RIGHTS AND THE USE OF NAMES IN THE

INTERNET DOMAIN NAME SYSTEM 1 188 (2001), available at http://www.
wipo.int/amc/en/processesprocess2/report/html/report.html [hereinafter WIPO REPORT] ("[T]he
names of political figures, religious leaders, scientists and historical persons may never have
been used in commerce and, thus, are unlikely to have trademarks associated with them.").
However, some politicians have been regarded as having commercial trademark rights in their
personal names in relation to certain commercial activities. See, e.g., Clinton v. Dinoia,
National Arbitration Forum Claim No. FA0502000414641, 2005 WL 853535 (Mar. 18, 2005)
(Atkinson, Arb.), available at http://www.adrforum.com/domains/decisions/414641.htm
(finding that Senator Clinton had an unregistered trademark right in her personal name in
connection with both her political activities and her career as an author of a number of books
sold in commerce).
64. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006) (including in the definitions of both "trademark" and
"service mark" the requirement that such marks indicate their source).
65. That is not to say that celebrities do not also get involved in public interest issues-it
is just more typical of politicians in their day to day activities.
66. There can also obviously be temporal aspects to a celebrity's fame. However, the
temporal issues can be more pronounced and more important in the lead-up to an election where
election day is effectively the deadline for a politician to get her message across to the
electorate. The temporal issues in politics are also much more significant to the operation of a
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The kind of balancing exercise needed to protect a politician's interests in
her personal identity against the need of the public to engage in discourse about
her will be different from balancing speech and commerce under trademark
law. The First Amendment is likely to be more seriously implicated in the
political context than in the commercial context.67 This is yet another area in
which personality rights jurisprudence may be helpful because of its developed
focus on protecting different classes of individuals against improper use of their
personas. The right of publicity has already developed rules for protecting
politicians and public figures against certain unauthorized intrusions,68 while at
the same time promoting society's interests in free speech where these interests
should override a public figure's desire not to have her name or likeness used in
a certain way. 69
representative democracy than temporal issues relating to a celebrity's fame which are likely to
have more to do with the creation and waning of public interest in cultural commodities at any
given point in time.
67. See N.Y. Magazine v. Metro. Transit Auth., 987 F. Supp. 254,262 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)
(discussing the continuum of protections available under the First Amendment for political
versus commercial speech about politicians in the right of publicity context), affd in part,
vacated inpart, 136 F.3d 123 (2d Cir. 1998).
68. See Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 459-60 (6th Cir. 2003) (discussing
publicity rights of Rosa Parks in the context of a song title using her name in relation to a hip
hop recording that had nothing in particular to do with her or her work); N.Y Magazine,987 F.
Supp. at 268 (discussing then New York City Mayor Rudolph Giuliani's public image in
relation to an advertising campaign on city buses), aff'd in part,vacated in part, 136 F.3d 123
(2d Cir. 1998); Martin Luther King Jr., Ctr. for Soc. Change Inc. v. Am. Heritage Prods., Inc.,
694 F.2d 674, 683 (11 th Cir. 1993) (granting an injunction to prevent the defendant from selling
plastic busts of Dr. King).
69. See N.Y Magazine, 987 F. Supp. at 266 ("[A]s a highly visible public figure
Giuliani's interest in his privacy is very limited. One who chooses to be the Mayor of the 'Big
Apple' must expect that he will be the subject of all kinds of public comments, even in
advertisements."). Of course publicity rights jurisprudence is not perfect in the political context.
It is disharmonized common law that has not yet had an international reach. See DINWOODIE &
JANIS, supra note 30, at 813 ("Most states have recognized either statutory or common law
rights of publicity. In the remaining jurisdictions, right of publicity claims have not been
asserted in recent reported decisions .... ."); 1 GasoN LALONDE, supra note 5, § 2.16[ 1] ("The
publicity right is still developing and the courts are far from unanimous in defining its scope.");
Haemmerli, supra note 25, at 389 ("Existing practice [under the right of publicity] is...
confused, with fifty state regimes protecting differing aspects of identity, for varied terms, and
with disparate remedies."); see also WIPO REPORT, supra note 63, 173 (discussing the
diversity of interests). The Report provides:
Because of the diversity of interests affected by the treatment of personal names,
the legal principles and policies that can be deployed to protect personal names are
similarly diverse and vary, as might be expected, from country to country. These
legal principles and policies include the right to publicity or the right to control the
commercial use of one's identity, recognized in many States of the United States of
America; the tort of unfair competition; the tort of passing-off (conceptually
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Politicians and public figures will naturally have some concerns about
unauthorized uses of<name.com> domains that mirror those of celebrities. An
obvious example is cybersquatting. A cybersquatter may well register either a
celebrity's name or a politician's name in the hopes of making a commercial
profit from its transfer. There may be situations in which cybersquatting is
more serious for a politician than a celebrity in terms ofpractical consequences
of failing to secure control of a given name. For example, in the lead-up to an
election, a politician will likely have a strong desire to control a domain name
relating to her personal name, particularly the <name.com> version, as the
Internet has become a very important tool
for communicating with the
70
electorate and also for political fundraising.
Like celebrities, politicians and public figures will also have concerns
about situations where a domain name registrant is not cybersquatting on a
given name, but rather wants to use the name herself for some expressive or
commercial purpose. Where the purpose is purely commercial, the right of
publicity would presumably proscribe the conduct on the basis that the tort
prohibits unauthorized commercial exploitations of a person's name or
likeness. 7' Where the purpose is expressive, more difficult First Amendment
concerns will arise.
An opposing party or candidate may be highly motivated to register a
politician's name as a domain name in order to criticize the politician on the
treated, in many cases, as part of the law of unfair competition), recognized
generally in common-law countries; and the right to privacy.
Id Nevertheless, publicity rights jurisprudence is the most developed attempt at creating
workable interests in individual personas, and balancing those interests against the rights ofthe
public to engage in discourse about famous people.
70. Most politicians now run websites where supporters can donate funds to their
campaigns. See HillaryClinton.com, http://www.hillaryclinton.com (last visited Oct. 5, 2008)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Barack Obama and Joe Biden: The Change
We Need, http://www.barackobama.com/index.php (last visited Oct. 5, 2008) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review). Senator Obama's website has a rather sophisticated
fundraising project where individuals can set up accounts and set fundraising goals that they
plan to achieve to support the senator's campaign. Id.Little has been written about the impact
of the Internet on political fundraising to date. For a survey of Howard Dean's use of the
Internet in his run for the 2004 presidential ticket, see Abigail B. Brown, Politics,Innovation,
and the Internet: A Source of Howard Dean's FundraisingSuccess? (Sept. 6, 2007)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfln?abstract-id=1012481. On domain name use in politics
more generally, see Matthew Coleman, Domain Name Piracy and Privacy: Do Federal
Election Regulations Offer a Solution?, 19 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 235 (2000).
71. See 1 GiLsoN LALONDE, supra note 5,§ 2.16[1] ("The right ofpublicity ...is the right
of an individual to control the commercial use of his or her name, likeness, signature, or other
personal characteristics.").
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associated website. Because of the importance of free speech in the political
process, these uses of a <name.com> domain name raise important competing
aspects of the need for the electorate to communicate effectively about
politicians. On the one hand, if all political speech is to be protected,
regardless of content or forum, then anyone should arguably be entitled to
register and use such a name for any expressive purpose. On the other hand, if
there is a social norm that <name.com> domains will resolve to websites
authorized by relevant politicians, it could be misleading to allow even purely
expressive unauthorized messages about a politician under those domain
names. Internet users could be misled in these cases as to the identity of the
speaker, and it could make it more difficult for Internet users to find authorized
messages by the politicians in question.
There are two recent examples of this conduct in Montana. One involves
Bob Keenan, a Republican candidate who ran for the United States Senate.
The domain name <bobkeenan.com> has been registered by the Montana
Democratic Party and hosts a website critical of Keenan's past policies and
practices.72 The second example involves a Democratic candidate for Montana
Secretary of State, Linda McCulloch. The Montana Republican State Central
Committee has registered the domain name <lindamcculloch.com> and is using
it for a website critical of McCulloch. 7 Given the lack of likely trademark
interest in these politicians' names,74 it is unlikely that trademark law would
help either candidate. The conduct would not even run afoul of the personal
name provisions in § 1129(1)(A) of the Lanham Act, which does not require a
trademark interest, because technically the registrants of the domain names are
not cybersquatters-section 1129(1)(A) requires an attempt to sell a domain
name for profit for liability to attach." The registrants in these scenarios are
72. See Bob Keenan & Mike Lange, http://www.bobkeenan.com (last visited Oct. 5,
2008) (providing negative information regarding Bob Keenan) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
73. See LindaMcCulloch.com, http://www.lindamcculloch.com (last visited Oct. 5,2008)
(providing negative information regarding Linda McCulloch) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
74. Often, local politicians, as compared with some federal politicians, are not regarded as
having sufficient trademark interests in their names to support trademark-related actions. See,
e.g., Townsend v. Birt, WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center Case No. D2002-0030, 2002
WL 827005, § 7 (Apr. 11, 2002) (Donahey, Davis & Sellers Arbs.), available at
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2002/d2OO2-0030.html (finding that an
individual politician in a state gubernatorial race did not hold trademark rights in her personal
name).
75. 15 U.S.C. § 1129(l)(A) (2006). The Act provides:
Any person who registers a domain name that consists of the name of another living
person, or a name substantially and confusingly similar thereto, without that
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not attempting to sell the names. Rather they are utilizing the names to
communicate messages critical of the politicians in question.76
There is some state legislation in California that indirectly addresses such
situations by prohibiting fraudulent and misleading conduct on the Internet in
relation to a ballot measure. 7 This would likely catch some instances of
misleading Internet users by registering a domain name similar to a politician's
name, particularly in the lead-up to an election. However, this approach has
not yet been picked up in other states within the United States, let alone at a
more global level. In any event, it is not targeted specifically at the protection
of individual names from unauthorized uses, but rather deals with ballot
measures more generally.78 Thus, it would not apply outside the electoral
context. There is also some Californian state legislation that deals specifically
with unauthorized registrations and uses of domain names corresponding with
personal names. 79 This covers all personal names, whether relating to
politicians or public figures or otherwise.80 However, again it only exists in
California and is, therefore, probably not a realistic option to address these
issues, at least in the short term.

person's consent, with the specific intent to profit from such name by selling the
domain name for financial gain to that person or any third party, shall be liable in a
civil action by such person.
Id.
76. Supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
77. See generally Political Cyberfraud Abatement Act, CAL. ELEc. CODE §§ 18320-18323
(West 2000).
78. See id. § 18320(c)(1) (defining "Political cyberfraud"). The statute provides:
"Political cyberfraud" means a knowing and willful act concerning a political Web
site that is committed with the intent to deny a person access to a political Web site,
deny a person the opportunity to register a domain name for a political Web site, or
cause a person reasonably to believe that a political Web site has been posted by a
person other than the person who posted the Web site, and would cause a
reasonable person, after reading the Web site, to believe the site actually represents
the views of the proponent or opponent of a ballot measure.
Id.
79. See generally CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE, §§ 17525-17526 (West 2006). California law
also provides: "It is unlawful for a person, with a bad faith intent to register, traffic in, or use a
domain name, that is identical or confusingly similar to the personal name of another living
person or deceased personality, without regard to the goods or services of the parties." Id.
§ 17525(a).
80. In fact, there is specific mention of using a domain name corresponding with an
individual person's name in bad faith to mislead electors. See id. § 175266) (including, as a
bad faith factor, "[t]he intent of a person alleged to be in violation of this article to mislead,
deceive, or defraud voters").

1468

65 WASH. &LEE L. REV 1445 (2008)

Developing specific principles that deal with uses of personal names in
general, and politicians' names in particular, under a new PDRP would more
directly address the kinds of situations described here. Such an approach
would also have the advantage of being globally harmonized. Additionally, a
PDRP would not be limited to the electoral context, but would cover all
politicians and public figures attempting to use their names to promulgate
messages on the Internet, regardless of whether an election was looming at a
given time. Importantly, it would take disputes about free speech in the
political process away from trademark policy by avoiding UDRP complaints
involving politicians' names. The development of online jurisprudence related
to free speech in the political process should not be decided by focusing on
trademark principles where the conflict in question 8is not about balancing
commercial trademarks against the First Amendment. '
3. PrivateIndividuals'Names
Private individuals' names are different than those of celebrities or
politicians in the issues they raise in the domain space. These names are
perhaps less important in the context of this discussion than celebrities' and
public figures' names. There are significantly fewer disputed situations
involving unauthorized registration and use of private individuals' names on
the Internet. 82 A number of disputes involving private individuals' names
actually do relate to83trademark uses of those names where a name has acquired
secondary meaning as being synonymous with the relevant person's business

81. Nevertheless, disputes about politicians' names in domain names have been brought
under the UDRP in the past and the focus has been on establishing trademark interests-or lack
thereof-in a relevant politician's name, rather than on the balance of speech interests in the
political context. See, e.g., Clinton v. Dinoia, National Arbitration Forum Claim No.
FA0502000414641, 2005 WL 853535 (Mar. 18, 2005) (Atkinson, Arb.), available at
http://www.adrforum.com/domains/decisions/414641 .htm (finding that Senator Clinton had an
unregistered trademark right in her personal name in connection with both her political activities
and her career as an author of a number of books sold in commerce); Townsend v. Birt, WIPO
Arbitration and Mediation Center Case No. D2002-0030, 2002 WL 827005, § 7 (Apr. 11,2002)
(Donahey, Davis & Sellers, Arbs.), availableat http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/
html/2002/d2002-0030.html (finding that an individual politician in a state gubernatorial race
did not hold trademark rights in her personal name).
82. See generally Trudeau v. Lanoue, No. 04 C 7165, 2006 WL 516579 (N.D. I11.
Mar. 2,
2006); Schmidheiny v. Weber, 285 F. Supp. 2d 613 (E.D. Pa. 2003); Wright v. Domain Source,
Inc., No. 02 C 2525, 2002 WL 1998287 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 27, 2002). These cases involved
personal names used in conjunction with businesses conducted by the complainant. They are
some of the few cases on record involving the names of private individuals.
83. See 1 GiLsoN LALONDE, supranote 5,§ 2.03[4][d] ("Just as with descriptive terms, a
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activities. 84 Thus, trademark-focused laws, including the UDRP, will, in fact,
be appropriate avenues for dispute resolution in many of these cases.
Where a private individual's name is not a trademark in the commercial
context, it is unlikely to raise many conflicts in the <name.com> space.
There is much less profit to be made by cybersquatting on non-famous
names, and little reason to set up gripe sites or parody sites about private
individuals. However, one obvious example of where such a situation might
arise would be the case where more than one person shares the same personal
name.8 5 This situation is analogous to the case where more than one
company legitimately shares the same or similar trademarks in different
product or geographic markets.8 6 In the absence of some kind of domain
trademark or trade name that consists of a personal name (first name, surname, or both) is
entitled to legal protection only if it attains secondary meaning.").
84. Many businesses, in fact, use their chief officers' names as business names and
trademarks, for instance, The Trump Organization (owned by Donald Trump). See
TrumpOrganization.com, www.trump.com (last visited Oct. 5, 2008) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review). Of course, because of his participation in the television
show "The Apprentice," it is possible that Trump's name also functions as a celebrity name.
Nevertheless, due to his business activities (and perhaps also his authorship of several books),
Trump's name is likely a trademark. Trump has also registered a variety of permutations ofhis
personal name as registered marks with respect to particular goods and services. See Trademark
Electronic Search System, http://tess2.uspto.gov/bin/gate.exe? f=tess&state=124i8r.1.1 (last
visited Oct. 5, 2008) (providing a list of trademark registrations associated with "Trump") (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
85. Ultimately, this was what happened in the <paulwright.com> dispute. Wright v.
Domain Source, Inc., No. 02 C 2525, 2002 WL 1998287 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 27, 2002). Although
the plaintiff was successful in an action to have the domain name <paulwright.com> transferred
back to him by a defendant cybersquatter, the order was conditioned on no third party having
acquired bona fide rights in the name. Id. at *5. The defendant had already transferred the
domain name before the court order went into effect so the plaintiff likely never regained control
of the name. Id. at *1.
86. See Nat'l Ass'n for Healthcare Commc'ns, Inc. v. Cent. Ark. Area Agency on Aging,
Inc., 257 F.3d 732, 738 (8th Cir. 2001) (granting injunction against federal trademark owner in
order to allow user of the same mark to use it in established six county area in California); Dawn
Donut Co. v. Hart's Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358, 360 (2d Cir. 1959) (holding that there was
no likelihood of confusion in a case where plaintiff and defendant used similar marks in
different product markets and different jurisdictions); David Barrett, The Future of the
Concurrent Use of TrademarksDoctrine in the Information Age, 23 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT.
L.J. 687, 689-91 (2001) (examining American legislative history of the "concurrent use"
doctrine in trademark law, which allows different trademark holders to use similar marks in
different geographic areas); Litman, supra note 11, at 152 ("Out here in meat space, we can
have a whole bunch of different owners of Acme as a trademark-the last time I counted there
were more than a hundred different trademark registrations... . On the Internet, only one
person can own acme.com."); Stuart Weinstein, The CyberpiracyPreventionAct: Reconciling
Real Space Sectoraland GeographicDistinctionsin the Use of Internet DomainNames Under

the Lanham Act, 9 U. MIAMI Bus. L. REv. 145, 158 (2001) ("[A]n entity may use an identical
mark as another, as long as he does not use that mark within the same sector or industry. As
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name sharing strategy, 87 it may be that the "first come, first served" rule has
to apply here. 8
More relevant to this discussion would be the admittedly less usual case
where someone registered one or more domain names relating to private
individuals' names either in the hope of extracting money from those
individuals for transfer of the names,8 9 or, perhaps more likely, extracting
money for offering web hosting services under the names. The first iteration of
this conduct-the pure sale motive-sounds like cybersquatting, but probably
is not covered by trademark law because private, non-commercial personal
names will generally not be trademarked. 9° It may be covered in the United
States by § 1129(1)(A) of the Lanham Act, which does not require a trademark

with geographical protection of a user's mark, the scope of protection is determined as an
evidentiary matter, looking at the likelihood of consumer confusion."); cf.Jacqueline Lipton, A
Winning Solution for YouTube and Utube? CorrespondingTrademarks and Domain Name
Sharing,21 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 509,549 (2008) (suggesting a domain name sharing mechanism
for situations where two legitimate trademark holders are asserting rights in the same domain
name simultaneously).
87. See Goldman, supra note 21, at 546 ("[S]ome domain names resolve to a 'gateway
page' (also referred to as a 'shared page' or 'intermediate page') for the sole purpose of
allowing multiple trademark owners or licensees to 'share' the domain name through links on
the page to their respective sites."); Lipton, supra note 86, at 549 (suggesting a domain name
sharing mechanism for situations where two legitimate trademark holders are asserting rights in
the same domain name simultaneously).
88. See Litman, supra note 11, at 151 ("Network Solutions registered .com domain names
on a first-come first-served basis, just as all the Internet domain names had always been
allocated."); see also Stephen Moccaldi, Do Any Viable Solutions Exist to Prevent The
Exploitation of Trademarks Usedas InternetDomainNames?, 21 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'LL. REv.
179, 182-83 (1997) (discussing a first-come, first-served basis). Moccaldi asserts:
Network Solutions, Inc. (NSI), a United States business, controls the registration of
internet domain names worldwide. Under the original registration policy, NSI
simply registered domain names on a first-come, first-served basis with no
requirement that the registrant actually intend to use the name in commerce. The
method enabled domain name pirates to register famous trademarks as domain
names without ever using them in commerce. Many pirates registered popular
names and auctioned them off to the highest bidder. Trademark holders filed suits
against the pirates for trademark infringement, and against NSI for contributory
infringement.
Id.
89. See generally Schmidheiny v. Weber, 285 F. Supp. 2d 613 (E.D. Pa. 2003)
(discussing such a situation in the dispute over the <schmidheiny.com> domain name); Wright
v. Domain Source, Inc., No. 02 C 2525, 2002 WL 1998287 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 27, 2002)
(discussing such a situation in the dispute over the <paulwright.com> domain name).
90. See 1GiLsON LALONDE, supra note 5,§ 2.03[4] [d] ("Just as with descriptive terms, a
trademark or trade name that consists of a personal name (first name, surname, or both) is
entitled to legal protection only if it attains secondary meaning.").
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in a personal name to support a cybersquatting action. 9' The second iteration
may or may not be Cybersquatting depending on whether the registrant would
be prepared to release the name to the relevant person without receiving a profit
in the event that the person in question did not want to accept the web hosting
services. If the registrant is only holding the name in the hope of selling web
hosting services and is prepared to give it up if the relevant person does not
agree, then it will not likely amount to cybersquatting. However, if the
registrant seeks a profit to transfer the name, it will likely amount to
cybersquatting and would be covered by § 1129(1)(A) of the Lanham Act.92
B. Shortcomings of The ExistingLegal Framework
Before turning to ways in which the substance of the personality rights tort
might usefully inform the development of a new PDRP, it is worth briefly
surveying the shortcomings of the current trademark-focused options, in
particular the UDRP. It may seem counter-intuitive to say that the UDRP has
shortcomings in the personal domain name dispute context, as a number of
celebrities and some politicians have used it successfully to gain control of
relevant domain names.93 Ironically, the very success of personal domain name
91. See 15 U.S.C. § 1129(l)(A) (2006) (detailing the cybersquatting requirements for
civil liability under the Lanham Act).
92. One permutation of this conduct that is occurring with increasing frequency, with
respect to personal names and other names, involves an individual registering his own name as a
domain name and then accidentally letting the registration lapse. Some online businesses
quickly register lapsed domain names of all kinds and then try to extort money from selling the
names back to the original registrants or to someone else with an interest in the name. See
Wright, 2002 WL 1998287, at *1 (recounting how the defendant registered the plaintiff's
domain name-paulwright.com--when the plaintiff accidentally let it lapse and then attempted
to resell it to the plaintiff for almost $2,000). This is basically a new form ofcybersquatting that
differs from traditional cybersquatting only in terms of timing. Traditional cybersquatters
registered domain names in a more anticipatoryway: that is, the cybersquatter would estimate
what domain names would likely be valuable to "rightful owners" in the future and would
register those names in the hope of extorting money for their transfer. This new permutation
relates to names that have been valuable to someone in the past, and the cybersquatter hopes
that that person, or someone else with a competing interest in the name, will pay significant
sums for transfer of the name, after its original registration has lapsed. This conduct will be
caught by the anti-cybersquatting legislation assuming that the second registrant-the
cybersquatter-has no legitimate interest in the name other than seeking to make a profit from
its sale back to the original owner or perhaps to someone else with an interest in the name.
93. See, e.g., Cruise v. Alta. Hot Rods, WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center Case No.
D2006-0560, 2006 WL 4002761, § 7 (July 5, 2006) (Abbott, Abel & Sorkin, Arbs.), available
at http://www.wipo.int/_amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2006/d2006-0560.html (finding that
Tom Cruise had trademark and service mark rights in his name); Clinton v. Dinoia, National
Arbitration Forum Claim No. FA0502000414641, 2005 WL 853535 (Mar. 18,2005) (Atkinson,
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complaints under the trademark-focused UDRP may evidence a problem with
the current system. The major problem with the UDRP in this context is that it
requires complainants to establish trademark rights in their personal names. 94
Personal names, like other descriptive marks, are only trademarkable if they
attain secondary meaning. 95 The question as to whether a particular name has
acquired such a meaning can be quite a difficult one and has generally been left
to the courts within domestic trademark systems.96
Asking UDRP arbitrators to resolve these questions raises several
concerns. For one thing, UDRP arbitrators, unlike courts, will generally not
have the benefit of detailed judicial precedent on the question of secondary
meaning in front of them when making a decision.97 In any event, they are not
Arb.), available at http://www.adrforum.com/domains/decisions/414641.htm (finding that
Senator Clinton had an unregistered trademark right in her personal name); Spacey v. Alta. Hot
Rods, National Arbitration Forum Claim No. FA0205000114437,2002 WL 1832705 (Aug. 1,
2002) (Meyerson, Buchele & Harris, Arbs.), available at http://www.adrforum.com/
domains/decisions/i 14437.htm (finding that Kevin Spacey had sufficient proprietary rights in
his name); Roberts v. Boyd, WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center Case No. D2000-02 10,
2000 WL 33674395, § 6 (May 29, 2000) (Page & Bridgeman, Arbs.), available at
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-02lO.html (finding that Julia
Roberts had a common law trademark in her name).
94. See UDRP, supra note 3, 4(a) (detailing the requirement that complainants establish
trademark rights in their own names). The UDRP provides:
You are required to submit to a mandatory administrative proceeding in the event
that a third party (a "complainant") asserts to the applicable Provider, in compliance
with the Rules of Procedure, that: (i) your domain name is identical or confusingly
similar to a trademarkor service mark in which the complainant has rights; and,
(ii) you have no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and,
(iii) your domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.
Id. (emphasis added).
95. See 1GILSON LALOwNDE, supra note 5,§ 2.03[4][d] ("Just as with descriptive terms, a
trademark or trade name that consists of a personal name (first name, surname, or both) is
entitled to legal protection only if it attains secondary meaning.").

96. See id.(discussing various cases where courts have examined personal names for
secondary meanings).
97. Although complainants under the UDRP are required to assert legitimate trademark
interests, the proceedings do not require registered trademark interests, or detailed discussions
of the nature of a complainant's alleged trademark interest. The Julia Roberts arbitration is a
good example of how little time is often spent on the trademarkability question with respect to a
personal name. The arbitration panel in the Roberts case stated:
A recent decision citing English law found that common law trademark rights exist
in an author's name. The Policy does not require that the Complainant should have
rights in a registered trademark or service mark. It is sufficient that the Complainant
should satisfy the Administrative Panel that she has rights in common law
trademark or sufficient rights to ground an action for passing off.
Roberts v. Boyd, WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center Case No. D2000-0210, 2000 WL
33674395, § 6 (May 29, 2000) (Page & Bridgeman, Arbs.), available at http://www.
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bound by judicial precedent. This has led to inconsistent, and often arbitrary or
superficial, reasoning in personal domain name arbitrations. 8 Secondly, the
fact that the UDRP is the easiest and most cost effective avenue for domain
name disputes results in most personal domain name disputes being directed to
UDRP arbitrators, rather than courts. 99 This compounds the difficulties for
UDRP arbitrators because of the sheer volume of disputes in the personal name
area they need to adjudicate without the benefit of much detailed judicial
precedent on the trademarkability question.
This Part considers the development of trademark practice from the early
days of the domain name system through to the adoption of the UDRP. Its aim
is to illustrate how we arrived at a situation where the UDRP is, by default, the
best available avenue for personal domain name disputes, despite its
shortcomings. Parts III and IV then focus on how an online dispute resolution
mechanism based largely on the substance of the right of publicity tort could
improve matters.
1. TrademarkInfringement
In the early days of the domain name system, litigants turned to existing
trademark law-trademark infringement and dilution actions-to protect their
valuable source-identifiers in cyberspace. 10 The trademark infringement action
protects a trademark holder against an unauthorized use of the mark in
commerce that is likely to confuse consumers as to the source of a particular
product or service. 01 It was applied successfully in early domain name cases
involving trademarks on the basis that unauthorized registration and use of

wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/htmlI/2000/d2000-0210.html.
98. Why, for example, should Julia Roberts and Tom Cruise be regarded as having
trademark interests in their personal names when the same is not necessarily true for Bruce
Springsteen or the late Anna Nicole Smith? Why should Hillary Clinton be recognized as a
trademark when the same is not true for other politicians such as Kathleen Kennedy Townsend?
See supra notes 12-17 and accompanying text (questioning the disparate treatment of each of
the above celebrities' UDRP claims).
99. Moreland & Springer, supra note 4, at 386 ("Prior to the establishment of ICANN
Arbitration, recovery of celebrity domain names was an expensive and potentially lengthy
process.").
100. See 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (2006) (providing a civil action for the infringement of
registered trademarks); id. § 1125(a) (providing a civil action for the infringement of
unregistered trademarks).
101. See 2 GISON LALONDE, supra note 5, § 5.01 (noting that the general aim oftrademark
law is to prevent consumer confusion about the source of products or services).
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domain names corresponding with someone else's trademark would likely
confuse consumers. 0 2
There are only a few instances with disputes involving personal names.'0 3
Perhaps personal name litigants did not feel that they could support a trademark
infringement action because of concerns that they might not be able to establish
a trademark interest in their names. It may also have been that the cost of4
judicial proceedings in trademark law was prohibitive for private individuals,'0
even those most likely to be able to establish trademark interests in their own
names. This is probably the reason why most disputes involving personal
domain names have been brought under the faster and less expensive UDRP.105
Trademark based actions can also raise jurisdictional concerns that do not arise
under the UDRP.10 6 The actor Kevin Spacey, for example, failed to establish
personal jurisdiction over a defendant in litigation for control of the domain
went on to successfully obtain control of
name <kevinspacey.com> 0 7 He then
10 8
the name in a UDRP proceeding.
102. See Brookfield Commc'ns, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm't. Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1053-65
(9th Cir. 1999) (holding that the use of the "moviebuff.com" domain name by one video library
was likely to confuse customers of one of its competitors where each had some association with
an iteration of the term "Movie Buff' in its trademark); Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am., Inc.
v. Bucci, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d 1430, 1435 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding that defendant's use of the
<plannedparenthood.com> domain name for messages critical of the Planned Parenthood
organization was likely to confuse consumers as to the source of various services provided by
the plaintiff).
103. See generally Lamparello v. Falwell, 420 F.3d 309,320 (4th Cir. 2005) (involving an
intentional misspelling of Reverend Falwell's name as a domain name), cert. denied, 547 U.S.
1069 (2006); Trudeau v. Lanoue, No. 04 C 7165, 2006 WL 516579 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 2, 2006)
(discussing Mr. Kevin Trudeau's name as a domain name); Schmidheiny v. Weber, 285 F.
Supp. 2d 613 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (discussing the <schmidheiny.com> domain name).
104. See Litman, supra note 11, at 155 (noting the often prohibitive cost of trademark
infringement and dilution litigation in early domain name disputes); Moreland & Springer,
supra note 4, at 386 ("Prior to the establishment of ICANN Arbitration, recovery of celebrity
domain names was an expensive and potentially lengthy process.").
105. See Moreland & Springer, supra note 4, at 386 ("ICANN Arbitration provides an
inexpensive and extremely quick means of recovering a domain name. In addition, celebrities
have come to enjoy a very high success rate in arbitration.").
106. See, e.g., Wright v. Domain Source, Inc., No. 02 C 2525,2002 WL 1998287, at *2-4
(N.D. Ill. Aug. 27, 2002) (discussing jurisdictional issues raised in complaint against
cybersquatter's registration of <paulwright.com> domain name).
107. See Kieren McCarthy, Kevin Spacey Loses Pivotal Cybersquatting Court Case,
REGISTER, Nov. 26, 2001, http://www.theregister.co.uk/2001/l1/26/kevin-spacey-loses_
pivotalcybersquatting/ (discussing the issue of jurisdiction in the case involving the
<kevinspacey.com> domain name).
108. See Spacey v. Alta. Hot Rods, National Arbitration Forum Claim No.
FA0205000114437, 2002 WL 1832705 (Aug. 1, 2002) (Meyerson, Buchele & Harris, Arbs.),
available at http://www.adrforum.com/domains/decisions/I 14437.htm (transferring the domain
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Even in situations where the complainant is able to bear the cost of
trademark litigation and can establish a trademark interest in her name, she
must still satisfy the "consumer confusion" element of a trademark infringement
action. 1°9 Consumer confusion is the key to a successful trademark
infringement suit. 10 Many situations involving personal domain names will
not involve consumer confusion in the trademark sense. It may be that a person
is making unauthorized commercial use of a domain name, but it is clear that
the registrant does not represent the person whose name is used in the domain
name."' This could happen where the registrant is simply
using the name as a
2
1
customers.
commercial
unrelated
attract
to
"draw"
There would still be an open question in the celebrity cases at least as to
whether the misleading use of the mark was "in commerce" in the sense
required by trademark law. If the domain name registrant was not actually
using the unauthorized website for commercial purposes in the sense of selling
any goods or services, the use of the name purely to attract Internet users may
not be sufficiently "in commerce" to support a trademark infringement action.
name <kevinspacey.com> from respondent to Kevin Spacey).
109. See 2 GILsoN LALONDE, supra note 5, § 5.01 (noting that the general aim oftrademark
law is to prevent consumer confusion about the source of products or services).
110. See id. (noting trademark law's focus on the prevention of consumer confusion).
111. There may be an argument that the right of publicity should not prohibit such conduct.
However, if there is something significant about protecting the integrity of individual personas
online, theories of personhood as well as property would come into play, and they might support
an argument for a right of publicity action, even if such an action would not arise under
trademark law. For a discussion of personhood theories as a basis for the right of publicity, see
generally Haenmerli, supra note 25, and McKenna, supra note 54.
112. Such conduct could amount to trademark infringement under the "initial interest
confusion" doctrine or perhaps to trademark dilution. However, both of these approaches to
domain name disputes under domestic trademark principles have come under attack for overextending the boundaries of trademark law in cyberspace. For a discussion of initial interest
confusion, see Lastowka, supra note 22, at 35-36. Lastowka provides:
With respect to search engines.., a... significant expansion of trade-mark law is
the doctrine of initial interest confusion. Traditionally, and not surprisingly, most
courts have focused analysis of consumer confusion on the time period proximate
to consumer purchases. The doctrine of initial interest confusion shifts the focus of
confusion analysis to a time prior to the time of purchase. Initial interest confusion
can be found to exist even if that confusion was not present at the time of purchase.
Id.; see also Goldman, supra note 21, at 559 ("[Initial interest confusion] lacks a rigorous
definition, a clear policy justification, and a uniform standard for analyzing claims. With its
doctrinal flexibility, [it] has become the tool of choice for plaintiffs to shut down junior users
who have not actually engaged in misappropriative uses."); Jennifer Rothman, InitialInterest
Confusion: Standing at the Crossroads of Trademark Law, 27 CARDozo L. REv. 105, 121-50
(2005) (offering a broad critique of the initial interest confusion doctrine). For a discussion of
dilution, see infra Part II.B.2.
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There is some case law in the domain name context suggesting that any
unauthorized use of a trademark as a domain name could be sufficiently "in
commerce" for a trademark infringement action on the basis that the Internet by
its nature is a global commercial communications medium." 3 On this
reasoning, any use of a trademarked personal name in a domain name could
potentially give rise to a trademark infringement action. However, it remains to
be seen whether future courts would follow this line of reasoning.' "4
Of course, right of publicity jurisprudence also has an "in commerce"
requirement" l5 which may or may not be interpreted in the same way as
trademark law's "in commerce" requirement in cyberspace. Whether or not this
requirement is interpreted in the same way for the right of publicity, there is a
good argument that unauthorized non-commercial uses of even a <name.com>
domain name should not be proscribed under a new PDRP. These uses may
well, for the most
part, be purely expressive uses that are protected by the First
6
Amendment."

113. See Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am., Inc. v. Bucci, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d 1430, 1434
(S.D.N.Y. 1997) ("Internet users constitute a national, even international, audience, who must
use interstate telephone lines to access defendant's web site .... The nature of the Internet
indicates that establishing a typical home page on the Internet, for access to all users, would
satisfy the Lanham Act's 'in commerce' requirement."). In American LibrariesAssociationv.
Pataki,969 F. Supp. 160, 173 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), the court asserted:
In addition, many of those users who are communicating for private,
noncommercial purposes are nonetheless participants in interstate commerce by
virtue of their Internet consumption. Many users obtain access to the Internet by
means of an on-line service provider, such as America Online, which charges a fee
for its services. "Internet service providers," including plaintiffs Panix, Echo, and
NYC NET, also offer Internet access for a monthly or hourly fee. Patrons of
storefront "computer coffee shops," such as New York's own CyberCafe, similarly
pay for their access to the Internet, in addition to partaking of food and beverages
sold by the cafe. Dial-in bulletin board systems often charge a fee for access.
Id.
114. See Lastowka, supranote 22, at 64 ("[I]t is not clear how Bucci had used the Planned
Parenthood mark in commerce, given that he was not selling anything. Those who advocate for
an expansion of trademark use often criticize Bucci for this reason.").
115. See I GiLsoN LA.NDE,supra note5, § 2.16[l] ("The right ofpublicity... is the right
of an individual to control the commercial use of his or her name, likeness, signature, or other
personal characteristics.") (emphasis added).
116. The balance of First Amendment rights against personality rights in personal domain
names is considered further in Part IV.
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2. TrademarkDilution
Trademark dilution also has limited application to personal domain name
disputes because of its requirement of a trademark interest in the personal
name, and because of the time, cost and jurisdictional problems often
associated with litigation. Dilution differs from trademark infringement in that
it is not focused on the prevention of consumer confusion and, therefore, does
1 17
not require a showing of consumer confusion on the part of the plaintiff.
Rather, it protects famous marks" 8 from blurring 1 9 or tamishment. 120 Dilution
at the federal level is designed to prevent people from creating "noise" around a
mark that might have the effect of lessening the strength ofthe mark in terms of
its capacity to identify the plaintiff's goods or services.' 2 1 Thus, a dilution
action could prevent the sale of Sony potato chips as potentially dilutive of the

117. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2006) (providing injunctive reliefto victims of trademark
dilution without requiring a showing of consumer confusion). Section 1125(c)(1) applies only
to names or marks that are "distinctive" and can only be employed when the defendant has used
the name in commerce. Id. Most personal domain name disputes probably will not satisfy these
requirements.
118. See id. § 1125(c)(2)(A) (defining "famous mark").
[A] mark is famous if it is widely recognized by the general consuming public of
the United States as a designation of source of the goods or services of the mark's
owner. In determining whether a mark possesses the requisite degree of
recognition, the court may consider all relevant factors, including the following:
(i) The duration, extent, and geographic reach of advertising and publicity of the
mark, whether advertised or publicized by the owner or third parties; (ii) The
amount, volume, and geographic extent of sales of goods or services offered under
the mark; (iii) The extent of actual recognition of the mark ....

Id.
119. See id. § 1125(c)(2)(B) (defining "blurring" as an "association arising from the
similarity between a mark or trade name and a famous mark that impairs the distinctiveness of
the famous mark").
120. See id. § 1 25(c)(2)(C) (defining "tarnishment" of a famous mark as an "association
arising from the similarity between a mark or trade name and a famous mark that harms the
reputation of the famous mark").
121. See 2 GILSON LALONDE, supra note 5, § 5A.01[l] (discussing federal dilution law).
Gilson Lalonde provides:
Federal dilution law protects famous trademarks from unauthorized uses that are
likely to impair their distinctiveness or harm their reputation. It enables owners of
those marks to maintain their value as source indicators and as symbols of good
will. While the law benefits only famous trademarks, it adds a potent weapon
against the whittling away of the hard-to-measure distinctive quality ofthose marks.
Id.; see also Lemley, supra note 22, at 1698-99 ("Dilution laws are directed against the
possibility that the unique nature of a mark will be destroyed by companies who trade on the
renown of the mark by selling unrelated goods, such as Kodak pianos or Buick aspirin.").
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22
Sony corporation's marks for audio-visual and electronic equipment.'
23
There is a non-commercial use exception from trademark dilution liability.1
Additionally, under revisions to the Lanham Act in 2006, there is an
expanded fair use defense that contemplates various
forms of commentary on
124
a trademark holder as a defense to the action.
Trademark dilution actions were used successfully by trademark holders
in the early days of the domain name system. 25 These actions were
particularly effective in cases involving cybersquatters. 26 This is because the
use of someone else's trademark in a domain name for no particular purpose
other than to sell the name to the trademark holder-or perhaps to a
competitor of the trademark holder--could be said to be creating noise
around the mark in the dilution sense. Early courts held that a domain name
corresponding to a trademark is integral to a business's ability to engage in
commerce on the Internet such that cybersquatting
on such a name would be
27
prohibited as interfering with this ability.
However, a dilution action requires that the plaintiff establish not only a
trademark interest, but also that she holds afamous mark.' 28 Despite the fact
that it has historically been reasonably easy in practice for commercial
plaintiffs to establish that their mark is sufficiently famous to bring a dilution
action, 129 this may not be the case with respect to personal names. Personal

122. See Lemley, supra note 22, at 1698 (explaining that dilution laws prohibit
individuals or business entities from using famous trademarks to sell unrelated goods at
the expense of the trademark owner).
123. See 15 U.S.C. § I125(c)(3)(C) (2006) (excluding "[a]ny noncommercial use of a
mark" from actionable conduct under federal dilution law).
124. See id. § 1125(c)(3)(A)(ii) (excluding "parodying, criticizing, or commenting
upon the famous mark owner or [the owner's] goods or services" from actionable conduct
under federal dilution law).
125. See, e.g., Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1327 (9th Cir. 1998)
(finding trademark dilution in an action against cybersquatter who was not using the name
for any purpose other than attempting to sell it to the corresponding trademark holder).
126. For an example of a successful action, see id.
127. See id. at 1327 ("We reject [defendant's] premise that a domain name is nothing
more than an address. A significant purpose of a domain name is to identify the entity
that owns the web site .... [Defendant's] use of Panavision.com also puts Panavision's
name and reputation at his mercy.").
128. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2006) (requiring a plaintiff in a federal dilution
action to establish that she holds a famous mark); id. § 1 125(c)(2)(A) (defining "famous
mark").
129. See Lemley, supranote 22, at 1698-99 ("[C]ourts applying the state and federal dilution
statutes have been quite willing to conclude that a local favorite, or a rather obscure company, is
famous within the meaning of the Act.... Worse, many courts seem willing to find dilution
without even inquiring into the fame of the mark."). However, since the enactment of
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names are often not trademarks at all, even with respect to some rather wellknown celebrities.1 30 Recent amendments to the federal dilution statute may
make it more difficult for individuals, even famous individuals, to establish
that their personal names operate as famous marks.' 31 The new definition of
"famous mark" inserted into the Lanham Act in October 2006 contemplates
the notion of a famous mark in very consumer-oriented terms with respect to
the source of goods or services. 32 Many famous individuals' names will not,
in fact, operate in this way. Thus, it may be more difficult, in theory at least,
for a plaintiff to establish trademark dilution with respect to a personal name
than even to establish trademark infringement. Celebrities to one side,
presumably most politicians, public figures, and private individuals will not
be able to show marks at all, or at least marks with sufficient fame, to bring a
successful dilution action. This, coupled with the costs of litigation, makes a
trademark dilution action an inappropriate and unlikely avenue for the future
resolution of personal domain name disputes.

the Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006 ("TDRA"), it may be more difficult than in
the past to establish that a mark is famous due to the new definition of "famous mark." See 15
U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A) (2006) (defining "famous mark"). At least courts may have to undertake
an analysis of whether a mark is famous or not with regard to this provision.
130. See Smith v. DNS Research, Inc., National Arbitration Forum Claim No.
FA0312000220007, 2004 WL 2358216 (Feb. 21, 2004) (Davis, Arb.), available at
http://www.adrforum.com/domains/decisions/220007.htm ("[T]he mere fact of having a
successful career as an actress, singer or TV program star does not provide exclusive rights to
the use of a name under the trademark laws."); Springsteen v. Burgar, WIPO Arbitration and
Mediation Center Case No. D2000-1532, 2001 WL 1705212, § 6 (Jan. 25, 2001) (Harris &
Froomkin, Arbs.), available at http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/
2000/d2000-1532.html ("It appears to be an established principle.., that... [celebrities']
names can acquire a distinctive secondary meaning giving rise to rights equating to unregistered
trade marks (sic)... [but] it is by no means clear from the UDRP that it was intended to protect
proper names of this nature."); Sumner v. Urvan, WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center Case
No. D2000-0596, 2000 WL 33939204, 6.5 (July 24, 2000) (Christie, Arb.), available at
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0596.html ("In the opinion of
this Administrative Panel, it is doubtful whether the Uniform Policy is applicable to this dispute.
Although it is accepted that the Complainant is world famous under the name STING, it does
not follow that he has rights in STING as a trademarkorservice mark."); see also Moreland &
Springer, supra note 4, at 390-92 (comparing UDRP arbitrations where celebrities have not
been able to establish trademark rights in their personal names).
131. See supra note 129 and accompanying text (discussing the possible effects of the
TDRA).
132. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A) (2006) (defining "famous mark").
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3. The Anti-CybersquattingConsumer ProtectionAct, and California's
Business andProfessions Code
The Anti-Cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (ACPA) was enacted
in 1999 to address some of the specific concerns of trademark holders in
relation to cybersquatting. 133 It is focused on protecting trademarks in
cyberspace, although it does make some specific provision for personal
names-the only law to have done so in the Internet context. 134 The ACPA
inserted two new provisions into the Lanham Act--one directed at the
prevention of cybersquatting with respect to trademarks, 135 and the other
36
directed at the prevention of cybersquatting with respect to personal names.
Both provisions prohibit the registration of a domain name with a bad faith
137
profit motive where there is no other legitimate purpose for using the name.
Again, the trademark-focused provision is of limited use to personal name
holders because many personal names will not be trademarks. 138 However, the
personal name provision' 39 is available to people who are concerned about
cybersquatters registering their names as domain names.140 This should provide
133. See Anti-Cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113,
§§ 3001-3010, 113 Stat. 1501 (2000) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (2000)) (prohibiting the
bad faith usage, registration, or trafficking of domain names which infringe on another's
trademark rights).
134. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A) (2006) ("[A] personal name... is protected as a mark
under this section.").
135. See id. § 1125(d) (prohibiting the bad faith usage, registration, or trafficking of
domain names which infringe on another's trademark rights).
136. See id. § 1129(1)(a) (creating a cause of action for any famous individual against
"[a]ny person who registers a domain name that consists of the [famous person's] name...
without that person's consent, with the specific intent to profit from such name" by selling the
domain name).
137. Registering, trafficking, or using a domain name inbad faith for a profit are prohibited
by id.
§ 1125(d)(1 )(A)(ii), while id.
§ 1129(1 )(A) contemplates an attempted sale of the name in
bad faith.
138. See 1GILSON LALONDE, supranote 5,§2.03[4][d] ("Just as with descriptive terms, a
trademark or trade name that consists of a personal name (first name, surname, or both) is
entitled to legal protection only if it attains secondary meaning.").
139. See supra note 136 and accompanying text (defining the personal name provision).
140. See 15 U.S.C. § 1129(l)(A) (2006) (providing a legal avenue to persons concerned
about cybersquatters registering their names as domain names). This provision is argued in
situations involving cybersquatting on personal names. See, e.g., Schmidheiny v. Weber, 285 F.
Supp. 2d 613,626,628 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (noting that § 1129(1XA) prohibits cybersquatters from
using personal names in domain names and ordering the transfer of the domain name
<schmidheiny.com> to Stephan Schmidheiny); Wright v. Domain Source, Inc., No. 02 C 2525,
2002 WL 1998287, at *5-6 (N.D. I11.
Aug. 27, 2002) (noting that § 1129(l)(A) prohibits
cybersquatters from using personal names in domain names and ordering the transfer
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some comfort to those concerned about having to pay exorbitant sums of money
for return of a name that should "rightfully" be theirs. However, interestingly,
the provision has not been utilized much in practice, particularly in comparison
142
with the UDRP.14' This is probably because the UDRP is faster and cheaper,
even though it is premised on the existence of a trademark interest.
One significant limitation of the ACPA is that it does not cover situations
where the registrant is not a cybersquatter but is using a domain name for some
other purpose which may be commercial, or may be expressive, or may be a
combination of both. 143 Some registrants of <name.com> names will use them
to attract commercial customers, through advertising, for example.' 44 If they
can make more money by doing this than by selling the name, they will not be a

of the domain name <paulwright.com> to Paul Wright). For a discussion of these provisions by
a UDRP arbitrator, see Townsend v. Birt, WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center Case No.
D2002-0030, 2002 WL 827005, § 6 (Apr. 11, 2002) (Donahey, Davis & Sellers, Arbs.),
availableat http://www. wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2002/d2002-0030.html. The
arbitrator in Townsend provided:
The Panel finds that the protection of an individual politician's name, no matter
how famous, is outside the scope of the Policy since it is not connected with
commercial exploitation as set out in the Second WIPO Report. This does not
mean that Complainant is without remedy. The ACPA contains express provisions
protecting the rights in personal names. Complainant is free to pursue her claims in
that forum. And, as mentioned, the committee may have rights in the marks that are
sufficiently commercial as to entitle the committee to protection under the Policy.
Id.
141. See Moreland & Springer, supra note 4, at 386 (noting the high success rate of
celebrities in personal domain name disputes under the UDRP); id. at 394 ("A plethora of
disputes involving personal names have been submitted to ICANN Arbitration.").
142. See id. at 385 ("ICANN Arbitration provides an inexpensive and extremely quick
means of recovering a domain name.").
143. See Miriam Claire Beezy, Good Marksmanship, 29 L.A. LAw. 20, 24 (2006)
(discussing how some cybersquatters may avoid trademark infringement liability). Beezy
provides:
[T]he distinction between cybersquatter and cybergriper-that is, the difference
between bad faith registration and the use of a domain name that incorporates
another's mark and permissible registration and use, albeit unauthorized, of
another's mark-will become difficult to discern. Relying on First Amendment or
fair use defenses, sophisticated cybersquatters are certain to create visually
impressive gripe sites in a manipulative attempt to blur the line between free speech
and trademark infringement.
Id.
144. See Jacqueline Lipton, Clickfarming: The New Cybersquatting?,12 J. INTERNET L. 1,
12 (2008) (examining the extent to which current regulations cover situations in which "the use
of a domain name corresponding to another person's trademark or personal name [is used by
another person] to gain advertising revenues through click-on advertisements").
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cybersquatter under § I 129(1)(A).141 Unauthorized uses of personal domain
names for purely expressive purposes raise more difficult policy questions.
Should there be an overriding presumption that <name.com> names in
particular "rightfully" belong to people with corresponding names, regardless of
the use a registrant is making of the domain name? Such a presumption may
well trample on First Amendment concerns where the registrant's use of the
name is purely expressive.
Issues of First Amendment rights versus the rights of trademark holders
have arisen already in trademark disputes that do not involve personal names.
For example, some UDRP arbitrators have suggested that legitimate
146
commentary about a trademark holder should be protected on the Internet.
This might include allowing an unauthorized use of a domain name that
corresponds in some way with a registered trademark for, say, a gripe site about
the trademark holder. 147 However, judges and arbitrators in the trademark
context have not generally accepted that commentators should be allowed to
utilize the most intuitive domain name corresponding to the trademark-that is,
the <trademark.com> version of the name. 148 They have been relegated to
"lesser" forms of the domain name, such as those using a different generic Top
145. See 15 U.S.C. § I129( l)(A) (2006) (including as cybersquatters only those "with the
specific intent to profit from [another's] name by selling the domain name for financial gain to
that person or any third party").
146. See Bridgestone Firestone, Inc. v. Myers, WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center
Case No. D2000-0190, 2000 WL 33674384, § 6 (July 6,2000) (Haviland, Arb.), availableat
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0190.html ("[T]he exercise of
free speech for criticism and commentary... demonstrates a right or legitimate interest in the
domain name under Paragraph 4(c)(iii). The Internet is above all a framework for global
communication, and the right to free speech should be one of the foundations of Internet law.").
147. See id. (declining to find bad faith registration, an essential element of a UDRP claim,
when defendant registered the domain name <bridgestone-firestone.net> for the purpose of
complaining about the complainant's products and policies). There is some judicial authority
suggesting the same thing. For example, see Bosley v. Kremer, 403 F.3d 672, 679-80 (9th Cir.
2005), where the court provided:
Kremer is not Bosley's competitor; he is their critic. His use of the Bosley mark is
not in connection with a sale of goods or services-it is in connection with the
expression of his opinion about Bosley's goods and services. The dangers that the
Lanham Act was designed to address are simply not at issue in this case. The
Lanham Act ... does not prohibit all unauthorized uses of a trademark .... Any
harm to Bosley arises not from a competitor's sale of a similar product under
Bosley's mark, but from Kremer's criticism of their services. Bosley cannot use the
Lanham Act either as a shield from Kremer's criticism or as a sword to shut Kremer
up.
148. See BridgestoneFirestone,Inc., 2000 WL 33674384, § 6 (explaining that the use of a
<trademark.com> domain name by a third party is more likely to make him or her liable for
cybersquatting than would the use of a <trademark.net> domain name).
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Level Domain (gTLD) such as <.org> or <.net>, or those using a "qualifier" at
the end of the domain, such as <trademarksucks.com>.149 There perhaps is, or
should be, a presumption that well-known people such as celebrities and public
figures do have rights to the <name.com> versions of their names if this is an
identifiable Internet usage norm. If this presumption is correct, the ACPA will
not assist with its development or enforcement because of its focus on
cybersquatting, as opposed to web commentary.IS5
Interestingly, one state-California-has experimented with legislation
directed at personal name cybersquatting.' 5 l Section 17525(a) of California's
Business and Professions Code provides that:
It is unlawful for a person, with a bad faith intent to register, traffic in, or
use a domain name, that is identical or confusingly similar to the personal
personality, without regard to
name of another living person or deceased
52
the goods or services of the parties.
This legislation is broader than § 1129(1)(A) of the Lanham Act in that it
contemplates deceased as well as living persons and that it contains a list of
"bad faith factors" that includes an intention on the part of the registrant to
"mislead, deceive, or defraud voters."'' 5 3 This may be relevant to situations
where a politician is complaining about unauthorized use of her name in a
corresponding domain name, at least if the use of the name is misleading or
fraudulent in some way.' 5 4 However, it is an open question as to whether the
149. See id. (noting the federal cases in which domain names consisting of a trademark
followed by a pejorative qualifier, e.g., <trademarksucks.com>, have been found not to violate
cybersquatting laws). However, some arbitrators have held that even domain names employing
pejorative qualifiers should be in the control of the trademark holder rather than anyone else.
See, e.g., Societ6 Air France v. Virtual Dates, Inc., WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center
Case No. D2005-0168, 2005 WL 5143242,1 7 (May 24, 2005) (Wallberg &Le Stanc, Arbs.),
available at http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2005/d2005-0168.html
(deciding that the <airfrancesucks.com> domain name should be transferred to the trademark
holder and ought not be controlled by a gripe site operator).
150. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(i) (2006) (listing "a bad faith intent to profit" as one of
the elements of cybersquatting).
151. See CAL. Bus. AND PROF. CODE §§ 17525-17526 (West 2007) (creating a cause of
action for personal name cybersquatting).
152. Id. § 17525(a).
153. Id. § 175260).
154. On this point, see CAL. ELEc. CODE § 18320 (West 2008), which prohibits certain
activities described as "political cyberfraud." This legislation, although not specifically targeted
at personal name protection, may have the same results in practice as the Business and
Professions Code with respect to some uses of politicians' names in the lead-up to elections.
For a more general discussion of the operation of both Californian statutes in the political
domain name context, see Lipton, supra note 63, at 60-84, in which Lipton discusses the
shortcomings of current domain name law in the political context.
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legislation would, or indeed should, cover pure political gripe sites, such as the
<bobkeenan.com> and <lindamcculloch.com> examples described in Part
II.A.2. This is because a legitimate criticism of a politician may not be
regarded as misleading, deceiving or defrauding voters, provided it is clear
from the context that these websites are not endorsed by the politician in
question. On the other hand, if the view is taken that using a <name.com>
domain name for a website other than that authorized by the person in question
is automatically a misleading use of the name because Internet users would
expect the domain name to resolve to an authorized website, then the section
might have some application.
4. The Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy
This brings us back to the most popular avenue for personal domain name
disputes' 55 -the UDRP-which was adopted at the same time that the ACPA
was enacted. The UDRP is global in scope because of its incorporation into
relevant domain name registration agreements.156 It thus does away with some
of the jurisdictional problems inherent in both trademark- and personality
rights-based litigation.1 57 Again, the UDRP is aimed at preventing
155. See Beezy, supra note 143, at 23-24 (noting high success rate of celebrities in
personal domain name proceedings under the UDRP and surveying some of the recent
decisions); Moreland & Springer, supra note 4, at 394 ("A plethora of disputes involving
personal names have been submitted to ICANN Arbitration.").
156. See UDRP, supra note 3, at Note 2 ("This policy has been adopted by all accredited
domain-name registrars for domain names ending in .com, .net, and .org. It has also been
adopted by certain managers of country-code top-level domains (e.g., .nu, .tv, .ws)."). The
UDRP further states:
This Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the "Policy") has been
adopted by the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers ("ICANN"),
is incorporated by reference into your Registration Agreement, and sets forth the
terms and conditions in connection with a dispute between you and any party other
than us (the registrar) over the registration and use of an Internet domain name
registered by you.
Id. 1.
157. See, e.g., Wright v. Domain Source, Inc., No.02 C 2525,2002 WL 1998287, at *2-4
(N.D. Ill. Aug. 27, 2002) (discussing jurisdictional issues raised in complaint against
cybersquatter's registration of <paulwright.com> domain name).
The movie actor Kevin Spacey was also initially unsuccessful in a cybersquatting claim
against the registrant of <kevinspacey.com> on jurisdictional grounds, but later succeeded
under a UDRP proceeding. McCarthy, supranote 107. For completeness, it should also be
noted that the ACPA contains some in rem provisions to simplify jurisdictional issues for
actions taken under 15 U.S.C. § 1 125(dXl). See 15 U.S.C. § I 125(d)(2) (2006) (permitting an
offended trademark owner to "file an in rem civil action against a domain name in the judicial
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cybersquatting over trademarks. 158 The two major hurdles for personal domain
name complainants under the UDRP are that: (a) a trademark must be
established in the personal name, and (b) the UDRP will only apply to
cybersquatting.' 59 The UDRP contains a specific defense for domain name
registrants "making a legitimate noncommercial or fair use of the domain
name."' 60 It has not been clear what will constitute "fair use" in this context,
although noncommercial use should be relatively easy to identify in practice.
Further, it is unclear whether the UDRP is intended to cover personality rights
in individual names.' 6 ' A World Intellectual Property Organization ("WlPO")
Report on the subject specifically suggested that these rights are not covered
under the UDRP. 162 However, some UDRP arbitrators have felt that in the
absence of any specific prohibition on the protection of such rights, they are
covered by the UDRP 1 63 Thus, to the extent that complainants are specifically
basing claims on personality interests rather than trademark rights, there is
some confusion as to whether they should be successful in the absence of a
trademark right.64
district in which the domain name registrar, domain name registry, or other domain name
authority that registered or assigned the domain name is located ... ").
158. See UDRP, supra note 3, 1 4(a) ("You are required to submit to a mandatory
administrative proceeding in the event that a third party (a 'complainant') asserts to the
applicable Provider... that (i) your domain name is identical or confusingly similar to a
trademark or service mark in which the complainant has rights .... ).
159. See Beezy, supra note 143, at 24-25 ("[The distinction between cybersquatter and
cybergriper-that is, the difference between bad faith registration and the use of a domain name
that incorporates another's mark and permissible registration and use, albeit unauthorized, of
another's mark-will become difficult to discern."); Moreland & Springer, supra note 4, at
390-92 (noting that the UDRP will not assist a complainant where a domain name registrant is
using a domain name for commentary or otherwise to refer to the complainant in a legitimate
manner).
160. UDRP, supra note 3,1 4(c)(iii).
161. See Moreland & Springer, supra note 4, at 394-95 (citing WIPO report to the effect
that personality rights were never intended to be covered by the UDRP).
162. See WIPO REPORT, supra note 63, 1199 ("Persons who have gained eminence and
respect, but who have not profited from their reputation in commerce, may not avail themselves
of the UDRP to protect their personal names against parasitic registrations.").
163. See id. M 181-84 (surveying decisions in which UDRP arbitrators have ordered
transfers of domain names based on personal names); Spacey v. Alta. Hot Rods, National
Arbitration Forum Claim No. FA0205000114437, 2002 WL 1832705 (Aug. 1, 2002)
(Meyerson, Buchele & Harris Arbs.), available at http://www.adrforum.com/
domains/decisions/1 14437.htm ("Respondent has argued that... 'personality' disputes are
outside the scope of the Policy.... Because the Policy does not purport to exclude the category
of disputes involving personality rights, we join the many other Panels that have recognized that
the Policy does, indeed, protect such interests.").
164. See, e.g., Spacey, 2002 WL 1832705 (deciding that the text of the UDRP is not
ambiguous as to personality rights and refusing to exclude personality rights from the Policy on
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The current application of the UDRP to personal domain name disputes is
certainly confused in terms of the scope of the policy over personal names.
Some arbitrators are more prepared to recognize protectable interests in
personal names than others, usually on the basis of an unregistered trademark
right. Julia Roberts and Tom Cruise were found to have trademark interests in
their personal names,' 65 but a majority panel of UDRP arbitrators felt that
Bruce Springsteen did not likely have such rights.166 A UDRP arbitrator also
held that the late Anna Nicole Smith was not sufficiently famous to assert a
trademark interest in her personal name. 67 In the political context, "Hillary
Clinton" has been recognized as a trademark under the UDRP, 68 but the same
was not true for the Maryland gubernatorial candidate, and former lieutenant
governor, Kathleen Kennedy Townsend. 169

the basis that the Final Report of the WIPO Internet Domain Name Process recommends their
exclusion).
165. See Cruise v. Alta. Hot Rods, WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center Case No.
D2006-0560, 2006 WL 4002761, § 7 (July 5, 2006) (Abbott, Abel & Sorkin, Arbs.), available
at http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/ htmlI/2006/d2006-0560.html (ordering the
transfer of the domain name <tomcruise.com> to Tom Cruise); Roberts v. Boyd, WIPO
Arbitration and Mediation Center Case No. D2000-0210, 2000 WL 33674395, § 7 (May 29,
2000) (Page & Bridgeman, Arbs.), availableat http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/
html/2000/d2000-0210.html (ordering the transfer of the domain name <juliaroberts.com> to
Julia Roberts).
166. See Springsteen v. Burgar, WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center Case No. D20001532, 2001 WL 1705212, § 6 (Jan. 25, 2001) (Harris & Froomkin, Arbs.), available at
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-1532.html ("It should be
noted that no evidence has been given of the name Bruce Springsteen having acquired a second
meaning.... In the view of this Panel, it is by no means clear from the UDRP that it was
intended to protect proper names of this nature.").
167. See Smith v. DNS Research, Inc., National Arbitration Forum Claim No.
FA0312000220007, 2004 WL 2358216 (Feb. 21, 2004) (Davis, Arb.), available at
http://www.adrforum.com/domains/decisions/220007.htm ("The cases require a clear showing
of high commercial value and significant recognition of the name as solely that of the
performer.... The Panel does not believe Complainant's name has yet reached that level of
fame.").

168. See Clinton v. Dinoia, National Arbitration Forum Claim No. FA0502000414641,
2005 WL 853535 (Mar. 18, 2005) (Atkinson, Arb.), available at http://www.
adrforum.con/domains/decisions/414641.htm (deciding that Senator Clinton has an
unregistered trademark right in her personal name).
169. See Townsend v. Birt, WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center Case No. D20020030, 2002 WL 827005, § 6 (Apr. 11, 2005) (Donahey, Davis & Sellers, Arbs.), availableat
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/ 2002/d2002-0030.html ("The Panel finds
that the protection of an individual politician's name, no matter how famous, is outside the
scope of the Policy since it is not connected with commercial exploitation as set out in the
Second WIPO Report.").
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Although one could attempt some factual distinctions, it appears that
Roberts, Cruise, Springsteen and the late Anna Nicole Smith are all basically
entertainers who do not sell products or services under their names in a
trademark sense, unless you consider their names to be marks for the movies or
television shows they appear in, or the songs they perform. 170 If the marks
work in this way, it is not clear why Bruce Springsteen would not be a mark in
the same way as Julia Roberts and Tom Cruise. A UDRP arbitrator recognized
a trademark interest in Hillary Clinton's name partly on the basis that she had
authored books under her name. 171 If this is the basis for a trademark interest in
a personal name, shouldn't "Bruce Springsteen" also be a trademark as the
writer and performer of songs? If the test for trademarkability relates to
whether a person has written a song or book or appeared in a movie, then
would this not lead to peculiar results? For example, would all politicians and
public figures have to write an autobiography in order to achieve protected
trademark status for their personal names under the UDRP? What about
merchandising to establish trademark rights? 72 At the time of this writing,
Senator Barack Obama was selling a series of "Obama 2008" merchandise on
his campaign website,173 as was Senator Hillary Clinton with respect to her own
names on t-shirts,
presidential bid. 174 Would the use of the Senators' respective
75
blankets, and keyrings amount to a trademark use?1

170. See Verna, supra note 36, at 170-71 (questioning why certain famous personalities
are able to establish trademark rights in their personal names for UDRP purposes while others
are not).
171. See Clinton, 2005 WL 853535 (deciding that Senator Clinton has an unregistered
trademark right in her personal name in connection with both her political activities and her
career as an author of a number of books sold in commerce).
172. See Stacey Dogan &Mark Lemley, The MerchandisingRight: FragileTheory orFail
Accompli? 54 EMORY L.J. 461,464-65 (2005) [hereinafter Dogan & Lemley, Merchandising
Right] (describing the merchandising right as the protected use of a trademark not as a source
indicator but as a desirable feature of a product); Dogan & Lemley, supra note 28, at 1175-78
(discussing the merchandising right in trademark law).
173. Barack Obama Store, http://store.barackobama.com/ (last visited Oct. 5,2008) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
174. Senator Clinton, in fact, has a stand-alone website for merchandising purposes:
HillaryGear.com, http://www.hillarygear.com/ (last visited Oct. 5, 2008) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
175. In Senator Obama's case, it should be noted that he has already authored two books.
Thus, Senator Obama arguably already has trademark rights in his personal name. Cf.Clinton
v. Dinoia, National Arbitration Forum Claim No. FA0502000414641, 2005 WL 853535 (Mar.
18, 2005) (Atkinson, Arb.), available at http://www.adrforum.com/domains/decisions/
414641.htm (granting Senator Clinton an unregistered trademark right in her personal name
partly in connection with her career as an author of a number of books sold in commerce).
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Obviously rules relating to the protection of trademark interests are not
automatically geared towards protecting personal names, although they may
cover personal names in some cases. 176 Creating a new PDRP that replaces the
UDRP's trademark focus with a personality rights model would help here. It
would lead to more predictable results, and to the development of a more
nuanced jurisprudence geared to balancing the integrity of individual personas
against other interests such as free speech. It would remove the need for
arbitrators to explain why certain individuals should have trademark rights in
their personal names while others would not. In so doing, it would prevent an
inappropriate expansion of trademark law into the personal name context in
cyberspace.
III. PersonalityRights
A. The Right of Publicity and PersonalName Disputes
The right of publicity has been described as "the right of an individual to
control the commercial use of his or her name, likeness, signature, or other
78
177
It derives originally from the right of privacy.1
personal characteristics."'
Admittedly, this genesis has caused some confusion about the scope of the
modem day tort, which covers both privacy and some property-like aspects of
an individual's persona. 79 Over the years, the right has developed in different
176. The obvious case is where the personal name is, in fact, used as a trademark in a
business context. See, e.g., Trudeau v. Lanoue, No. 04 C 7165, 2006 WL 516579, at *1(N.D.
Il1.Mar. 2, 2006) (discussing Mr. Kevin Trudeau's name as a domain name); Schmidheiny v.
Weber, 285 F. Supp. 2d 613, 628 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (ordering the transfer of the domain name
<schmidheiny.com> to Stephan Schmidheiny).
177. 1 GILSON LALONDE, supra note 5, § 2.16[1].
178. Id.§ 2.16[5]; see also id. § 2.16[1][a] ("[S]ome courts view the right ofpublicityas a
direct descendant of the right of privacy."); Haemmerli, supra note 25, at 406 ("It is worth
asking... why the doctrinal confusion is so extreme. One reason is that... [the right of
publicity] may have taken a wrong turn forty-six years ago, when Second Circuit Judge Jerome
Frank severed the right of publicity from the right of privacy."); Madow, supranote 55, at 167
("As Thomas McCarthy tells the story, the right of publicity was 'carved out ofthe general right
of privacy'-'like Eve from Adam's rib'.... [T]his simile is... misleading. The right of
publicity was created not so much from the right of privacy as from frustration with it." (quoting

1 J. THoMAs McCARTHY,

THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY

§ 5:61 (2nd ed. 2006))).

179. See Haemmerli, supra note 25, at 407-08 (discussing the development of the right of
publicity). Haemmerli states that:
The doctrine... developed in a schizoid manner: publicity rights were purely
economic property rights, as distinct from "personal" privacy rights (thereby
enabling publicity rights to become transferable and descendible); but publicity
rights, even though economic in nature, were also part of the tort of invasion of
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states sometimes as a matter of common law180 and sometimes under state
legislation. 18 High profile examples include situations relating to unauthorized
uses of Elvis Presley's name and likeness after his death, 82 John Wayne's
likeness on greeting cards, 183 Martin Luther King Jr.'s likeness on unauthorized
plastic busts,'" Rosa Parks's name as a song title, 85 Arnold Schwarzenegger's
likeness as a bobblehead doll, 8 6 and Rudolph Giuliani's
likeness on an
87
advertisement run on city buses in New York City.'
privacy, thereby implying that they should be viewed as a species of personal
privacy rights, and as such nonassignable and nondescendible.
Id.; see also Dogan & Lemley, supra note 28, at 1208-09 (noting that privacy-based
justifications for right of publicity are legitimate and are different from the economic trademark
rationale for publicity rights).
180. Kentucky, for example, has a common law basis for the right of publicity. See
DINWOODIE & JANIS, supra note 30, at 823-27, for a discussion of Kentucky's long-standing
recognition of invasion of privacy as an actionable tort under the state's common law.
181. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 32-36-1-7 (West 2002) ("As used in this chapter,'rightof
publicity' means a personality's property interest in the personality's: name; voice; signature;
photograph; image; likeness; distinctive appearance; gestures; or mannerisms.").
182. See Estate of Elvis Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339, 1382-83 (D.N.J. 1981)
(enjoining the defendant from using any pictures, sketches, or artist's renderings of Elvis
Presley as promotional materials to advertise the defendant's stage theatrical production).
183. See Madow, supra note 55, at 141-45 (discussing the objections of John Wayne's
children to the use of John Wayne's picture on a greeting card sold mostly in gay bookstores as
offensive to his conservative macho image).
184. See Martin Luther King, Jr., Ctr. for Soc. Change, Inc. v. Am. Heritage Prods., 694
F.2d 674, 675-76 (11 th Cir. 1993) (involving a suit on behalf of the estate of Martin Luther
King, Jr. which sought an injunction to prevent the defendant from selling plastic busts of Dr.
King).
185. See Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 441-43 (6th Cir. 2003) (involving
publicity rights of Rosa Parks in the context of a song title using her name in relation to a hiphop recording that had nothing in particular to do with her or her work).
186. See William T. Gallagher, Strategic Intellectual Property Litigation, the Right of
Publicity, andthe Attenuationof FreeSpeech: Lessonsfrom the Schwarzenegger Bobblehead
Doll War (andPeace),45 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 581, 583 (2005) (arguing that the bobblehead
producers would have prevailed, based upon the First Amendment, had the case gone to trial
and asserting that the plaintiff's theory of the case was "legally unsupportable because it
presumed that the plaintiff had an almost absolute right to control the use of Schwarzenegger
image"); Charles J. Harder & Henry L. Self III, Schwarzeneggervs. Bobbleheads: The Casefor
Schwarzenegger,45 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 557, 558 (2005) (arguing that any politician has as
much right as any other person to control "the commercial use of his name, image and
identity"); David S. Welkowitz & Tyler T. Ochoa, The TerminatorAs Eraser: How Arnold
Schwarzenegger Used the Right of Publicityto Terminate Non-DefamatoryPoliticalSpeech, 45
SANTA CLARA L. REv. 651, 652 (2005) (arguing that basic flaws in the current analysis of
celebrity right of publicity actions led to the suppression of free speech in the Schwarzenegger
case).
187. See N.Y. Magazine v. Metro. Transit Auth., 987 F. Supp. 254, 257-59 (S.D.N.Y.
1997) (involving a suit brought by New York Magazine after the City of New York and the
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88
Because the right is arguably based both on aspects of property theory
and aspects ofpersonhood,' 89 it is uniquely able to protect individual personas
in ways that more purely economically based laws-such as trademark lawcannot. Most importantly, it protects aspects of an individual's persona
regardless of commercial trademark rights in the person's name. It can thus
protect personas of celebrities, public figures, and private individuals against
unauthorized commercial exploitations. Past practices have demonstrated that
the combination of interests people want to protect in their names online' 90
corresponds to the same mixture of morally and economically based protections
derived from the right of publicity.' 9 1 A PDRP based on personality rights
theory can draw on the policy justifications underpinning protection of an
individual's persona against unauthorized use. This would include protections
of an individual's online privacy and support the notion that individuals should
have some economic control of at least the <name.com> versions of their
personal names.

Metropolitan Transit Authority refused to run advertisements on city buses that used the slogan
"Possibly the only good thing in New York Rudy hasn't taken credit for"), affdin part, vacated
in part, 136 F.3d 123 (2nd Cir. 1998). Mayor Giuliani ultimately failed in his appeal on free
speech grounds. See N.Y. Magazine v. Metro. Transit Auth., 136 F.3d 123, 131 (2nd Cir. 1998)
("[P]rotecting the right to express skeptical attitudes toward the government ranks among the
First Amendment's most important functions."). The right of publicity tort has been also
extended to "lookalikes" and "soundalikes" of famous people. See generallyWaits v. Frito-Lay,
Inc., 978 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1992) (discussing the imitation of Tom Waits's distinctive singing
voice in an advertising campaign); White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir.
1992) (addressing the use of a Vanna White lookalike robot in a television commercial); Midler
v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988) (discussing the imitation of Bette Midler's
singing voice in an advertising campaign).
188. See supranote 54 and accompanying text (discussing numerous commentators' views
on the relationship between the right of publicity and property theory).
189. See supra note 56 and accompanying text (discussing numerous commentators' views
on the relationship between the right of publicity and aspects of personhood and privacy).
190. These interests include both economic rights, to control the value of personas in
cyberspace (e.g., Prince threatening legal action against unauthorized fan sites' exploitation of
images and information about him) as well as individual privacy rights (e.g., the desires of some
celebrities to prevent anyone using a <name.com> version of their personal name, such as Julia
Roberts and Tom Cruise).
191. See 1 GsoN LALONDE, supranote 5,§ 2.16[5] (noting different courts' approaches
to treating the right of publicity either as a property-based or a privacy-based right); Kwall,
supra note 54, at 36-37 ("The author has argued elsewhere that 'the unauthorized use of an
individual's persona potentially poses the maximum harm when the persona is being
appropriated.., for an objectionable purpose.....' [S]ome celebrities still might want to pursue
the limelight... , other celebrities, particularly those with strong moral philosophies, might
not." (quoting Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, The Right of Publicity vs. The FirstAmendment: A
Property and Liability Rule Analysis, 70 IND. L.J. 47, 70 (1994))); supra note 179 and

accompanying text (discussing the right of publicity).
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Another advantage of personality rights theory is that it can effectively
address situations that fall somewhere in between privacy, defamation,
copyright, and trademark law. Consider, for example, a case where a person
manufactures and sells an unauthorized coffee mug bearing a photograph of
Britney Spears. It may be difficult for Ms. Spears to bring an invasion of
privacy action when her persona has been developed largely for public
consumption.1 92 In other words, it is hard to claim invasion of privacy for
something that she herself has put into public view-her image and
likeness 193-unless the image on the coffee mug was taken in an unauthorized
private context: for example, by a photographer using a telephoto lens to shoot
her in the privacy of her own home. 194 Further, if the coffee mug does not
suggest anything defamatory about Ms. Spears, there will be no remedy in
defamation law. 195 Copyright also will be an unlikely avenue for Ms. Spears
unless she can bring a copyright infringement action with respect to the
photograph in question. 96 She does not hold a copyright interest in her own
person, although she may own the copyright in a particular photograph.
Trademark law, as we know, is also potentially problematic here.
Trademark law protects source indicators of products and services to prevent
consumer confusion and to encourage investment in developing those products
192. See Madow, supra note 55, at 168-69 ("Claims of... emotional injury [under privacy
law] were not nearly as convincing when they came from celebrities .... [H]ow could a movie
star or professional athlete, who had deliberately.., sought the limelight, complain of
embarrassment or hurt feelings when an advertiser or merchandiser simply gave his face some
additionalpublicity?").

193. See id. (discussing the unconvincing nature of celebrities' claims of emotional injury
under privacy law); Dogan & Lemley, supra note 28, at 1171 (noting that privacy actions were
not generally much use to celebrities because they were regarded as having purposely sought out
the limelight so there was no obvious invasion of privacy); Kwall, supra note 54, at 36 ("Some
courts... hold that celebrities cannot maintain right-of-privacy actions, although this view is
not universal.").
194. For a summary of the genesis of privacy rights based on media intrusion into personal
space, see Madow, supra note 55, at 167-70.
195. Kwall, supra note 54, at 36 ("Another significant disadvantage [for celebrities
protecting their personality rights] derives from the law of defamation, under which celebrities
enjoy less protection than other citizens. Defendants in defamation actions involving.., public
figures must meet the higher, 'actual malice' standard of liability .... ").
196. Copyright generally subsists in the author of an original work, which would typically
include a photographer in the case of a photograph, or the person who hired the photographer to
take the photograph under the "works for hire" doctrine. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (2000)
("Copyright in a work protected under this title vests initially in the author or authors of the
work."); id. § 201(b) ("In the case of a work made for hire, the.., person for whom the work
was prepared is considered the author..., and, unless the parties have expressly agreed
otherwise in a written instrument signed by them, owns all of the rights comprised in the
copyright.").
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and services. 97 Thus, if Ms. Spears could establish trademark rights in her
image and could establish that the coffee mugs in question were confusing
consumers as to source, origin, or affiliation with her, she may be able to
establish a trademark infringement claim. Alternatively, if she could establish a
trademark in her image and could establish also that the coffee mugs were
blurring or tarnishing the mark in the marketplace, she may be able to sustain a
claim in trademark dilution. 98 However, it is not clear whether Ms. Spears
actually has a trademark in her name or image.' 99
Even if Ms. Spears could establish a trademark interest in her likeness,
would it be sufficiently connected to the sale of merchandise, like coffee mugs,
to support a successful trademark infringement action? It would seem more
likely that any mark that did exist would relate to concerts and to music
products, not to the merchandising of coffee mugs and associated products. 2°
While there are some trademark cases that accept trademark infringement in the
merchandising context,20' this use of trademark law has been criticized as
straying from the basis of trademark infringement law in protecting marks per
se rather than marks used as trademarks.2 °2
197. See 2 GILSONLALONDE, supra note5, § 5.01 (noting that the general aim oftrademark
law is to prevent consumer confusion about the source of products or services); see also
DINWOODIE &JANIS, supra note 30, at 16-17 ("[Tlwo primary justifications have traditionally
been offered in support of trademark protection: to 'protect the public so that.., it will get the
product which it asks for;' and to ensure that 'the owner of a trade-mark... is protected in his
investment from its misappropriation by pirates and cheats."' (quoting S.REP. No. 79-1333, at 3
(1946)).
198. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2006) (creating a right in the owner of a famous mark that is
distinctive to file suit to enjoin the use of a mark or trade name in commerce by another person
because it is likely to cause dilution by blurring or dilution by tarnishment of the famous mark).
199. A search of the United States Patent and Trademark Office's Trademarks Database as
of November 11, 2007 shows that Britney Spears has, in fact, registered her name as a
trademark for various products and services. However, the mere fact of registration does not
prove that a trademark is valid. See DINWOODIE & JANIS, supra note 30, at 315 ("Trademark
registration... does not create rights; it only confirms the existence of rights.").
200. A search of the United States Patent and Trademark Office's Trademarks Database as
of November 11, 2007 shows that Britney Spears has registered her name as a mark for a variety
of products including arts and craft kits, desk organizers and backpacks. However, there does
not appear to be a registration specifically for coffee mugs.
201. For a detailed critique of the merchandising right in trademark law, see generally
Dogan & Lemley, MerchandisingRight, supra note 172.

202. In fact, there is currently a significant debate as to whether "trademark use" by a
defendant is an essential element of a trademark infringement action in the United States. See
Dinwoodie & Janis, Confusion over Use, supranote 22, at 1602-08 (rejecting the theory that
the user of an unauthorized trademark is only liable when it uses the plaintiff's trademark as a
"mark" and arguing that the theory's use in courts' analyses will result in insufficient market
regulation); Dinwoodie &Janis, Lessons,supra note 22, at 1704-05 (arguing that the Lanham
Act does not impose a trademark use requirement, that trademark use theory would still fail to
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Of course, there is also a possibility of a trademark dilution action, but,
again, Ms. Spears would have to establish the existence of a trademark right in
her image to begin with, as well as establishing that the use of the picture on the
coffee mug blurred or tarnished her mark in some way. By increasing
circulation of her image in the marketplace, it may actually enhance the value
of her mark rather than blurring or tarnishing it. 20 3 Additionally, the dilution
action is limited to "famous marks, ''20 4 and the name of a famous person is not
necessarily a famous mark.
People other than sports and entertainment celebrities may have greater
difficulties with trademark focused laws. A politician, public figure, or private
individual may have more trouble establishing trademark rights in her name or

create sufficient oversight of search engine results or advertising sales practices, and that offline
analogies should not be used to direct the outcomes of trademark disputes over online
practices); Dogan & Lemley, supra note 22, at 1670-73 (discussing the emergence of the
trademark use doctrine and arguing that it is required in order to quash suits brought against
defendants who have not attempted to promote their own products or services using the
protected mark); Lastowka, supra note 22, at 45-47 (discussing three recent cases in the federal
courts, which all concluded that the commercial sale of a search term in the "pop-up" context
does not amount to trademark use).
203. See Madow, supra note 55, at 168-69 (discussing the unconvincing nature of
celebrities' claims of emotional injury under privacy law). There is also some debate about
whether increased circulation of a name or image actually increases or rather decreases the value
of the celebrity identity:
Landes and Posner argue that overgrazing on identity leads to "face wearout," a
reduction in the value of one's persona due to declining interest in the person as her
persona is increasingly used. Their argument is at odds with the well-known
maxim that "all publicity is good publicity," though both sentiments are
oversimplifications of the phenomenon of fame. Publicity tends to feed off of itself

and, as a result, many uses actually increase the value of a celebrity's identity,
whatever the character of those uses. But additional publicity will increase the
value of an individual's identity only until a certain point, after which interest may
wane, along with the value of the identity. In other words, early additional uses
may create "network effects" that increase the value of an identity, but at some
point the number of uses will lead consumers to tire of that identity and it no longer

will capture their attention. In most cases, consumers lose interest in particular
cultural objects simply because something has come along that better defines them
at that point in time. The point of tedium, however, may be accelerated, at least in
terms of chronological time, as a result of overexposure. Some celebrities have
more enduring cultural significance than others and, as a result, almost every aspect
of an identity's long-term value will vary from individual to individual: the rate at
which value is added by early uses, the point at which additional uses begin to
erode value and the value of the persona at that point, and the rate at which the
value will decline beyond the wearout point.
McKenna, supra note 54, at 269-70.
204. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A) (2006) (defining "famous mark").
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likeness than a celebrity. 20 Thus, if the above hypothetical involved Rudolph
Giuliani coffee mugs, rather than Britney Spears coffee mugs, Giuliani may
have much more trouble establishing a trademark interest in his name or
likeness, simply because he does not sell any goods or services in connection
with his name or likeness in the trademark sense.
These are the kinds of situations where personality rights jurisprudence
may be helpful. Personality rights cover celebrity personas. 206 However,
they have also been used by politicians,20 7 public figures,20 8 and private
individuals 20 9 to provide remedies against unauthorized commercial uses of
their personas. Although generally regarded as an "economic" tort protecting
against commercial harm on the basis of a property-like right in a famous
person's identity, 210 it has also been recognized as having "moral"
205. See WIPO REPORT, supra note 63, 188 ("[T]he names of political figures, religious
leaders, scientists and historical persons may never have been used in commerce and, thus, are
unlikely to have trademarks associated with them.").
206. See 1GILSON LALONDE, supranote5, § 2.16[l][b] ("The right ofpublicity is generally
available only to celebrities, the Luciano Pavarottis, the John McEnroes, the Robert Redfords.
Cases involving unknowns are usually brought under the older right of privacy.").
207. See N.Y. Magazine v. Metro. Transit Auth., 987 F. Supp. 254, 257-59 (S.D.N.Y.
1997) (involving a suit brought by New York Magazine after the City of New York and the
Metropolitan Transit Authority refused to run advertisements on city buses that used the slogan
"Possibly the only good thing in New York Rudy hasn't taken credit for"), aff'd in part,vacated
in part, 136 F.3d 123 (2nd Cir. 1998). Mayor Giuliani ultimately failed in his appeal on free
speech grounds. N.Y. Magazine v. Metro. Transit Auth., 136 F.3d 123, 131 (2nd Cir. 1998)
("[P]rotecting the right to express skeptical attitudes toward the government ranks among the
First Amendment's most important functions.").
208. See supra notes 184-85 and accompanying text (discussing personality rights as
applied to Rosa Parks and Martin Luther King Jr.).
209. See Tellado v. Time-Life Books, Inc., 643 F. Supp. 904, 905-08 (D.N.J. 1986)
(involving the unauthorized use of image of private individual plaintiff taken during Vietnam
war for advertising materials relating to a book); 1GILSON LALONDE, supranote 5, § 2.16[1][a]
("The first successful right of privacy action... was designed to enable a non-public figure to
retain his anonymity. The courts... enjoin[ed] the unauthorized commercial use of the
plaintiff's name and likeness, and they awarded general damages for injury to individual
feelings, much as is done for libel and slander."); see also Kwall, supra note 57, at 96-100
(discussing Tellado v. Time-Life Books, Inc. and the different implications for the plaintiff's suit
had the photo been used in the book or inthe promotional materials).
210. See Dogan & Lemley, supra note 28, 1172-74 (noting growth in the view that the
right of publicity is an economic right); Haemmerli, supra note 25, at 392 ("The right of
publicity is traditionally formulated as the right to exploit the commercial value of personal
identity."); Konsky, supra note 55, at 349 ("[M]ost courts and commentators now ground the
right of publicity in property rationales."); Kwall, supra note 54, at 15 ("[A] property-based
conception for publicity rights is the natural outgrowth of our cultural norms as well as our
theoretical conceptions of property."); McKenna, supra note 54, at 226 ("Because the right of
publicity has focused entirely on the economic value of a celebrity's identity, courts considering
claims have no basis to differentiate among the variety of ways in which others might exploit
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elements. 21' The key moral harm that has been protected by the right of
publicity is more like a privacy protection than a property protection. The
obvious example is where unauthorized commercial use is made of an
individual's name or likeness in circumstances in which that individual wants
to maintain the privacy of her image, rather than control commercial profits
derived from her image. Another advantage of a right of publicity framework
is that courts have already engaged in balancing exercises between personality
rights and the First Amendment in a variety of contexts.21 2 Such jurisprudence
is more relevant to the personal domain name dispute context than that relating
to the balance between trademark interests and the First Amendment.
Questions have arisen under the right of publicity as to whether purely
expressive conduct by the defendant, not necessarily resulting in a commercial
profit, should be compensable. Rogers v. Grimaldi,213 for example, is a case in
which the expressive speech elements of the defendant's use of the plaintiff's
name and likeness were not compensable under trademark law or under the

that value.").
211. See Haemmerli, supra note 25, at 390 (discussing "the right of publicity as an
extension of human worth and autonomy, rather than as a purely economic interest. ... ");
Kwall, supra note 57, at 50 ("[E]conomic harms are typically far less onerous than
nonmonetizable harms which derive from uses the plaintiff would never have condoned. These
nonmonetizable, or morally based, harms can include reputational damage, distasteful
associations, or uses which advance a substantive argument the plaintiff finds objectionable.");
McKenna, supra note 54, at 231 ("All individuals have a legitimate interest in autonomous selfdefinition, and celebrities deserve protection against uses of their identities that implicate that
interest.").
212. See Felcher & Rubin, supra note 57, at 1590 ("The First Amendment inevitably
defines the operation and extent of the right of publicity; once the defendant can establish that
the expression in question is protected, he will almost invariably prevail."); Haemmerli, supra
note 25, at 441-58 (analyzing First Amendment issues involving the right of publicity); Kwall,
supra note 54, at 46-47 ("We do not deprive the owners of famous trademarks ... oftheir rights
just because the public has played some role in placing a value on these works. Therefore,
right-of-publicity critics must justify why the cachet of a person's fame should be treated
differently."); Kwall, supra note 57, at 48-52 (suggesting a property versus liability rule basis
for balancing First Amendment concerns against right of publicity claims); Madow, supranote
55, at 140 (describing the role of the consumer as an active and creative participant in the
creation of cultural commodities); Rielly, supra note 54, at 1172-74 (balancing First
Amendment concerns with the publicity rights of public figures and politicians); see also
Zimmerman, supranote 57, at 39-43 (arguing that the law of publicity will no longer be able to
rely on the fact that commercial speech receives less protection under the Constitution than
political speech and proposing that this will result in publicity rights being subject to more
rigorous scrutiny).
213. Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 1005 (2d Cir. 1988) (concluding that the use of the
plaintiff's name in a movie title, a minimally relevant use of a celebrity's name, did not violate
the Lanham Act or Oregon's common law right of publicity).
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right of publicity. 214 In that case, the defendant had used the title "Ginger and
Fred" in a film about a cabaret act that impersonated Ginger Rogers and Fred
Astaire. 2 15 The court held that the defendants had used no more of Ms.
Rogers's identity than was necessary for expressive artistic purposes. 216 Ms.
Rogers was therefore unsuccessful on her claims in both trademark law and
publicity rights.
In the Internet context, one analog to the Rogers facts might be the use of
a personal domain name resolving to a website that commented on the person
in question. The commentary could be a fan website, a parody, or a website
critical of the person. Assuming the domain name registrant did not receive
any commercial profit from the use of the domain name, the right of publicity
may not provide any compensation to the plaintiff. However, if the registrant
was attempting to make a profit from the name either by selling the name
itself--that is, cybersquatting---or by using the name to attract customers to the
website for commercial purposes, a right of publicity claim would more likely
be successful.
B. Does a PersonalityRights FrameworkImprove on the
CurrentSituation?
1. PersonalityRights vs. the UDRP
Despite the theoretical suitability of personality rights law for personal
217
domain name disputes, most disputes are currently brought under the UDRP.
214.
215.

Id.
Id. at 996-97.

216. The Court of Appeals provided:
[W]e hold that section 43(a) of the Lanham Act does not bar a minimally relevant
use of a celebrity's name in the title of an artistic work where the title does not
explicitly denote authorship, sponsorship, or endorsement by the celebrity or
explicitly mislead as to content. Similarly, we conclude that Oregon law on the
right of publicity, as interpreted by New York, would not bar the use of a
celebrity's name in a movie title unless the title was "wholly unrelated" to the
movie or was "simply a disguised commercial advertisement for the sale of goods
or services.
Id.at 1005.
217. There are only a small handful of cases where the right of publicity has been argued in
the domain name context. See, e.g., Trudeau v. Lanoue, No. 04 C 7165, 2006 WL 516579, at
*2-4 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 2,2006) (assessing plaintiff's right of publicity claim, amongst other unfair
competition claims, in a dispute involving a domain name corresponding with the plaintiff's
personal name); Wright v. Domain Source, Inc., No. 02 C 2525,2002 WL 1998287, at *6 (N.D.
Ill. Aug. 27, 2002) (assessing a claim brought by the plaintiff under CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE
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There are a number of reasons why this has been the case, relating to cost,
timing, and general accessibility for individual complainants as compared with
litigation under either trademark or right of publicity law. 218 Judicial
proceedings will be more costly, more time-intensive, and more resourceintensive than online arbitration.1 9 Compared even with federal trademark
law, the right of publicity has a number of procedural disadvantages. For one
thing, it is state law that is not harmonized nationally within the United
States,220 let alone globally. This potentially causes conflicts of law issues,
including problems of asserting
jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant, 22I as
222
well as choice of law issues.
Apart from these problems with litigation, it is likely that complainants are
simply more focused on the UDRP for any domain name dispute than on the
right of publicity. When complainants and their legal counsel think of personal
§ 17525, which is a cyberspace analog to right of publicity law in some respects as it protects
personal names in the domain space against certain unauthorized uses); Beezy, supra note 143,
at 23-24 (noting high success rate of celebrities in personal domain name proceedings under the
UDRP and surveying some of the recent decisions); Moreland & Springer, supranote 4, at 386
(noting high success rate of celebrities in personal domain name disputes under the UDRP)
(citing STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS UNDER UNIFORM DOMAIN NAME DISPUTE
RESOLUTION POLICY, http://www.icann.org/udrp/proceedings-stat.htm); id.at 394 ("A plethora
of disputes involving personal names have been submitted to ICANN Arbitration.").
218. See Moreland & Springer, supra note 4, at 395 ("ICANN Arbitration offers celebrities
and their lawyers a quick, cost effective and usually successful means to recover domain names
registered by third parties that incorporate the celebrity's name.").
219. Id.
220. See Rogers v Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 1002-05 (2d Cir. 1988) (discussing problems
of applying Oregon's right of publicity law in a New York forum); 1 GILSON LALONDE, supra
note 5, § 2.16[l ] ("The publicity right is still developing and the courts are far from unanimous
in defining its scope. Precedent (or the lack of it) in the selected forum may thus dictate reliance
on trademark rights and unfair competition claims to the exclusion of, or in addition to, the
publicity right."); Haemmerli, supra note 25, at 389 ("Existing practice [under the right of
publicity] is... confused, with fifty state regimes protecting differing aspects of identity, for
varied terms, and with disparate remedies.").
221. This has been an issue with respect to personal domain name disputes in the past. See
Wright v. Domain Source, Inc., No. 02 C 2525,2002 WL 1998287, at *2-4 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 27,
2002) (discussing jurisdictional issues raised in complaint against cybersquatter's registration of
<paulwright.com> domain name). The movie actor Kevin Spacey was also initially
unsuccessful in a cybersquatting claim against the registrant of <kevinspacey.com> on
jurisdictional grounds, but later succeeded under a UDRP proceeding. See Spacey v. Zuccarini,
National Arbitration Forum Claim No. FA0103000096937, 2001 WL 1708365 (May 8, 2001)
(Yachnin, Arb.), available at http://www.adrforum.com/domains/decisions/96937.htn
(transferring the domain name <kevinspacey.com> to Kevin Spacey after the arbitrator
determined Mr. Spacey had satisfied all three elements required under the ICANN Policy). See
generally McCarthy, supra note 107.
222. See, e.g., Grimaldi, 875 F.2d at 1002-05 (discussing problems with applying
Oregon's right of publicity law in a New York forum).
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domain name disputes, they probably instinctively categorize them as
"domain name disputes," rather than "personal name disputes," and thus
focus on the set of rules geared towards resolving the former.223 In many
ways, this is a problem of classification. If one classifies a given dispute as
a "domain name dispute" rather than as a "dispute to protect the integrity of
an individual's persona," one will tend to think of domain name-focused
rules, rather than personal identity rules.
This Article identifies advantages in marrying the substance of the
personality rights tort with the procedural advantages of the UDRP to
arrive at the best solutions regardless of whether the dispute is classified as
being primarily "about domain names" or "about personality." Under a
new PDRP, one could achieve the time and cost benefits of the UDRP, but
with a clearer focus on the aspects of an individual's persona that should be
protected in the domain space as a substantive policy matter. One could
also avoid undesirable expansions of trademark law into matters involving
personal names that do not really operate as trademarks, as well as
minimize inconsistencies in arbitrations about which personal names
should be accepted as trademarks.
In substance, what would a personality rights-based PDRP do
differently than the UDRP? Take, at a broad level of generality, two
classes of conduct that concern potential personal domain name
complainants. The first is comprised of cybersquatting situations where a
registrant has registered or used a domain name corresponding with the
plaintiff's personal name with the intent to sell it for a profit. The second
is comprised of situations where a registrant does not want to sell the
domain name, but wants to use it for commercial or commentary purposes.
With respect to the first class--cybersquatting-a personality rights
framework improves on the UDRP in several ways. It does not require the
complainant to establish a trademark interest in her personal name.2 24
Thus, it applies as equally to extremely famous celebrities 225 as to
223. Of course, there are some legislative provisions that could be categorized as aimed at
both domain name disputes and personal names. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1129(1)(A) (2006)
("Any person who registers a domain name that consists of the name of another living person, or
a name substantially and confusingly similar thereto, without that person's consent, with the
specific intent to profit.., by selling the domain name for financial gain .... shall be liable in a
civil action ...

.").

However, these laws require expensive domestic litigation as opposed to

inexpensive online arbitration.
224. Of course, infringement under legislative provisions such as 15 U.S.C. § 1129(l)(A)
does not require establishment of a trademark in a personal name, but it does require often
expensive litigation.
225. The right of publicity has its most obvious applications in the case of celebrity
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politicians,22 6 public figures,2 27 and private individuals, 228 not to mention
"lesser celebrities., 229 It clearly would cover cybersquatting because it prevents
the use of another's name or likeness for an unauthorized commercial profit.23 °
personas. See Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1096-98 (9th Cir. 1992) (deciding a
right of publicity action regarding Tom Waits's distinctive singing voice); Rogers v. Grimaldi,
875 F.2d 994, 996-97 (2nd Cir. 1988) (adjudicating a right of publicity action regarding Ginger
Rogers's name); Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 461-62 (9th Cir. 1988) (assessing a
right of publicity action regarding Bette Midler's distinctive singing voice); 1 GiLsON LALONDE,
supra note 5, § 2.16[1l] ("The right of publicity, a developing common law right of great value
to the celebrity.. . ."); Michael A. Carrier, CabiningIntellectual PropertyThrough a Property
Paradigm, 54 DuKE L.J. 1, 141-42 (2004) ("[R]eferences to celebrities are essential for
dialogue on issues such as culture and values .... By putting alternative conceptions of
celebrity off limits, the right of publicity.., threatens to suppress expression and to give
celebrities the power to censor alternative versions of their images that are.., iconoclastic or
irreverent."); Dogan & Lemley, supranote 28, at 1164 (conceiving right ofpublicityin terms of
protecting celebrities' names and likenesses); Madow, supranote 55, at 178-238 (critiquing the
right of publicity in the celebrity context); McKenna, supra note 54, at 226 (conceiving of the
right of publicity as being focused "entirely on the economic value of a celebrity's identity").
226. See Lipton, supra note 63, at 55 (examining "the large gaps and inconsistencies in
current domain name law and policy as to domain name use in the political context"); Rielly,
supra note 54, at 1169-72 (discussing the application of the right of publicity to political
figures); supra notes 186, 207 and accompanying text (discussing the right of publicity as it
applied to Arnold Schwarzenegger and Rudolph Giuliani).
227. See supra notes 184-85 and accompanying text (discussing the right of publicity as it
applied to Rosa Parks and Martin Luther King, Jr.).
228. See Trudeau v. Lanoue, No.04 C 7165,2006 WL 516579, at *2-4 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 2,
2006) (addressing a suit where the plaintiff argued a right of publicity claim, amongst other
unfair competition claims, in a dispute involving a domain name corresponding with the
plaintiff's personal name); Wright v. Domain Source, Inc., No. 02 C 2525, 2002 WL 1998287,
at *6 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 27, 2002) (addressing a claim brought by the plaintiff under CAL. Bus. &
PROF. CODE § 17525, which is a cyberspace analog to right of publicity law in some respects as
it protects personal names in the domain space against certain unauthorized uses).
229. In other words, it would cover situations in which people like Bruce Springsteen and
Anna Nicole Smith had trouble convincing UDRP arbitrators that they held trademark interests
in their personal names. See Smith v. DNS Research, Inc., National Arbitration Forum Claim
No. FA0312000220007, 2004 WL 2358216 (Feb. 21, 2004) (Davis, Arb.), available at
http://www.adrforum.com/domains/decisions/220007.htm ("[lit is unlikely that the evidence...
of [Ms. Smith's] career, in and of itself, is sufficient to establish common law trademark
rights .... [T]he mere fact of having a successful career as an actress, singer or TV program
star does not provide exclusive rights to the use of a name .... ."); Springsteen v. Burgar, WIPO
Arbitration and Mediation Center Case No. D2000-1532, 2001 WL 1705212, § 6 (Jan. 25,
200 1) (Harris & Froomkin, Arbs.), availableat http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/
html/2000/d2000-1532.html ("[I]n the case of very well known celebrities, their names can
acquire a distinctive secondary meaning .... [N]o evidence has been given of... 'Bruce
Springsteen' having acquired a secondary meaning .... [I]t is by no means clear from the
UDRP that it was intended to protect proper names of this nature.").
230. See 1 GILsON LALONDE, supranote 5, § 2.16[l] ("The right ofpublicity... is the right
of an individual to control the commercial use of his or her name, likeness, signature, or other
personal characteristics."); Carrier, supra note 225, at 22-23 ("The right of publicity prevents
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Thus, it would cover all cybersquatting involving a personal name regardless of
the trademarkability of the name. 3
One might argue that the deficiencies of the UDRP here could be
remedied easily enough by simply including a personal name as a protected
interest under the UDRP alongside a trademark. This would prohibit all
cybersquatting involving any personal name regardless of whether or not the
name in question operated as a trademark.232 Nevertheless, the UDRP for the
most part is still geared at protecting marks in cyberspace against unauthorized
commercial uses likely to confuse consumers as to the source or origin of goods
or services.233 In other words, it is still focused on aspects of trademark law
that are not necessarily well suited to addressing concerns about unauthorized
commercial uses of personal names. Thus, even adding a personal name as a
protected interest under the existing UDRP would likely lead to inconsistent
the appropriation of an individual's name or likeness for commercial advantage."); Konsky,
supra note 55, at 347 ("The right of publicity prohibits commercial use of a person's name or
likeness without the person's consent."); Kwall, supranote 57, at 47 ("The right of publicity is a
legal theory which enables individuals to protect themselves from unauthorized, commercial
appropriations of their personas.").
231. Of course, § 1129 of the Lanham Act would also cover the same conduct. See 15
U.S.C. § 1129 (2006) (stating that anyone registering a domain name of another with the intent
to profit "shall be liable in a civil action"). However, that involves litigation as opposed to
inexpensive online arbitration, so a PDRP would be an improvement over the Lanham Act for
personal domain name disputes. See infra Part IV.D (discussing remedies available under
PDRP).
232. See Lipton, supranote 63, at 69 (discussing the possibility of adding personal names
as a protected interest under the UDRP and noting the practical difficulties of protecting
personal names on an international level).
233. See, e.g., UDRP, supra note 3, 4(b) (limiting a finding of bad faith registration and
use of a domain name). On bad faith, the UDRP provides:
[T]he following circumstances, in particular but without limitation, if found by the
Panel to be present, shall be evidence of the registration and use of a domain name
in bad faith: (i) circumstances indicating that you have registered or you have
acquired the domain name primarily for the purpose of selling, renting, or
otherwise transferring the domain name registration to the complainant who is the
owner of the trademark or service mark or to a competitor of that complainant, for
valuable consideration in excess of your documented out-of-pocket costs directly
related to the domain name; or (ii) you have registered the domain name in order to
prevent the owner of the trademark or service mark from reflecting the mark in a
corresponding domain name, provided that you have engaged in a pattern of such
conduct; or (iii) you have registered the domain name primarily for the purpose of
disrupting the business of a competitor; or (iv) by using the domain name, you have
intentionally attempted to attract, for commercial gain, Internet users to your web
site or other on-line location, by creating a likelihood of confusion with the
complainant's mark as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation, or endorsement of
your web site or location or of a product or service on your web site or location.
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and arbitrary results as UDRP arbitrators attempted to apply trademark-like
tests to personal name disputes.234
Additionally, the UDRP is not particularly appropriate for the second class
of personal domain name conflicts: that is, situations in which the registrant
does not want to sell the name for a profit, but rather wants to use it herself for
some reason. These situations really boil down into two sub-categories which
can overlap: commerce and commentary. Some unauthorized uses of a
personal domain name will be commercial and some will be for commentary
purposes-whether it be idolatry, parody or criticism, or a combination.
Additionally, it is possible for a website to contain elements of commerce and
elements of commentary simultaneously. 235 A fan website may charge a fee for
joining a relevant fan club, online chat group or the like. It may equally sell
unauthorized celebrity merchandise. A website critical of a particular person
may sell or advocate the sale of merchandise or information supporting a view
critical of that person or her views.2 36 Even a parody website may advocate the
sale of merchandise critical of the person or institution being parodied.237
These kinds of cases raise difficult questions of balancing interests in an
individual's persona against the First Amendment. Personality rights law is the
body of law that has historically dealt with this balance. Trademark law has
dealt with a similar balance relating to protecting free speech against trademark
238
interests.2 8 However, the interests of a trademark holder are somewhat
different than those of an individual in her persona, and the appropriate body of
234. See Lipton, supra note 63, at 69 ("On the global scale, there are more names and
presumably more people, and even potentially famous people, with the same or similar names.
Additionally, different legal systems may well take different attitudes to the protection of
personal names in the domain space." (citations omitted)); see also infra Part IV.E (discussing
the concerns raised when personal names are employed in an unauthorized way for political and
commercial purposes).
235. See, e.g., People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. Doughney, 113 F. Supp.
2d 915, 917-18 (E.D. Va. 2000) (discussing a parody site of PETA linking to websites where
fur and animal products antithetical to plaintiff's views were available for sale), aff'd, 263 F.3d
359 (4th Cir. 2001).
236. See, e.g., Lamparello v. Falwell, 420 F.3d 309, 311 (4th Cir. 2005) (discussing a
gripesite containing links to amazon.com webpage selling a book critical of Reverend Jerry
Falwell's views on homosexuality), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1069 (2006).
237. See, e.g., Peoplefor the Ethical Treatment ofAnimals, 113 F. Supp. 2d at 917-18
(concerning parody site linking to websites where fur and animal products antithetical to
plaintiff's views were available for sale), aff'd, 263 F.3d 359 (4th Cir. 2001).
238. See generally Margreth Barrett, Domain Names, Trademarks and the First
Amendment: SearchingforMeaningful Boundaries,39 CoNN. L. REv. 973 (2007) (discussing
the proper role of trademark rights on the Internet versus free speech protections); Lipton, supra
note 52 (discussing the possible problems in the extension of trademark protections into the
Internet, resulting in infringement upon free speech).
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rules should be applied in each case. Rights in individual personas flow from
both theories of personhood 3 9 and theories of property,240 while trademark
rights are focused purely on commercial source identifiers. 24'
2. Case Study 1: UnauthorizedCelebrity Websites
Two examples might be useful to illustrate ways in which a personality
rights framework for personal domain name disputes could differ from a
trademark-focused model. They are: (a) a celebrity concerned about an
unauthorized fan website utilizing her personal name as a domain name; and
(b) a politician concerned about a website that uses her personal name as a
domain name and contains messages critical of her, or her views. These
examples have been chosen because they both implicate First Amendment
concerns. However, the first example may additionally implicate commercial
values much more than the second example. Each example deals with ways in
which a personality rights framework might balance the complainant's rights in
her persona against First Amendment concerns.
In the first case, the trademark-focused laws would obviously not help the
celebrity at all unless she could establish a trademark interest in her personal
name. 242 Assuming she could establish such an interest, she would have to
establish that the website in question was confusing consumers for a trademark
infringement action, 243 was dilutive of her name in commerce for a dilution
239. See Haemmerli, supra note 25, at 413 ("A concept of autonomy taken from idealist
philosophy, however, can provide a rationale for a property interest in individual identity.").
240. See supra note 54 and accompanying text (tracing the origins of rights in individual
personas back to theories of property rights).
241. See DINWOODIE & JANIS, supra note 30, at 563-66 (noting that dilution protection
under the Lanham Act focuses on protecting commercial source identifiers to protect both
consumers and producers) (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 1125(c), 1127 (2000)); see also Stacey Dogan &
Mark Lemley, Trademarksand ConsumerSearch Costs on the Internet,41 Hous. L. REv. 777,
786 (2004) ("Both consumers and producers, these courts point out, benefit from having access
to truthful information about the source of products and services."). Traditional trademark law
has generally been premised on two interconnected aims: (a) to protect the public when
purchasing a product or service to ensure that the purchasers get what they think they are paying
for in terms of goods or services from a particular source, and (b) to ensure that those who
invest in developing goodwill in a particular mark are protected against unfair misappropriations
of that goodwill. Id. at 786-87.
242. See 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (2006) (dictating the remedies available when a trademark
interest is violated). But see id. § 1129(1) (allowing for remedies through a civil action when an
unauthorized person registers a domain name without any trademark interest). Remedies only
exist under 15 U.S.C. § 1129(1), however, if the unauthorized registrator "sell[s] the domain
name for financial gain." Id.
243. See id. § 1114 ("Any person who shall, without the consent of the registrant (a) use in
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action, 244 or was registered and used in bad faith for an ACPA action 245 or a
UDRP arbitration. 246 This is putting to one side an action under the personal
name provisions of the Lanham Act on the basis that they only prohibit bad
faith intents to sell the relevant domain name, and not unauthorized uses of the
name per se.247
An unauthorized fan website is probably not confusing to consumers
provided that it is not passing itself off as an authorized fan website. Thus, a
disclaimer might cure any confusion and mitigate against the likelihood of a
successful trademark infringement action. 22448 If no commercial activity is
conducted on the website, it is not likely to be "in commerce" for the purposes
of a dilution action. 249 However, if there are commercial activities, such as
commerce any reproduction... of a registered mark... in connection with such use is likely to
cause confusion... shall be liable in a civil action."); see also id. § 1125(a) (holding liable in a
civil action anyone using unregistered trademarks in a false or misleading way).
244. See id. § 1125(c)(1) ("[Tihe owner of a famous mark that is distinctive.. . shall be
entitled to an injunction against another person who... commences use of a mark or trade name
in commerce that is likely to cause dilution by blurring or dilution by tamishment.").
245. See id. § 125(d)(1)(A) ("A person shall be liable in a civil action by the owner of a
mark... if... that person (i) has a bad faith intent to profit from that mark; including a
personal name which is protected as a mark under this section.").
246. See UDRP, supra note 3, 4(a) (allowing for an administrative proceeding only when
a domain name identical or confusingly similar to a person's name is used in bad faith without a
right to do so).
247. See 15 U.S.C. § 1129(1) (2006) (prohibiting explicitly the act of registering a domain
name "that consists of the name of another living person" and then selling the name but not
identifying any prohibited unauthorized uses).
248. See Bridgestone Firestone, Inc. v. Myers, WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center
Case No. D2000-0190, 2000 WL 33674384, § 6 (July 6, 2000) (Haviland, Arb.), availableat
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/ 2000/d2000-0190.html (differentiating the
attempts at deception in cybersquatting cases). The BridgestoneFirestone court specifically
stated:
In the cybersquatting cases, the domain names in question generally were
<www.trademark.com> domain names, which prevented the trademark holder from
utilizing the customary commercial domain name for its "official" site .... Here,
however, the domain name registrant has not usurped the <.com> domain, but has
utilized only the <.net> domain, has posted disclaimers on the website homepage,
and has included criticism or commentary on the site so that a reasonably prudent
Internet user can tell that the site is not the trademark holder's "official site."
Id.; see also Haemmerli, supra note 25, at 400 (noting that in a non-Internet setting that the use
of a highly visible disclaimer on a film might negate likelihood of confusion). But see Planned
Parenthood Fed'n of Am., Inc. v. Bucci, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d 1430, 1439 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) ("Any
ensuing confusion resulting from defendant's use of plaintiff's mark as his domain name and
home page address is likely to be destructive to the image that plaintiff, the senior user of the
mark, has established." (citing MGM-Pathe Commc'n Co. v. Pink Panther, 774 F. Supp. 869,
876 (S.D.N.Y. 1991))).
249. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(C) (2006) (stating that "any noncommercial use of a
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charging membership fees or engaging in advertising, could an unauthorized
fan site be said to be dilutive of a celebrity persona as a mark? Even if there is
some commercial activity, it is possible that the use of the domain name could
be excused under the new "commentary" defense to dilution inserted into the
Lanham Act in 2006.250 Obviously, the fan site creates some "noise" around
the celebrity's name, but such noise may be reinforcing the celebrity's identity,
rather than blurring or detracting from it. 25 1 Additionally, a celebrity's name is
unlikely to meet the def'nition of "famous mark. 2 52 Thus, a dilution action
may not be successful in this case. Further, if the domain name has been
registered not in bad faith but for the purposes of legitimate fan-related
commentary, the provisions of§ 1125(d)(1)(A) of the Lanham Act are unlikely
to be satisfied in terms of a traditional cybersquatting action.253
Would the right of publicity give a different result here and, just as
importantly, should it? One might argue that because trademark laws carry
these inherent limitations, partly to balance them against First Amendment
concerns, the same should be true of personality rights law. Otherwise,
individual names and likenesses will be overpropertized and this result will
chill free expression on the Internet. 254 However, it is important not to consider
rights in personal names with too much emphasis on trademark law.
Personality rights clearly implicate a number of concerns similar to trademark
law.255 However, they also protect other aspects of an individual's personality,
such as the right to keep certain aspects of a persona out of the public
domain. 256 Thus, while trademark jurisprudence may in some ways inform the

mark" will "not be actionable by dilution by blurring or dilution by tarnishment").
250. See id. § 1125(c)(3)(A)(ii) (excusing identifying the plaintiff for the purposes of
parody, criticism, and commentary from the scope of a trademark dilution action).
251. See supra note 203 and accompanying text (discussing the pros and cons of creating
noise around a celebrity's name).
252. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A) (2006) (defining a "famous mark").
253. See id.
§ I 125(d)(1)(A) (dictating that under cyberpiracyprevention only those people
that use a protected mark with a bad faith intent to profit will be liable in a civil action). The
same will be true of an attempt to satisfy the bad faith requirements of the UDRP. See UDRP,
supra note 3, 4(a)(iii) (stating bad faith as a requirement in order to be found liable in an
administrative proceeding).
254. See Dogan & Lemley, supra note 28, at 1190 ("The structure and content of trademark
law provide a theoretical justification for a bounded right of publicity." (citations omitted)).
255. See id. at 1190-1208 (discussing the similarities between trademark law and the right
of publicity).
256. See id.at 1168 (noting that a privacy right "would redress the harms that private
individuals suffered from invasions of their privacy").
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development of personality rights jurisprudence, trademarks are not the same as
personality rights.257
The right of publicity tort does not require the complainant to establish
trademark-like incidents in her personal name or likeness. 258 This is clearly an
advantage for complainants over the UDRP. However, the commercial use
requirement could be a problem here in the same way that it could be a problem
in a trademark-based action. If the view is taken that all Internet conduct is
commercial because of the nature of the Internet, the commercial use
requirement is automatically satisfied.259 If not, it may be that the nature of the
activities on the website could satisfy the commercial use requirement only if
the registrant was advertising or selling products or services on the relevant
website. 260 This may well be as it should be. A purely expressive website,
257. See id.
at 1211 (identifying a specific difference between personality rights and
trademarks-there is no "use in commerce" or secondary meaning requirement for complainants
under the right of publicity).
258. See id.(stating that trademark requirements "make little sense in the context of
personal likeness").
259. See Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am., Inc. v. Bucci, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d 1430, 1434
(S.D.N.Y. 1997) (finding use of a mark on the Internet to be an "in commerce" use). The court
provided:
Internet users constitute a national, even international, audience, who must use
interstate telephone lines to access defendant's web site on the Internet. The nature
of the Internet indicates that establishing a typical home page on the Internet, for
access to all users, would satisfy the Lanhan Act's "in commerce" requirement.
Id. (citing Intermatic v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227, 1239 (N.D. Ill.
1996)); see also Am.
Libraries Ass'n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 173 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (finding, in a case outside the
trademark context, that everything on the Interet is automatically in commerce). The American
LibrariesAssociation court provided:

In addition, many of those users who are communicating for private,
noncommercial purposes are nonetheless participants in interstate commerce by
virtue of their Internet consumption. Many users obtain access to the Internet by
means of an on-line service provider, such as America Online, which charges a fee
for its services. "Internet service providers," including plaintiffs Panix, Echo, and
NYC NET, also offer Internet access for a monthly or hourly fee. Patrons of
storefront "computer coffee shops," such as New York's own CyberCafe, similarly
pay for their access to the Internet, in addition to partaking of food and beverages
sold by the cafW. Dial-in bulletin board systems often charge a fee for access.
Id. Note, however, that the context in which "in commerce" is used in Bucci and American
LibrariesAssociation relates to the Lanham Act and the Commerce Clause respectively, and
those interpretations might not apply to the right of publicity.
260. See Cruise v. Alta. Hot Rods, WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center Case No.
D2006-0560, 2006 WL 4002761, § 6 (July 5, 2006) (Abbott, Abel & Sorkin, Arbs.), available
at http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/ 2006/d2006-0560.html (finding that a
website including links to services and products was not connected enough with complainant to
satisfy the in commerce requirement).
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even in the <name. com> space, should perhaps be protected speech where there
is no unfair or unauthorized commercial gain being made from someone else's
persona.2 6'
On the other hand, the right of publicity protects individuals from being
thrust into the limelight against their wishes.262 This is the privacy aspect of the
right, usually applied more to private individuals than celebrities on the basis
that the latter are presumably expecting, and even overtly seeking, the
limelight.263 While the privacy-based aspects of the right of publicity are
usually geared towards private individuals, and even then at public commercial
uses of a private individual's persona,2 6 there may be some scope to argue that
celebrities should have some privacy rights in relation to at least <name.com>
versions of their names online. There have been cases where the right of
publicity has prevented public uses of likenesses of private individuals even
where there is no direct economic harm to the plaintiff and where the plaintiff's
concern is with moral privacy-related objections to the use of the image, rather
than economic benefits.265
Although one might argue that celebrities should not be entitled to bring
such actions because of their admittedly public personas, the nature of the
Internet brings a new scope and scale to the idea of unauthorized public
distribution.266 Whereas a plaintiff in the past may have been concerned about
emotional distress or loss of privacy in relation to an unauthorized billboard
advertisement in one or more specific geographical locations, today's plaintiff
261. See Dogan & Lemley, supra note 28, at 1191 (arguing that applying a trademark
analogy is desirable because it would provide a reason to protect publicity rights). But see
supranotes 256-57 and accompanying text (discussing the importance of protecting the privacy
rights of private individuals).
262. See Dogan & Lemley, supra note 28, at 1167 ("The privacy phase... involved the
court's recognition... of the right of individuals to limit the use of their names or likenesses by
commercial actors. Most privacy cases involved noncelebrities.").
263. See id.
at 1171 (noting that the mere production ofa celebrity's photograph or image
is not protected by publicity rights because "the celebrities had actively sought out their fame
and could not be offended by its furtherance").
264. See Tellado v. Time-Life Books, Inc., 643 F. Supp. 904, 910 (D.N.J. 1986) (finding
that the defendant's use of the plaintiff's photo to advertise a book was a commercial use of the
plaintiff's likeness even though damage was not monetary).
265. See id. (discussing a situation when the right to publicity was implicated when no
economic harm befell the plaintiff); see also Kwall, supra note 57, at 96-100 (criticizing the
Tellado decision because granting damages would not appropriately remedy the emotional
distress that the plaintiff had suffered).
266. See DANIEL SoLOvE, THE FuTuRE OF REPUTATION: Gossip, RUMOR, AND PRIVACY ON
THE INTERNET 33 (2007) ("The Internet ...makes gossip a permanent reputational stain, one
that never fades. It is available around the world, and with Google it can be readily found in
less than a second.").
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may face a complete loss of privacy in the face of the whole world. 267 Thus,
even a celebrity may be entitled to some control of Internet content about her on
this basis, particularly if that control is initially limited to the <name.com>
space, which is likely most closely associated with the idea of the celebrity's
authorized online persona. A PDRP based on a personality rights framework
might justify this result. Decisions under the PRDP based on balancing the
rights of a given celebrity in her persona against the registrant's free speech
entitlements would create a more nuanced jurisprudence for these situations in
cyberspace.
3. Case Study 2: UnauthorizedPoliticalWebsites
With respect to the second hypothetical raised above-a website critical of
a politician under a <name.com> domain-trademark-focused laws are again a
poor fit.268 They are not aimed at balancing a politician's rights in her persona
against the public interest in free speech.269 Most politicians do not have, or
should not be regarded as having, trademarks in their personal names. The
balance of their interests in their names against the public's right to comment
about them should not be a part of trademark law. It might be determined more
effectively by personality rights principles.
Even in a situation where a politician can establish trademark rights in her
name, a trademark infringement action is an unlikely candidate for resolving
issues about unauthorized political commentary. There will likely be no
consumer confusion in such cases.27 ° It is possible that a court liberally
applying the initial interest confusion doctrine271 would find confusion here in
the sense that the Internet user is initially confused by use of the <name.com>
272
domain name and ends up on a website she did not desire to access.
267. See id. at 35 ("In a world where it is difficult to separate the true from the false, rumor
and defamation can readily spread, and the Internet can be used as a powerful tool to launch
malicious attacks on people and ideas.").
268. Cf. 15 U.S.C. § 1129(1) (2006) (allowing for some civil actions without trademark
interests, but limiting these actions to cybersquatting situations and not extending the cause of
action to unauthorized uses).
269. See supra notes 203, 250 and accompanying text (discussing the contention that all
publicity is good publicity and the commentary exception in the Lanham Act).
270. See Dogan & Lemley, supra note 28, at 1191-97 (focusing on consumer confusion
when discussing what qualifies as confusion under the Lanham Act).
271. See supra note 112 and accompanying text (explaining how the doctrine of interest
confusion shifts the focus to the time in which the user accesses the website).
272. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am., Inc. v. Bucci, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d 1430, 1441
(S.D.N.Y. 1997) (finding that even the use of a disclaimer on the relevant website would not
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However, the initial interest confusion test is not universally accepted in
trademark law. 273 Even in cases where a court was prepared to adopt the
doctrine, the case of a political criticism website could be distinguished from
prior initial interest confusion cases on the basis that the prior cases have
generally had something to do with competing commercial activity, rather than
purely expressive content.274
Trademark dilution will also not be an appropriate fit for these situations.
The point of trademark dilution is to protect famous commercial marks from
losing their distinctiveness in the marketplace 275 and not to protect politicians
against undesired commentary. 2776 Even where politicians can establish
trademarks in their names for infringement purposes, they would have to
establish a "famous mark" for dilution purposes.277 This would be difficult
even for well-known politicians.278 Even if sufficient fame could be shown, the
politician would still have to satisfy the "blurring or tarnishment0 79 and "in
'' 8° requirements. Additionally, there is now a new "commentary"
commerce
defense to dilution
that may become relevant in these situations. 28 ' Blurring

detract from confusion caused).
273. Lastowka, supra note 22, at 36 ("Though not all federal circuits have endorsed the
doctrine of initial interest confusion and the Supreme Court has yet to consider a case applying
it, many courts have accepted and applied the doctrine.").
274. See id. ("Traditionally, and not surprisingly, most courts have focused analysis on
consumer confusion on the time period proximate to the consumer purchases.").
275. 2 GILSON LALONDE, supra note 5, § 5A.01 [1] ("Federal dilution law protects famous
trademarks from unauthorized uses that are likely to impair their distinctiveness or harm their
reputation."); see also supra notes 117-24 and accompanying text (discussing the purpose of
dilution application at the federal level).
276. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(A)(ii) (2006) (providing an express commentary defense
to a dilution action).
277. In particular, the new definition of"famous mark" for dilution purposes contemplates
fame with respect to the sale of goods or services. See id. § 1125(c)(1) ("Subject to the
principles of equity, the owner of a famous mark that is distinctive, inherently or through
acquired distinctiveness, shall be entitled to an injunction."). This is not the kind of interest
usually associated with politicians' names.
278. See id. § 1125(c)(2)(A) (making it difficult for politicians to establish a famous mark
by contemplating fame with respect to commercial activities).
279. See id. § 1125(c)(2)(B) ("'[D]ilution by blurring' is association arising from the
similarity between a mark or trade name and a famous mark that impairs the distinctiveness of
the famous mark."); id. § 1125(c)(2)(C) ("'[D]ilution by tamishment' is association arising from
the similarity between a mark or trade name and a famous mark that harms the reputation of the
famous mark.").
280. See id. § 1125(c)(3)(C) (stating that "any noncommercial use of the mark" is not
actionable in a dilution action).
281. See id. § 1125(c)(3)(A)(ii) (excluding from liability in a dilution action "identifying
and parodying, criticizing, or commenting upon the famous mark owner or the goods or services
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could be difficult to establish here as a website critical of a politician is not
likely to blur the distinctive power of the politician's name as a mark, but rather
reinforces the politician's identity while criticizing her.
Tarnishment may be a possibility in such cases, but, again, the registrant's
conduct may be tarnishing the politician's personal reputation, but would be
unlikely to be tarnishing the politician's name in a trademark sense. Criticizing
a politician's views on a particular issue will not interfere with the integrity of
the politician's name as a mark in connection with the sale of goods or services,
such as books and campaign merchandise. It will rather impact the way in
which people regard the politician and her suitability for office. Such criticism
may even increase sales of books written by the relevant politician by people
interested in learning more about the politician's views spurred on by the
criticisms of the politician.2 82 Finally, there is the issue of whether purely
expressive content is "in commerce" for dilution purposes. Commentary
websites, such as the <bobkeenan.com> and <lindamcculloch.com> examples,
do not appear to have any commercial application. Thus, unless all Internet
conduct is regarded as commercial, pure political gripesites will likely not
satisfy the threshold for trademark dilution. Even if the conduct is regarded as
being "in commerce," it may still be excused under the new "commentary"
defense to a dilution action.283 This is not surprising, because trademark
dilution was never intended to cover political commentary. 284
The ACPA and the UDRP will not help much with this balance because of
their focus on commercial bad faith cybersquatting. Sections 1125(d) and
in
1129(1)(A) of the Lanham Act each assume that the defendant's purpose 285
registering a relevant domain name is to make a bad faith commercial profit.
A registrant who has registered a politician's name as a domain name for
expressive purposes is unlikely to satisfy the test set out in either section.
Additionally, § 1125(d) will not apply unless the politician has a trademark in
her name.286 The UDRP would likely excuse commentary about a politician
of the famous mark owner").
282. See id. § 11 25(c)(2)(C) (focusing punishment on the "tarnishment of a famous mark"
and not punishing an act influencing public opinion about a politician).
283. See id. § 125(c)(3)(A)(ii) (providing the commentary defense).
284. Dogan & Lemley, supra note 28, at 1194 ("[D]ilution properly understood is targeted
at reducing consumer search costs.").
285. See 15 U.S.C. § 11 25(d)(l)(A)(i) (2006) (stating that a person shall be held liable by
the owner of a mark if the person "has a bad faith intent to profit from that mark, including a
personal name which is protected as a mark under this section"); id. § 1129(1)(A) (holding
liable anyone registering as a domain name the name of another "with the specific intent to
profit from such name by selling the domain name for financial gain").
286. See id. § 1125(d)(1)(A) ("A person shall be liable in a civil action by the owner of a
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under a corresponding domain name, even a <name.com> name, as a legitimate
use of the name.28 7 In any event, it will not technically apply to a politician if
her name does not operate as a trademark. 288 The same may be said of
California'sBusiness andProfessionsCode, although there is little case law or
commentary available on that legislation to date. Even though the key
provision in § 17525(a) contemplates bad faith registrations of domain names
without regard to goods or services of the parties,289 several of the bad faith
factors relate to trademark-like concepts. 290 The provision that does
contemplate misleading voters as a bad faith factor does not make it clear
whether a political commentary site would be excused as not misleading voters
as to source or affiliation of the website.29'
Again, all of this may well be as it should be. It may be that there should
be no law giving a politician any rights against a registrant of a corresponding
domain name, even a <name.com> name, where the registrant's purpose is
political commentary. However, there may be room for a presumption that
<name.com> names, even in the political context, would be expected by
Internet users to refer to officially sanctioned websites, and that any other use of
those names is misleading. Could a personality rights model resolve this
dilemma? For one thing, it would obviously protect any politician's or public
figure's identity regardless of a trademark interest. However, it would only
protect them from unauthorized commercial conduct and not necessarily against
undesired critical commentary. Thus, as with the previous case study, if the
defendant's conduct was purely expressive, rather than commercial, the right of
publicity may not provide results any different from those currently provided
under trademark focused rules.

mark, including a personal name which is protected as a mark under this section.").
287. See UDRP, supra note 3, 4(c)(iii) ("[Y]ou are making a legitimate noncommercial
or fair use of the domain name, without intent for commercial gain to misleadingly divert
consumers or to tarnish the trademark or service mark at issue.").
288. See id. 4(a)(i) (mandating that the domain name must be "identical or confusingly
similar to a trademark or service mark in which the complainant has rights").
289. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17525(a) (West 2006) ("It is unlawful for a person,
with a bad faith intent to register, traffic in, or use a domain name.").
290. See, e.g., id. § 17526(a) (relating to trademark rights in a given domain name); id.
§ 17526(c) (relating to use of domain name in relation to the bona fide offering of goods and
services); see also Lipton, supra note 63, at 84-88 (discussing the questions concerning the
California code's bad faith requirement and whether that renders the code useless against
political cybersquatting).
291. See CAL. Bus. &PROF. CODE § 175260) (West 2006) (providing as a bad faith factor
"[t]he intent of a person alleged to be in violation of this article to mislead, deceive, or defraud
voters").
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Again, if the defendant's conduct did contain commercial elements, either
because the Internet is regarded as a global commercial communications
medium, 292 or because the website engages in some kind of commerce, such as
advertising books that criticize the politician, 293 then the politician might have
more luck. As a general matter, unauthorized commercial use may be more
difficult to establish in the case of a political commentary website than an
unauthorized fan website. This is because the iterations of unauthorized fan
conduct are more likely, in practice, to have a commercial aspect than is a pure
political commentary website. Celebrities names are more likely to attract
online customers than political names and may thus be more desirable to those
seeking294to make commercial profits from use of corresponding domain
names.
Overall, a personality rights based framework for personal domain name
disputes that allowed unauthorized expressive uses of <name.com> names,
while prohibiting unauthorized commercial uses, might achieve a better
theoretical focus than the current UDRP. It would remove the requirement that
a complainant establish trademark rights in her personal name, or establish
cybersquatting, as opposed to other kinds of commercial profit motives by the
registrant. At the same time, it would not unduly chill speech because it would
preserve the right to engage in purely expressive conduct about an individual,
and, if limited in the first instance to <name.com> names, would preserve other
iterations of a relevant name in the domain space for both expressive and
commercial conduct. To some extent, these results are similar to those
currently found in practice in some trademark-based litigation. However, the
use of a personality rights model would lead to greater consistency on the
question of what is being protected-a name rather than a mark-and whybecause we care about both the personhood and proprietary aspects of an
individual's persona.2 95
292. See supra note 113 and accompanying text (discussing cases in which courts labeled
use of the Internet as inherently commercial).
293. See People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. Doughney, 113 F. Supp. 2d
915, 919 (E.D. Va. 2000) (finding that a parody website of PETA linking to websites selling
items offensive to PETA was in commerce and connected with distribution of services), affd,
263 F.3d 359 (4th Cir. 2001).
294. See, e.g., Cruise v. Alta. Hot Rods, WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center Case No.
D2006-0560, 2006 WL 4002761, § 4 (July 5,2006) (Abbott, Abel & Sorkin, Arbs.), available
at http://www.wipo.int/anc/en/domains/decisions/html/2006/d2006-0560.html (addressing a
situation in which the respondent used the <tomcruise.com> domain name to draw attention to a
website that advertised products unrelated to actor Tom Cruise).
295. See supra notes 54,56 and accompanying text (discussing numerous commentators'
views on the personhood and property theories behind the right of publicity).
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IV. Craftinga New PersonalDomain Name Dispute
Resolution Policy (PDRP)
A. Basic Structure andScope of a PDRP

Obviously, the right of publicity can be applied to some personal domain
name cases now.
Even after the implementation of a new PDRP, this would
continue to be the case, as contractual arbitration procedures will not oust the
jurisdiction of domestic courts. 29 Thus, even if a PDRP was limited to
<name.com> disputes, conflicts about personal domain names in other domain
spaces could arguably be litigated under right of publicity laws in relevant
jurisdictions.2 98 The main problem with the right of publicity in domestic law
is that it raises jurisdictional and cost problems that are largely avoided or
minimized by using an inexpensive and efficient online dispute resolution
procedure. Thus, merging the substance of the right of publicity with the
procedural advantages of the UDRP in a new PDRP would be a useful
innovation in domain name dispute resolution policy and practice.
This Article has suggested that most relevant disputes arise in
<name.com> cases, 299 and that initially a new PDRP should be limited to these
cases until a clearer jurisprudence about the protection of personas in
cyberspace emerges. This approach also goes some way towards alleviating
concerns about the potential chilling effect on free speech of any new procedure
for personal domain name dispute resolution. There may be some question as
to whether a PDRP should automatically apply to registrations in the newer
<.name> gTLD, although there are already other protections for that gTLD that
might assist people in the protection of their personal names.3°° Thus, a new
296. See, e.g., Trudeau v. Lanoue, No. 04 C 7165, 2006 WL 516579, at *2-4 (N.D. Ill.
March 2, 2006) (asserting a right of publicity claim, amongst other claims, in a dispute
involving a domain name corresponding with the plaintiff's personal name); Wright v. Domain
Source, Inc., No. 02 C 2525, 2002 WL 1998287, at *5(N.D. I11.Aug. 27, 2002) (finding that
the defendant's use of the plaintiff's domain name violated the plaintiff's right of publicity).
297. See UDRP, supra note 3, 4(k) ("The mandatory administrative proceeding
requirements set forth in Paragraph 4 shall not prevent either you or the complainant from
submitting the dispute to a court of competent jurisdiction for independent resolution before
such mandatory administrative proceeding is commenced or after such proceeding is
concluded.").
298. And of course <name.com> disputes could be litigated in domestic courts under right
of publicity laws as well. See supra note 296 and accompanying text (discussing two recent
cases in which <name.com> disputes were litigated in domestic courts under right of publicity
laws).
299. See supra note 19 and accompanying text (discussing several arbitrations that dealt
with <name.com> disputes).
300. See Lipton, supra note 6, at 1420-21 (describing domain name "watch" service and
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PDRP should, at least initially, only be incorporated by reference into domain
name registration agreements for <.com> domain names. It could later be
extended or modified if the need arose.
A new PDRP could be drafted in terms similar to the UDRP. It could
adopt the UDRP's basic structure and general terms, including representations
and warranties made by the registrant, 30 1 orders that could be made by
arbitrators, 0 2 and procedural matters such as how to lodge communications
relating to a dispute. 30 3 As with the UDRP, a person who has registered a
<name.com> domain name30 4 would be required to submit to a mandatory
arbitration proceeding if a complainant with the relevant personal name
established the matters set forth in the policy. Again, as with the UDRP, an
administrative proceeding under the PDRP would not prevent either party from
taking the dispute to a relevant court.30 5 The idea would be to streamline
"defensive registration" service, which may act as protections for the gTLD). "Watch" service
allows an individual to be notified if anyone else attempts to register a given domain name
without having to register it herself. Id. at 1421. "Defensive registration" service allows a
person with a legitimate interest in a domain name to register it without having to actively use it
in order to maintain the registration. Id.
301. See UDRP, supra note 3, 2 (describing regulations regarding registering a domain
name). The UDRP specifically states:
By applying to register a domain name, or by asking use to maintain or renew a
domain name registration, you hereby represent and warrant to us that (a) the
statements that you made in your Registration Agreement are complete and
accurate; (b) to your knowledge, the registration of the domain name will not
infringe upon or otherwise violate the rights of any third party; (c) you are not
registering the domain name for an unlawful purpose; and (d) you will not
knowingly use the domain name in violation of any applicable laws or regulations.
It is your responsibility to determine whether your domain name registration
infringes or violates someone else's rights.
Id.
302. See id. 4(i) ("The remedies available to a complainant pursuant to any proceeding
before an Administrative Panel shall be limited to requiring the cancellation of your domain
name or the transfer of your domain name registration to the complainant."). For a more
detailed discussion of proposed PDRP remedies, see infra Part IV.D.
303. See ICANN, RULES FOR UNIFORM DoMAiN NAME DIsPuTE RESOLUTION PoLicY 3
(1999), available at http://www.icann.org/en/dndr/udrp/uniform-rules.htm (describing
procedures for lodging a complaint).
304. This could ultimately be expanded to include some other iterations of the name, if
there was ever a need to extend the policy more broadly.
305. The UDRP provides:
The mandatory administrative proceeding requirements set forth in Paragraph 4
shall not prevent either you or the complainant from submitting the dispute to a
court of competent jurisdiction for independent resolution before such mandatory
administrative proceeding is commenced or after such proceeding is concluded. If
an Administrative Panel decides that your domain name registration should be
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disputes in a more accessible forum than is currently available in court
proceedings due to cost and jurisdiction issues.
B. The Basis of a PDRP Complaint
To establish a complaint under the new PDRP, a complainant should be
required to establish that: (a) the registrant's domain name corresponds letter
for letter with the complainant's personal name, (b) the registrant has no
legitimate interests in the domain name, and (c) the registrant has registered or
used the name for an unauthorized commercial purpose. This would be the
PDRP analog to clause 4(a) of the UDRP. 306 Rather than establishing a
trademark interest, the complainant would only have to establish what her own
name is-this should be easier than establishing a trademark right in a personal
name for obvious reasons. The provision should cover a complainant's actual
personal name, as well as a name she is commonly known by. Thus, it would
cover "Cher" for "Cheryl Sarkisian LaPiere" and "Madonna" for "Madonna
potentially cover "Tyra" for "Tyra
Louise Veronica Ciccone., 30 7 It could also308
Banks" and "Trump" for "Donald Trump."
canceled or transferred, we will wait ten (10) business days (as observed in the
location of our principal office) after we are informed by the applicable Provider of
the Administrative Panel's decision before implementing that decision. We will
then implement the decision unless we have received from you during that ten (10)
business day period official documentation (such as a copy of a complaint, filestamped by the clerk of the court) that you have commenced a lawsuit against the
complainant in a jurisdiction to which the complainant has submitted under
ParaM-aoh 3(b)(xiii) of the Rules of Procedure. (In general, that jurisdiction is
either the location of our principal office or of your address as shown in our Whois
database. See Paragraphs I and 3(b)(xiii of the Rules of Procedure for details.) If
we receive such documentation within the ten (10) business day period, we will not
implement the Administrative Panel's decision, and we will take no further action,
until we receive (i) evidence satisfactory to us of a resolution between the parties;
(ii) evidence satisfactory to us that your lawsuit has been dismissed or withdrawn;
or (iii) a copy of an order from such court dismissing your lawsuit or ordering that
you do not have the right to continue to use your domain name.
UDRP, supra note 3, 4(k).
306. See supra note 94 and accompanying text (discussing UDRP paragraph 4(a)).
307. This would accord with the way in which the right of publicity currently works. See,
e.g., IND. CODE § 32-36-1-3 (2002) (defining "name" for the purposes of the statute as including
"the actual or assumed name of a living or deceased natural person that is intended to identify
the person").
308. It may or may not cover intentional misspellings of complainants' names such as
"Tom Kruse" for "Tom Cruise." Cf Lamparello v. Falwell, 420 F.3d 309, 315-16 (4th Cir.
2005) (addressing an intentional misspelling of Reverend Falwell's name as a domain name),
cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1069 (2006). However, perhaps such names should not be covered in the
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The requirement to show that the registrant has no legitimate interests in
the domain name would be necessary to cover cases where, for example, the
registrant happens to have the same personal name as a complainant. In cases
of competing legitimate interests in the same name, a "first come, first served"
rule, subject to private negotiation between the parties, is probably preferable to
a dispute resolution mechanism in which the arbitrators have little to go on as to
who has the best interest in a given domain name. This accords with the way
the UDRP works in the case of competing trademark interests. 3 9 It may be that
ultimately domain name sharing arrangements could be developed for such
situations either by private agreement between parties or facilitated through a
body such as310 the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers
("ICANN").
With respect to the unauthorized commercial use requirement, the PDRP
could give examples of such uses or could leave the wording vague and allow
arbitrators over time to determine what constitutes an unauthorized commercial
use on a case by case basis. If the PDRP were to be drafted more
comprehensively to include examples of unauthorized commercial use, these
could be taken from current right of publicity statutes. For example, an Indiana
statute defines "commercial purpose" in the context of the right of publicity as:
"the use of an aspect of a personality's right of publicity... (1) On or in
connection with a product, merchandise, goods, services, or commercial
activities. (2) For advertising or soliciting purchases ofproducts, merchandise,
goods, services, or for promoting commercial activities. (3) For the purpose of
fundraising. 3 11 The incorporation of such a definition would give arbitrators
first instance of the policy in the interests of avoiding chilling speech. This may be a little like
the "look-a-like" and "sound-a-like" cases under the right of publicity in the "real world," which
have been criticized for extending the right too far. See Steven C. Clay, Note, Starstruck: The
Overextension of CelebrityPublicityRights in Stateand FederalCourts, 79 MINN. L. REV. 485,
487 (1994) ("[T]he right of publicity as applied in White and other cases has far outgrown the
limited rationales that support it and other intellectual property protections."); William M.
Heberer III, Comment, The Overprotection of Celebrity: A Comment on White v. Samsung
Electronics America Inc., 22 HOFSTRA L. REV. 729, 771 (1994) (arguing that a Samsung
advertisement parodying Vanna White was fair use and should have been allowable under
copyright law).
309. See Lipton, supra note 86, at 514 (describing the first-come, first-served domain
registration system established by ICANN).
310. ICANN is the body that manages the Internet domain name system. See generally
ICANN.com, http://www.icann.org (last visited Oct. 5, 2008) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review). The author has canvassed the possibility of domain name sharing previously
in the trademark context, and the mechanics of such arrangements for personal names would
work similarly. Thus, domain sharing strategies for personal names are not discussed further
here. See generally Lipton, supra note 86.
311. IND. CODE § 32-26-1-2 (2002).

1516

65 WASH. &LEE L. REV. 1445 (2008)

some guidance in applying the PDRP to the registrant's activities, and may be
helpful at least in the early days of such a dispute resolution policy. It would
also allow disputing parties to draw to some extent on existing personality
rights jurisprudence to help inform initial determinations under the PDRP.
Although this test does reflect some concepts traditionally associated with
trademark law, it is somewhat broader with its inclusion of uses such as the
promotion of commercial activities for fundraising purposes.
C. A "LegitimateInterest" Defense Under the PDRP
It may be a good idea for the PDRP to include a defense such as that
found in clause 4(c) of the UDRP to give the registrant some guidance on how
to establish a legitimate interest in a given domain name. The indicia of a
legitimate interest in the UDRP largely relate to good faith uses of the domain
name in connection with the registrant's own commercial or non-commercial
endeavors.31 2 Any legitimate interest provision included in a new PDRP would
have to be drafted differently because the policy would actually prohibit some
unauthorized commercial uses even if they are associated with a bona fide
business plan of the registrant. The UDRP, for example, currently excuses, as
legitimate, a registrant's use, or demonstrable preparation to use, a relevant
' 313
"domain name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services."
This makes sense in a trademark-based system because it amounts to two
competing legitimate interests in using the mark in a domain name, presumably
in different areas of commerce.3 m4 For example, if the complainant has
registered the trademark "Hypo" for medical syringes and I have registered the
domain name <hypo.com> for a business involving the sale of practice law
312. The UDPR gives examples of legitimate use, including the registrant's ability to
establish that:
(i) before any notice to [the registrant] of the dispute, [the registrant's] use of, or
demonstrable preparations to use, the domain name or a name corresponding to the
domain name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services; or
(ii) [the registrant] (as an individual, business, or other organization) [has] been
commonly known by the domain name, even if [she has] acquired no trademark or
service mark rights; or
(iii) [the registrant is] making a legitimate noncommercial or fir use ofthe domain
name, without intent for commercial gain to misleadingly divert consumers or to
tarnish the trademark or service mark at issue.
UDRP, supra note 3, 4(c).
313. Id. 4(c)(i).
314. The issues arising in relation to two competing trademark interests with one
corresponding domain name are taken up in more detail in Lipton, supranote 86.
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domain name in good faith for these
exam questions, and I have registered the
3 I5
purposes, I should be entitled to use it.
However, comparing this to the proposed PDRP, if the policy behind the
right of publicity is to prevent anyone from making any kind of unjust profit out
of another person's name or likeness, the PDRP should not permit a domain
name registrant to register another person's name as a domain name even for
some bona fide offerings of goods or services. In any event, it is difficult to
think of a situation in which a registrant would register someone else's name as
a domain name with such an intent. Why would anyone register
<tomcruise.com> for the sale of goods or services completely unrelated to Tom
Cruise, unless they wanted to use the name to attract attention to their own
goods, services, or advertising? 316 This would hardly be in good faith if we
accept that individuals have a right to prevent an unauthorized commercial
profit being made from their online persona in certain cases, such as with
respect to <name.com> versions of their personal names. Even if Tom Cruise
himself has no intention of using <tomcruise.com> to sell particular goods or
services, the unauthorized registrant has interfered with his ability to control his
persona in commerce, which may be prohibited under a personality rights
framework.3 17
There may be conflicts between the UDRP and the new PDRP where a
personal name truly is a trademark, as when an individual runs a business under
her own name. In such a case, it is arguable that trademark-based laws should
315. If such a case was brought under domestic trademark law, I may have some
difficulties under the "initial interest confusion" doctrine. The medical supply company might
argue in a trademark infringement suit that, even though consumers are not confused about the
source of the products when they get to my website, I am potentially diverting business from
them by attracting consumers to my website by using a similar online address. It may be that
consumers who assume that <hypo.com> is the website of the medical supply company would
accidentally access my website and then cease looking for the other company on the basis that it
is too difficult to find. Regardless of what view a court would take of this argument under
domestic trademark law, the UDRP currently has no "initial interest confusion" doctrine built
into it in this sense and seems to allow as a defense that the registrant was using, or planning to
use, the relevant domain name in a bona fide trademark manner. See supra note 112 and
accompanying text (discussing the initial interest doctrine in trademark law).
316. This appears to have been the strategy utilized by the domain name registrant of
<tomcruise.com> under discussion in Cruise v. Alta. Hot Rods, WIPO Arbitration and
Mediation Center Case No. D2006-0560, 2006 WL 4002761, § 6 (July 5, 2006) (Abbott, Abel
& Sorkin, Arbs.), available at http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2006/
d2006-0560.html.
317. Tom Cruise, in fact, did set up an official website for the first time in 2008 under
<tomcruise.com> to celebrate the 25th anniversary of the release of his movie, Risky Business.
See generally TomCruise.com, http://www.tomcruise.com (last visited Oct. 5, 2008) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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apply with respect to the trademarked version of the name. Of course, this
happens routinely in judicial proceedings under trademark law. In such cases,
courts have the power to determine trademark-based claims and right of
publicity claims in the alternative. 318 It may be that the new PDRP should
include some provision for joining UDRP proceedings with PDRP proceedings
in such situations, allowing one arbitrator or panel to hear the entire dispute and
decide whether the name in question is really being used by the registrant in a
trademark sense or in a personal sense. If PDRP claims are to be at least
initially limited to <.com> registration agreements, a procedure for joining
PDRP and UDRP disputes would only have to be developed and incorporated
into those agreements. There would be no need to incorporate a joining
procedure into other registration agreements, such as <.net> and <.org>
registrations, into which only the UDRP would be incorporated.
There may also be situations in which a domain name registrant simply
happens to have the same name as a complainant and has registered the domain
name for her own personal use, for example, to set up her own webpage. These
situations may actually be more difficult than they seem as a matter of policy.
It may be that a complainant is actually harmed in a right of publicity sense
even where the registrant herself has a legitimate interest in the name by virtue
of having a similar name to the complainant. As the right of publicity has no
consumer confusion requirement, it may be that simply using the complainant's
name in a domain name on a personal website might contravene the right in
some cases, particularly if the website contains some unrelated commercial
advertising. This may be one area in which personality rights theory needs to
be pared down to meet the realities of the Internet age. In most cases, it would
probably be best to excuse, as a legitimate interest under the PDRP, the conduct
of a person who has been commonly known by the relevant name and is only
using it for her own personal website. Of course, if the registrant were not
regarded as making a commercial use of the name in question, there would be
no basis for a complaint under the PDRP in the first place.

318. See generallyRogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1988) (assessing the use of
Ginger Rogers's name in a movie with which she had no involvement); Trudeau v. Lanoue, No.
04 C 7165, 2006 WL 516579, at *2-4 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 2, 2006) (discussing the use of
<trudeau.com> by a reseller to sell goods associated with Kevin Trudeau).

CELEBRITY IN CYBERSPACE

1519

D. Remedies Under the PDRP
Like the UDRP, the PDRP would be limited in terms of possible remedies
to a cancellation or transfer order over the relevant domain name. 31 9 Thus, a
successful complainant could either have the registration of the domain name
cancelled altogether or could have the name transferred to her. In most
personal domain name disputes under the UDRP to date, the registrant has
sought a transfer320 even where she does not intend to use the name herself,
presumably in order to maintain control over the most intuitive version of her
online persona-the <name.com> version of her name.
Because of these limitations on remedies, the proposed PDRP may
actually have less of a potential chilling effect on online speech, if any, than the
threat of litigation under the right of publicity. Although the usual remedy in a
right of publicity action is an injunction,32' which in the domain name case may
be tantamount to a cancellation or transfer order under the PDRP, courts can
award other remedies for infringement of personality rights. These include
damages based on injury to a plaintiff's feelings, 322 damages based on unjust
enrichment,323 and accounts of profits.324 Additionally, even an injunction may
be tailored to a given case more broadly than a mere transfer or cancellation
order: For example, it may prohibit the defendant from engaging in any
commerce online utilizing the name or
likeness of a plaintiff, regardless of the
3 25
domain name used by the defendant.
Given the broad range of potential remedies under the right of publicity, a
domain name registrant may be more deterred from engaging in unauthorized
online use of a personal domain name than she would be if most personal
319. See UDRP, supra note 3, 4(i) ("The remedies available to a complainant pursuant to
any proceeding before an Administrative Panel shall be limited to requiring the cancellation of
your domain name or the transfer of your domain name registration to the complainant.").
320. See, e.g., Roberts v. Boyd, WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center Case No. D20000210, 2000 WL 33674395, § 7 (May 29, 2000) (Page & Bridgeman, Arbs.), available at
http://www.wipo.int/amc/ en/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-02 10.html (transferring the
<juliaroberts.com> domain name).
321. 1 GILSoN LALONDE, supranote 5, § 2.16[6] ("Upon proof of a violation of the right of
publicity the courts almost always grant injunctive relief. Since the primary purpose of the right
of publicity is to prevent the unauthorized use of a person's name and likeness, an injunction
may be perfectly tailored to prevent further violation.").

322.

Id.

323. Id.
324. Id.
325. See 3 GILsoN LALONDE, supranote 5, § 14.02(1) (2008) ("[Tlhough injunctive relief is
an extraordinary remedy, the variety of acts that a court may prohibit or order are virtually
limitless.").
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domain name disputes were arbitrated under a PDRP. One might argue that the
threat of personality rights litigation is available for personal domain name
disputes today, and it does not appear to be chilling online conduct. However,
this may be a temporary situation. If, for example, the trend in UDRP
arbitration changes and UDRP arbitrators become less prepared to accept
trademark rights in individuals' names, then right of publicity litigation may
become a much more realistic prospect. It may in fact be the case that right of
publicity actions have not been brought more often in domain name disputes
simply because many people have not thought of it yet. It is possible that such
actions will become more common in the future. There have already been
some right
of publicity actions involving personal domain names in recent
326
years.
If right of publicity disputes gain popularity in the personal domain name
context, the development of a PDRP would be a welcome addition for both
complainants and domain name registrants. It would be quicker, easier, and
cheaper for both parties. It would also provide the most appropriate remedy in
such cases-a transfer or cancellation order-and may deter complainants from
seeking additional remedies in judicial proceedings. If the cost is significantly
less to a complainant, but the remedy is limited, the complainant may still
prefer this course of action over more time consuming and costly litigation,
despite the fact that litigation may provide more valuable and varied remedies.
This move towards arbitration with its more limited remedies may thus create
less of a chilling effect on online speech than would personality rights
litigation.
E. Politicians'Names:A Special Case?
As noted in Part III.B.3, the names of politicians in the domain space,
particularly in the lead-up to an election, may pose special problems. Where a
registrant has registered a politician's name as a domain name for purely
expressive purposes, there are obvious First Amendment arguments that this
conduct should not be proscribed. Speech critical of politicians and their
policies is an essential aspect of a representative democracy.327 However, it is
326. See supra note 296 and accompanying text (discussing two recent cases in which
<name.com> disputes were litigated in domestic courts under right of publicity laws).
327. See Coleman, supra note 70, at 263 ("[W]idespread use of a new and inexpensive
communications medium has the potential to lead to unprecedented citizen participation in
politics.. . ."); Lipton, supra note 63, at 129 ("The electoral process is fundamental to the U.S.
system of government, and the ability to disseminate and receive important information about
politics and politicians in an electoral context is key to the functioning of that system.").
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also important that Internet users are not misled about the authorized web
presence of a given politician. The question is: What is the correct
presumption here? Should there be a presumption that all <name.com> domain
names automatically belong to the relevant politician, so that others wishing to
comment on them are to be relegated to "lesser" domain spaces such as
<name.net>, or <namesucks.com>? Or are we better off with no such
presumption and a "first come, first served" system in which even a critic of a
politician is entitled to the <name.com> version of the name if she registers it
first?
Any personality rights framework for dispute resolution will only assist
328
individuals, including politicians, against unauthorized commercialconduct.
Thus, where the conduct complained of is purely expressive with no
commercial elements, the right of publicity will not assist the politician. On
this view, a PDRP based on the right of publicity should also not assist the
politician, unless all conduct on the Internet is regarded as "commercial" 329 which may well not be an accurate reflection of the law.330 If the view is taken
that a personality rights based PDRP only prohibits commercial conduct, then
some conduct involving a <name.com> version of a politician's name will be
prohibited and other conduct will not.
The example of the <kerryedwards.com> domain name from the 2004
American presidential election, for example, may have been a candidate for
protection under a PDRP as suggested here. An individual called Mr. Kerry
Edwards did have a legitimate interest in the name in the sense that it was his
personal name. However, he was also using the name for a commercial
purpose during the presidential race by attempting to auction it to the highest
bidder. 331 An arbitrator under the PDRP would have needed to decide whether
Mr. Kerry Edwards's legitimate interest in his personal name outweighed
conduct that clearly sought to profit from Senator John Kerry's and Senator
John Edwards's respective names. In actual fact, it is likely that Senators Kerry
and Edwards would have had no luck even under the PDRP contemplated in
this Article-Mr. Kerry Edwards did have a legitimate interest in the name by
328. 1 GILSON LALONDE, supra note 5, § 2.16[l] ("The right ofpublicity... is the right of
an individual to control the commercial use of his or her name, likeness, signature, or other
personal characteristics.").
329. See supranote 113 and accompanying text (discussing cases in which courts labeled
use of the Internet as inherently commercial).
330. Lastowka, supra note 22, at 64 ("[I]t is not clear how Bucci had used the Planned
Parenthood mark in commerce, given that he lacked any product or service. Those who
advocate for an expansion of trademark use often criticize Bucci for this reason.").
331. See Lipton, supra note 63, at 64-65 (discussing the <kerryedwards.com> domain
name dispute).
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virtue of his personal name, and <kerryedwards.com> does not correspond
letter for letter with the name of either senator. It is assumed here that, at least
initially, the PDRP should be narrowly confined to names that exactly match a
complainant's personal name in the <.com> space to avoid unnecessary chilling
effects on speech. If the facts were different and the name in question was
<johnkerry.com>, a registrant attempting to auction the name for profit may
well have lost a PDRP proceeding.
In cases where an unauthorized use of a politician's name in a
<name.com> domain is commercial, the PDRP would cover this without the
need for any special provisions relating to politicians' names. Certainly, the
PDRP as contemplated here would prevent political cybersquatting: that is,
registration of a politician's name as a domain name with the intent to sell it for
a profit.332 It may simply not cover registrants with purely expressive motives.
Politicians may also become more careful about their names in the domain
space over time, and they may become better at negotiating with those who
have registered their domain names before them. If, after some years of
operation of the PDRP a need is perceived to do something more specifically
directed at creating clearer rules or presumptions for political domain names,
such rights could be added to the PDRP at a later date.
F. Duration andDescendibility ofPersonalName Rights Under the PDRP
One contentious issue that arises under personality rights law is the
appropriate duration of those rights.333 Related questions are whether the rights
are transferable or descendible.334 The PDRP as contemplated in this Article
has presumed protection for a personal domain name during the course of the
relevant person's lifetime and has not focused on issues of transferability or
descendibility. This is implicit in the suggestion that the PDRP should require
the complainant to establish that the domain name in question corresponds
332. Such conduct would be actionable under 15 U.S.C. § 1129(l)(A) (2006), although
this has the time and cost disadvantages associated with any litigation.
333. In particular, there has been some disagreement as to whether personality rights
should survive a person's death. See 1 GILSON LALONDE, supra note 5, § 2.16[4] ("There is
sharp disagreement among the courts, and even within some courts, as to whether the right of
publicity is inheritable or whether it dies with the individual."); see also Kwall, supra note 57,
at 81-86 (discussing justifications for a descendible right of publicity).
334. See Kwall, supra note 57, at 81-86 (tracing expansion of the right ofpublicity from a
right that is capable of being assigned or licensed to being descendible in some jurisdictions);
see also 1 GILSON LALONDE, supranote 5, § 2.16[5] (acknowledging that the right of publicity
may be sold and assigned).
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letter for letter with her personal name. Once she is deceased, she can no
longer establish this. Her estate may be able to establish that the name
corresponds with her name, but that is not the intent of the PDRP as crafted
here. The idea here has been to protect individuals against unauthorized
commercial conduct with respect to their names in a domain space where
perhaps an individual has not thought to register the name herself, but the
public might expect her to have done so. In this sense, the rights 335
as
contemplated here spring more from personhood than from property theory.
If, for example, I enter <tomcruise.com> into my web browser, I might
expect to find the authorized Tom Cruise website or no content at all if Mr.
Cruise has not established an authorized website.336 However, if I were to enter
the name of a deceased famous person into a web browser, such as
<marlonbrando.com>, would I necessarily assume that this was an authorized
website for Mr. Brando? Or would I rather assume that, after his death, his
estate has little interest in maintaining such a website? In actual fact, the
<marlonbrando.com> domain name, along with domain names corresponding
to a number of other famous deceased persons, are used for "official" websites
3 37
managed by assignees of intellectual property rights in those people's names.
However, by way of contrast, a UDRP dispute involving Albert Einstein's
name was decided against Einstein's estate. 33' The decision was made largely
on the grounds that an Internet user would not necessarily expect the domain
name <alberteinstein.com> to resolve to a website actually run by Einstein's
estate such a lengthy period after his death.3 39
335. See supranotes 54,56 and accompanying text (discussing numerous commentators'
views on the personhood and property theories behind the right of publicity).
336. In fact, Mr. Cruise has recently established an official website in May of 2008. See
generally TomCruise.com, http://www.tomcruise.com (last visited Oct. 5, 2008) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
337. See, e.g., MarilynMonroe.com, http://www.marilynmonroe.com (last visited Oct. 5,
2008) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); JohnWayne.com,
http://www.johnwayne.com> (last visited Oct. 5, 2008) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
338. See Hebrew Univ. of Jerusalem v. Alta. Hot Rods, WIPO Arbitration and Mediation
Center Case No. D2002-0616, 2002 WL 31495974, § 7 (Oct. 7, 2002) (Limbury, Ophir &
Donahey, Arbs.), available at http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html
/2002/d2002-0616.html (arbitrating a complaint with respect to the domain name
<alberteinstein.com>).
339. Id. § 6. The opinion states:
There is a significant difference between the expectations of Internauts entering a
domain name of a celebrity (alive or dead) who is (or was) famously associated in
commerce with the supply of goods or services, on the one hand, and their
expectations entering a domain name of a celebrity long since dead who was not so
associated, on the other. The former expect to find a site offering goods or services
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What explains the differences here? Obviously, the estates of some
famous people have been extremely vigilant about protecting all relevant
intellectual property rights, including personality rights.340 If estates of famous
people or transferees of intellectual property rights pertaining to famous people
are vigilant about those rights and ensure registration of relevant domain names
before anyone else has done so, there is no problem. There is no need for a
PDRP to operate here because estates of famous people that are aggressive
about protecting relevant rights will already have registered important domain
names. This may explain why Einstein's estate lost its arbitration. Perhaps the
combination of the period of time since Einstein's death and the fact that the
estate had not been sufficiently vigilant to register the domain name before
anyone else were sufficient factors to justify the result. On the other hand,
given that the current registrants of <einstein.com> and <alberteinstein.com>
do not appear to be using the names for any particular purpose, 34' it is arguable
that the names would be better utilized by Einstein's estate for information
about Einstein and his life.
Given this possibility of wasteful uses of a deceased person's name and
342
the fact that personality rights are transferable in at least some jurisdictions,
there is a plausible argument that the PDRP should allow for assignees and
beneficiaries of personality rights to bring complaints in the name of the
associated with the celebrity's trademark. The latter cannot reasonably have such
an expectation.
Albert Einstein has been dead for 47 years. He was one of the most famous people
of the 20th century. The name Albert Einstein is universally associated with him.
That operates to the disadvantage of Complainant in this case. Internauts entering
the disputed domain name would not expect to find a site offering goods or services
with which Dr. Einstein was known to have been associated during his lifetime
because, on the evidence, he was not known as having any such association. Nor
would they expect to find a site associated with Complainant because Complainant
has not established that it has any common law trademark rights.
Id.
340. See, e.g., Estate of Elvis Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339, 1382-83 (D.N.J.
1981) (granting a preliminary injunction in favor of the estate of Elvis Presley prohibiting the
unauthorized use of the name, likeness, or image of Elvis).
341. As of the date of writing, they both look like cybersquatting sites perhaps disguised as
legitimate sites. One has no commentary at all-just a graphic and the name "einstein.com",
while the other contains lists of services unrelated to the domain name <alberteinstein.com>.
Each of these sites was last viewed on Oct. 5, 2008.
342. 1 GILsON LALONDE, supra note 5, § 2.16[5] (acknowledging that the right ofpublicity
may be sold and assigned). For an example of a specific state law on the transferability of
publicity rights, see IND. CODE § 32-36-1-16 (2002), which provides that "[t]he rights
recognized under this chapter are property rights, freely transferable and descendible, in whole
or in part ... "
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assignor or deceased person. If this were to be done, the PDRP would need to
allow a complainant to show either that she has a personal name corresponding
with the given domain name or that she controls personality rights relating to a
person with such a name. This raises some practical difficulties, including the
fact that if the beneficiary or transferee of the deceased lives in a jurisdiction
that has no personality rights laws, or has personality rights laws that do not
allow for transfer or descendibility, there is little plausible basis for bringing a
PDRP complaint. In other words, the complainant would not be able to show
that she controlled the relevant personality rights.
Additionally, it may be difficult for arbitrators to determine the validity of
a claim that a complainant controls personality rights in another person's name.
It is a simple enough task for arbitrators to accept evidence of what a
complainant's personal name actually is under the PDRP as contemplated here.
It may be more difficult for them to evaluate evidence of claims about
personality rights of deceased persons or persons who have allegedly
transferred personality rights to others. The PDRP procedure is intended to
achieve the same advantages in terms of time, cost, and procedural simplicity as
the UDRP does for trademark-related claims. If arbitrators are asked to
evaluate more complex questions than simply what a person claims her name
actually is, this could interfere with the operation of the procedure in terms of
time, cost and perhaps even predictability of outcome. These might be good
reasons to leave out matters relating to transferability and descendibility of
personal rights in domain names until a later iteration of the PDRP.
Other arguments against the initial inclusion of a provision allowing
assignees and beneficiaries of personality rights to bring complaints under the
PDRP include concerns about how long a person's image should be controlled
by her estate after her death.34 3 There may also be concerns that the
transferability and descendibility of rights in a persona are not universally
accepted even within the United States, 3 " so it may be a mistake to foist them
on a global system for protecting personal name interests in domain names.345

343. See Kwall, supra note 57, at 81-86 (arguing that the longer the principal has been
dead, the less likely the right of publicity should prevail over free speech concerns).
344. See I GILsON LALONDE, supranote 5, §§ 2.16[4] to [5] (acknowledging disagreements
among courts regarding transferability and the status of the right of publicity as a property
right).
345. Of course, the same argument could be made more generally in terms of foisting a
PDRP on the global economy that is based on unharmonized American state law. However, this
Article suggests that it may be less objectionable to base the PDRP on personality rights theory
if some of the more contentious aspects of the theory, such as questions of duration and
descendibility of rights, can be avoided, at least in the initial iteration of the PDRP.
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Further, there may be some question as to how often these issues would
arise in practice in the domain name context. As noted above, the estates of
many famous people currently hold the domain names corresponding with the
relevant names, 346 while celebrities and politicians are now getting better about
aggressively fighting for control of relevant domain names during their
lifetimes. 347 The result may be that the question of post-mortem personal
domain name disputes has minimal practical importance. If a PDRP is
established now to help those who want to assert interests in relevant domain
names to obtain those names, those people can presumably hold on to the
names and pass them to their estates in the future as a matter of contract law. It
is a simple matter for a successful complainant to transfer the domain name to
anyone she wants, either during her lifetime or presumably post mortem if she
executes the transfer formalities prior to her death.
V, Conclusion
This Article has identified why over-reliance on trademark-focused rules,
such as the UDRP, to resolve personal domain name disputes leads to
inconsistent and arbitrary results. It has suggested that a personality rights
model would create a better substantive framework for dealing with these
disputes. However, personality rights litigation suffers from cost and
procedural disadvantages. It also exists today largely as a matter of
unharmonized state law within the United States. The aim of this Article has
been to suggest a new procedure for personal domain name disputes-a
PDRP-that marries together the procedural and globalization advantages of
the UDRP with the substantive theoretical advantages ofthe right of publicity.
This approach potentially achieves the best of both worlds. It maintains the
procedural benefits of the UDRP-the avenue most often chosen by
complainants in personal domain name disputes today-while basing decisions
on a theory that more appropriately protects interests in an individual's persona
than trademark law.

346. See, e.g., MarlonBrando.com, http://www.marlonbrando.com (last visited Oct. 5,
2008) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); JohnWayne.com,
http://www.johnwayne.com (last visited Oct. 5, 2008) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review); MarilynMonroe.com, http://www.marilynmonroe.com (last visited Oct. 5,2008)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
347. See generally Beezy, supranote 143 (discussing developments in trademark practices
in the entertainment industry); Moreland & Springer, supra note 4 (examining celebrity use of
ICANN arbitration to recover domain names).
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Drafting and implementing a new PDRP would be a relatively easy and
cost-effective matter. It would require the drafting and adoption of such a
procedure by ICANN. Implementation would simply require the incorporation
of the new PDRP by reference into <.com> registration agreements in the first
instance. The drafting of the PDRP would generally mirror the drafting of the
UDRP except for some changes in substance to the text of UDRP's clause 4
relating to the matters the claimant needs to prove and the nature and scope of
the legitimate use defense available to the registrant.
The continued development of personal domain name jurisprudence based
on trademark principles threatens to warp the boundaries of trademark law and
to unjustifiably extend trademark practice online into areas where the alleged
trademarks are mere fictions. Alternatively, it could fail to protect interests that
3 48
really should be protected as a matter of tort law under the right of publicity.
In any event, the application of the trademark-based UDRP to personal domain
name disputes is clearly creating inconsistent results. 49
Another important advantage of a PDRP over the UDRP with respect to
personal domain name disputes is that it might refocus judicial attention on the
appropriate legal principles when these disputes do end up in court. While the
trademark-focused UDRP remains the most frequent first port of call with
respect to domain name disputes, litigation also seems to center around the
trademark-based provisions of domestic law. The Falwell case, for example,
was argued purely with respect to trademarks and did not raise personality
rights claims at all. 350 The Kathleen Kennedy Townsend complaint would
likely have been successful if it had been litigated under § 1129(1)(A) of the
Lanham Act, but it was brought under the trademark-based UDRP instead. 5' It
348. See supranote 43 and accompanying text (discussing a number of instances in which
interests that arguably should have been protected under the right of publicity were not
protected).
349. See supra note 98 and accompanying text (questioning the disparate treatment of
celebrities' UDRP claims).
350. See generallyLamparello v. Falwell, 420 F.3d 309 (4th Cir. 2005), cert. denied,547
U.S. 1069 (2006). This Article does not criticize the holding of the Falwell litigation but
merely observes with interest that the entire case was argued under trademark law, rather than
the right of publicity, despite the fact that the case revolved around rights in a personal name.
351. Townsend v. Birt, WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center Case No. D2002-0030,
2002 WL 827005, at § 6 (Apr. 11, 2002) (Donahey, Davis & Sellers, Arbs.), available at
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisionslhtml/2002/d2OO2-0030.html.
The Panel finds that the protection of an individual politician's name, no matter
how famous, is outside the scope of the Policy since it is not connected with
commercial exploitation as set out in the Second WIPO Report. This does not
mean that Complainant is without remedy. The ACPA contains express provisions
protecting the rights in personal names. Complainant is free to pursue her claims in
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may be that if the cost-effective avenue of choice for complainants focuses on
more appropriate issues than trademark law, litigants would think to bring
judicial proceedings under more appropriate provisions of domestic law in the
event that the dispute does end up in court.'
This Article has demonstrated the importance of developing a mechanism
specifically and appropriately tailored to personal domain name disputes. This
would be a simple and easy task for ICANN in practice. If a PDRP could be
adopted along the lines described here, it might well result in a more effective
resolution of domain name disputes involving personal names. It might also
assist more generally with appropriately nuanced developments in cyberlaw,
particularly pertaining to the protection of personality rights online. Given that
Internet regulators are constantly striving to balance property and property-like
rights online against free speech interests, the creation of more sophisticated
laws and regulations that more clearly define the scope of relevant interests is
of paramount importance. Trademark law in particular is currently under a lot
of pressure in cyberspace.352 If we are truly concerned about identifying the
boundaries of trademark law on the Internet, we must be prepared to address
situations that do not really involve trademarks by more targeted and effective
means. The right of publicity could form the basis for a more well-tailored
approach to personal domain name disputes, provided that we can avoid some
of the existing practical and theoretical limitations of personality rights
jurisprudence. A carefully drafted PDRP might achieve this result in practice.

that forum. And, as mentioned, the committee may have rights in the marks that are
sufficiently commercial as to entitle the committee to protection under the Policy.

Id.
352. See supra note 22 and accompanying text (noting that trademark law has come under
attack in recent years and listing a number of commentators' attacking works).

